page 1 1 Tuesday, 2nd June 2009 2 (10.30 am) 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Shortly after the Inquiry was announced work 4 began on the recovery of documents and the 5 identification of potential witnesses and the recording 6 of various statements. As the events leading up to this 7 Inquiry go back to January 1997, as you will appreciate, 8 much material has accumulated in the interim and so it 9 has taken a considerable amount of time to gather and to 10 analyse it. 11 The stage is now reached where the public hearings 12 can begin and this gives me an opportunity just to 13 outline what the sitting plans are so that if members of 14 the public who are interested want to know when events 15 will be continuing here at Maryhill, they will be able 16 to know when that will be. But I would urge them to 17 keep in touch with the website if possible because if 18 there are any variations they will be able to see that 19 then. 20 Now, first of all, the hearings of the evidence are 21 going to be here at the Maryhill Central Community 22 Centre, Central Hall, and the present plan -- and I'm 23 going to keep this under review and I'm open to 24 suggestions from Core Participants and others where 25 perhaps the ideas I have about when we should sit prove page 2 1 in some way inconvenient, I'm quite open to looking at 2 it again. But the present plan is to sit from Tuesday 3 to Friday, not on Mondays, and that we do that until 4 Friday 10th July. Of course the first exception to that 5 will be this week when I do not intend to go beyond 6 Thursday which I hope will give sufficient time for all 7 the business that we need to conduct this week. 8 Normally we will sit at 10.15 and continue to 1.00 9 and then from 1.50 in the afternoon to 4.00 pm. I 10 intend to have two short breaks during the day, one in 11 the morning as near as possible to 11.30 for 15 minutes 12 and then in the afternoon from 2.50 to 3.00 pm. The 13 other change that I think we might make is that on 14 Fridays we may stop at 3.00 rather than continue to 4.00 15 so people who have to travel can get to their various 16 destinations. 17 Then if we have a sufficient number of witnesses 18 available I would like to resume again on 18th August 19 and sit until 28th August and then there will be a break 20 to 22nd September. Then, subject to one further break 21 to allow for the preparation of material about 22 recommendations, my idea is that we should continue 23 until all the oral evidence is completed. 24 I know everyone will want to know as soon as 25 possible whether the August sittings are going to take page 3 1 place and we will make arrangements for that as soon as 2 possible as soon as we know whether the witnesses are 3 available. 4 Now, today the hearings will commence with a 5 presentation by Mr Moynihan QC who is on my left, senior 6 Counsel to the Inquiry, and he will make a presentation 7 but I want to make it clear that this is his 8 presentation, counsel's presentation, and it does not 9 represent any views that I have formed on any issue of 10 controversy because I can only form my views when I have 11 heard the evidence and when I have considered everyone's 12 submissions about it. 13 Then at the end of Mr Moynihan's presentation, which 14 the estimate will be some time tomorrow possibly, then 15 the legal representatives of Core Participants will have 16 an opportunity, if they wish to take it, to make an 17 opening statement and that is entirely a matter for 18 them. But it would help with the planning if they could 19 give Counsel to the Inquiry some indication of their 20 intentions about that. 21 The last thing I want to say is that it is a public 22 Inquiry and members of the public who wish to attend are 23 of course not only free to do so but encouraged to do so 24 and if anyone wants to follow the evidence but cannot be 25 here of course they will be able to do it by, each day, page 4 1 at the end of the day they will find a transcript of the 2 day's proceedings on the Inquiry website. That is not 3 difficult to find because it's Fingerprint Inquiry 4 Scotland. 5 That's all I want to say at this stage and I now 6 propose to invite Mr Moynihan to begin his presentation 7 in a few minutes. I am going to rise for a couple of 8 minutes so that those who want to leave can do so 9 particularly I am sure the media want to leave and we 10 will resume as soon as that's happened. 11 (10.35 am) 12 (A short break) 13 (10.41 am) 14 Opening statement by MR MOYNIHAN 15 MR MOYNIHAN: I begin with an introduction and the essential 16 facts. Marion Ross was found murdered in her own home 17 in Kilmarnock on 8th January 1997. 18 Scenes of Crime examinations carried out in the 19 course of the investigation yielded 428 fingerprints. 20 Of those, this Inquiry is primarily interested in 21 four: Y7, a fingerprint identified as the left thumb of 22 Ms McKie found on a doorframe surrounding the door to 23 the bathroom where Miss Ross' body lay; QI2 a cluster of 24 prints on a biscuit tin containing money found in 25 Mr Asbury's house, including a print identified as the page 5 1 right forefinger of Miss Ross and another print 2 identified as the right middle finger of Mr Asbury's; 3 QD2, identified as the right little finger of Mr Asbury 4 and found on a bank note in that biscuit tin; and XF 5 identified as the right forefinger of Mr Asbury and 6 found on a Christmas gift tag in the living room of 7 Miss Ross' house. 8 A fifth print, Z7, a partial palm print found at the 9 same time as Y7 and in close proximity to it may be of 10 potential relevance to Y7. 11 Y7 was discovered by the Scenes of Crime officers on 12 14th January 1997 and on 10th and 11th February 1997 it 13 was identified by fingerprint officers at the Scottish 14 Criminal Record Office as the left thumb print of 15 Ms McKie. Ms McKie then known as DC Cardwell had 16 briefly been part of the police team investigating the 17 murder. From the outset she denied having gone beyond 18 the porch at the entrance to the deceased's house and 19 therefore disputed that she had placed her fingerprint 20 on the bathroom doorframe. 21 In 1997 Mr David Asbury was prosecuted for the 22 murder of Ms Ross and convicted, with the fingerprint 23 evidence being a central part of the prosecution case. 24 During that trial, no-one challenged the identification 25 of the fingerprints. However, during the trial Ms McKie page 6 1 gave evidence denying that she had been anywhere near 2 the bathroom. 3 After the murder trial the prosecution authorities 4 decided to prosecute Ms McKie for perjury. In short the 5 prosecution case was that because Y7 had been identified 6 as the fingerprint of Ms McKie she must have lied when 7 she said that she had not been beyond the porch. At her 8 trial American fingerprint experts, Mr Wertheim and 9 Mr Grieve, disputed the identification of Y7 and gave 10 evidence that it could not be her print because of 11 certain points of difference between her print and the 12 mark. She was acquitted. 13 Subsequently, inquiries were carried out by the 14 police and other public authorities employing a number 15 of experts from the United Kingdom, Holland, Norway and 16 Denmark. These investigations cast doubt on the 17 identification of not only Y7 but also QI2 and QD2 and 18 two other prints which I, as senior counsel to this 19 Inquiry, have not yet been persuaded that it is 20 necessary to consider. 21 The identification of XF has not to date been 22 challenged. 23 After the full extent of the disputes regarding the 24 fingerprint evidence became known, Mr Asbury was 25 acquitted of the murder by the Appeal Court and a claim page 7 1 by Ms McKie for damages was compromised. 2 Those are the essential facts, as will be well known 3 to those who have followed the various past 4 investigations into this matter, including some that 5 have been published (for example, by Her Majesty's Chief 6 Inspector of Constabulary and the Scottish Parliament) 7 and some that to date have been private: a Strathclyde 8 police disciplinary Inquiry in relation to Ms McKie led 9 by Chief Inspector Wilson and two reports into 10 allegations of criminal conduct by the fingerprint 11 officers principally involved in the identification of 12 Y7 by Detective Chief Constable Mackay and then 13 Mr Bill Gilchrist. 14 However, the greatest weakness of those past 15 investigations is that they have not resulted in any 16 judicial determination and, hence, debates persist. 17 Most fundamentally, the Scottish Criminal Record Office 18 fingerprint officers continue to maintain that they 19 correctly identified Y7 as the mark of Ms McKie and in 20 that they are supported by a number of independent, 21 external experts including Mr Swan and Mr Leadbetter, 22 while a number of equally eminent fingerprint officers 23 at home and abroad say that they are wrong. 24 This is the opportunity, through an independent 25 judicial Inquiry, to investigate fully and publicly the page 8 1 controversy surrounding these fingerprints and to reach 2 conclusions in relation to the fingerprint examinations 3 that were carried out in order to learn lessons for the 4 future and to ensure that the public can have confidence 5 in the reliance placed on fingerprint evidence in 6 criminal trials in Scotland. 7 The Inquiry is being held under the Inquiries Act 8 2005 and has begun with an impartial investigation as 9 directed by the Chairman but conducted by the Inquiry 10 team. 11 The Inquiry team made request for access to 12 witnesses and to records that it considered may be 13 relevant to a proper investigation. The team has 14 received substantial co-operation from those to whom 15 requests were submitted. The team has accordingly 16 secured access to past reports (both public and private) 17 and to contemporaneous documents held by, among others, 18 the Scottish Government, the Crown Office, the Scottish 19 Criminal Records Office and Scottish Police Services 20 Authority, Strathclyde Police and Mr McKie. This has 21 included extensive material that would not otherwise be 22 made public. In particular, the team has had the 23 opportunity to study and, where of assistance, to use 24 the material gathered by Detective Chief Constable 25 Mackay as part of his police investigation and his page 9 1 eventual report and ministerial correspondence related 2 to it. 3 The Inquiry team has also been interviewing the 4 principal participants in the events and has been taking 5 detailed statements from them. Conscious that the 6 events took place more than 12 years ago, and that 7 memories are bound to be faded to some extent, the 8 Inquiry team has been particularly careful to tie in 9 witnesses' present recollections with the 10 contemporaneous documents and the witness statements 11 contain meticulous cross-references to those documents 12 so that any reader of the statement will be able to 13 check the consistency of the witnesses' evidence. 14 The process of interviewing witnesses continues but 15 the investigation has been marshaled to enable this 16 Inquiry to open and to deal with matters that have been 17 fully investigated and the Inquiry hearings will 18 progress as the investigation proceeds. 19 Dealing with this hearing, the legislation lays down 20 two guiding principles in relation to the conduct of the 21 Inquiry. The first is that the Chairman must act with 22 fairness and also that he must have regard to the need 23 to avoid any unnecessary cost, whether to public funds 24 or to witnesses or to others. 25 In order to avoid unnecessary cost, it is not page 10 1 intended to call as witnesses to the public hearing 2 every individual who has provided a statement. The 3 selection has been informed in part by the possibility 4 that the particular individual's evidence on a point of 5 significance to the Inquiry may in some respect be open 6 to question (for example, because it is contradicted by 7 another witness or inconsistent with a significant 8 document) and by consideration of the interest of the 9 public in seeing an open examination of the essential 10 issues. 11 Statements provided by witnesses who are not 12 required to give evidence at the public hearings will 13 still be published on the Inquiry website and may still 14 be relied upon by the Chairman in reaching his 15 conclusion. In the interests of accuracy, each witness 16 has been given advance notice of the points to be 17 covered in the interview and has been afforded an 18 opportunity to revise the draft statement that has been 19 prepared by the Inquiry team. When the statement has 20 been finalised to the satisfaction of the witness, each 21 witness has been required to sign the revised statement 22 testifying to the truth of its contents. 23 Witnesses called to give evidence at the public 24 hearing will do so under oath. These witnesses too will 25 have provided signed statements in advance in exactly page 11 1 the same way as already described and those statements 2 will be put on the website. The contents of those 3 statements will be taken as read when the witness is 4 called to the public hearing. It is not the intention 5 of Counsel to the Inquiry to rehearse the whole of the 6 witnesses' evidence. Instead, the examination in public 7 will be restricted to certain specific points but the 8 whole contents of the statement will be available to the 9 Chairman, whether or not the witness is asked about any 10 particular point at the hearing. 11 An analysis of the material gathered by the Inquiry 12 team (that is witness statements and documentary) has 13 been prepared by Counsel to the Inquiry and shared with 14 such of the Core Participants who were willing to give a 15 confidentiality undertaking. The objective has been to 16 ensure, so far as possible, that the Inquiry team is 17 fully investigating the points relevant to the Terms of 18 Reference and is making an appropriate selection of 19 witnesses to call to give evidence at the public 20 hearing. 21 This process of consultation will be ongoing as the 22 investigation progresses but ultimately decisions on the 23 issues to be pursued and witnesses to be heard are 24 matters for the Chairman. 25 The Inquiry team intends to lead evidence relating page 12 1 to the disputed fingerprint identifications of Y7 and 2 QI2 and, if there is any basis for dispute, QD2 and XF. 3 Investigations have yet to take place in that regard. 4 Among the complications is that in relation to mark 5 Y7 there are multiple images of the mark and also 6 multiple sets of fingerprints of Ms McKie. 7 Y7 has been photographed on at least seven 8 occasions: three times by Scenes of Crime officers as 9 part of the murder investigation on 14th January, 12th 10 and 18th February 1997; by a Home Office expert Mr Terry 11 Kent in March 1997; by Mr Wertheim in 1999; by the 12 National Training Centre at Durham, and by Dr Bleay of 13 the Home Office in 2009 for the purposes of this 14 Inquiry. 15 Ms McKie's prints have been taken on at least five 16 occasions, at least three times by the police on 6th 17 February 1997, 18th February and 6th March 1998; by 18 Mr Wertheim in March 1999; and, by a fingerprint 19 prectitioner, Mr Cook, in October 1999 presumably for 20 the purposes of a BBC documentary. 21 A substantial number of fingerprint experts have 22 entered the debate in relation to the identification of 23 Y7 but they have used a variety of combinations of these 24 source materials, with some of them using copies and not 25 principals. The end result is that the views expressed page 13 1 by them are not directly comparable because of the 2 potential distortion due to the variation in source 3 material. The Inquiry team has been exploring the 4 possibility of securing contributions from the experts 5 by reference to a common set of source materials. 6 Progress is being made but until that exercise has 7 been carried out, Counsel to the Inquiry cannot make any 8 pronouncement on the evidence bearing on this key issue. 9 This opening statement is accordingly confined to 10 material so far obtained in relation to the factual 11 background. 12 Also missing from this presentation but to be 13 covered by the Inquiry is a review of the progress made 14 by the Scottish Criminal Record Office and now the 15 Scottish Police Services Authority in implementing the 16 recommendations of past reports into the handling of 17 these fingerprints. 18 It would be possible to begin this Inquiry with a 19 short statement as to the issues raised by the materials 20 that the Inquiry has received and to proceed forthwith 21 to hear evidence. However, in common with the precedent 22 set in at least one other prominent public Inquiry I 23 propose to take a radically different course and to 24 review and in part analyse the evidence that the Inquiry 25 has so far received. page 14 1 I adopt this course primarily because I am aware 2 that the Inquiry has secured a substantial volume of 3 material and it is not the intention to rehearse all the 4 evidence at the public hearings, let alone to read out 5 the contents of all the relevant documents. The 6 evidence that will be heard at the public hearing will 7 focus on discrete parts of the controversy and without 8 an overall analysis it would be difficult for those not 9 directly involved in the hearings to follow the evidence 10 and to understand where it falls into the overall 11 picture. Accordingly, this statement seeks to paint the 12 general picture and places the contribution of 13 individual witnesses or documents in context. 14 This opening statement is modelled on the analysis 15 document sharing with Core Participants as I have 16 described. The full text, which will be place on the 17 website in due course, is complemented by footnotes 18 specifying the precise source for any particular 19 proposition and textual references to the electronic 20 codes for the documents in the Inquiry hearing database 21 to which the public will have access via the web. 22 It's not the intention to labour this presentation 23 by reading the footnotes but the references will be in 24 the text placed on the Inquiry website for anyone 25 wishing to pursue any point in detail. page 15 1 Where the text is summarising the evidence of a 2 particular witness, the name of the witness is 3 highlighted by underlining and there will be a table on 4 pages 9 to 10 of the text placed on the website to give 5 the Inquiry hearing database references for the witness 6 statements. 7 It has to be stressed that this opening statement 8 reflects the analysis carried out by me and not by the 9 Chairman. What is more, even as far as I am concerned, 10 it is no more than an analysis of the evidence and it 11 does not seek to reach conclusions in relation to the 12 various points of controversy. That is a matter for the 13 Chairman after hearing all the evidence and considering 14 all submissions received. 15 While care has been taken in preparing this summary 16 to give a fair account of what the witnesses are 17 understood to be saying, inevitably there is always the 18 risk that any summary can misrepresent the witness. 19 Notwithstanding the detailed nature of the opening 20 statement it is no substitute for witness statements and 21 documents and those who are participating in the hearing 22 and are concerned to follow the proceedings are invited 23 to follow the cross-references and to study the source 24 material for themselves. 25 So far as this opening statement is concerned, there page 16 1 will be an opening chapter dealing with the law and 2 practice in relation to fingerprint evidence in general 3 and then a chronological narration of the sequence of 4 events highlighting en route the specific issues that 5 require to be resolved by the Chairman and the evidence 6 available on the point. 7 I now turn to chapter one dealing with fingerprint 8 law and practice and I begin. The skin on the tips of 9 the fingers, palms of the hands and soles of the feet 10 contain patterned ridges to increase grip. The pattern 11 is on the outer layer of the skin (the epidermis) and is 12 shaped by the contours of the underlying inner layer 13 (the dermis) and the distribution of pores all formed in 14 the womb. Because the pattern in the epidermis reflects 15 the structure of the dermis it is constant throughout 16 life barring damage to the dermis itself. 17 These patterns are unique, not only comparing one 18 individual with another but also comparing one finger 19 with another. The attributes of uniqueness and 20 constancy result in fingerprints and other friction skin 21 patterns being a means of identification of individuals, 22 particularly (but not exclusively) in criminal justice 23 systems worldwide. 24 On contact with a surface an impression can be left 25 of the pattern of the skin. The quality of that page 17 1 impression will vary depending on the nature of the 2 surface and the nature of the contact. 3 Scenes of Crime and objects relevant to the crime 4 will be examined by specialists to reveal any 5 impressions that may be present and this can be done by 6 using various types of dust and chemicals suited to the 7 kind of surface. Any impression found is then preserved 8 either by being lifted using tape or by being 9 photographed. The lift or photograph is then passed to 10 a fingerprint practitioner, a person who by training and 11 experience is skilled in the identification of marks. 12 The fingerprint practitioner will also be provided 13 with fingerprint forms containing the impressions of 14 known individuals who may be of interest to the police. 15 In modern practice computer databases of fingerprints 16 can be used to search for any individual whose prints 17 may be a close match to the crime scene mark but 18 computers do not make identifications. Identification 19 is ultimately a matter for the fingerprint practitioners 20 who compare the crime scene mark with the fingerprint 21 forms of known individuals. 22 Identification is a process that consists of a 23 visual comparison examination by fingerprint 24 practitioners of the crime scene mark and known 25 fingerprint forms to determine whether there are page 18 1 sufficient characteristics in common between the mark 2 and a fingerprint from a known individual, and no 3 unexplained points of difference, to warrant the 4 conclusion that the two match to such an extent that the 5 mark can be individualised and attributed exclusively to 6 the known individual. 7 That process is more or less difficult depending on 8 the quality of the crime scene mark and the prints of 9 the individual. Not every comparison results in an 10 identification. The all important question is, of 11 course, how to judge the sufficiency of the 12 characteristics common to the mark and the print. How 13 is it determined that a particular combination of common 14 characteristics is sufficiently peculiar to be unique to 15 one individual? 16 I turn then to the history of the 16-point standard. 17 At the time of the Asbury and McKie prosecutions the 18 Scottish criminal justice system was working to the 19 16-point standard. A crime scene mark could be 20 identified as that of a known individual only if there 21 was a minimum of 16 characteristics in common and no 22 unexplained differences. 23 An account of the genesis of that standard was given 24 in an article by Evett and Williams, "A Review of the 25 Sixteen Points Fingerprint Standard in England and page 19 1 Wales". Though written from the vantage point of 2 England and Wales, it would appear from the overlap with 3 the corresponding narrative in Her Majesty's 4 Inspectorate of Constabulary Scotland report that the 5 historical outline is the same in Scotland. 6 The first fingerprint bureau in the UK was 7 established at New Scotland Yard in 1901. Initially, a 8 12-point standard was used in Great Britain until 1924 9 when the 16-point standard came to be recommended by New 10 Scotland Yard following review of an illustration in a 11 publication by Bertillon which had been sent to New 12 Scotland Yard by New Zealand police. The illustration 13 showed prints from two different individuals masked in 14 such a way as to obscure differences but with 16 points 15 of similarity marked on the revealed areas of the 16 prints, New Scotland Yard doubted six of the points of 17 similarity but accepted that 10 were present. Given 18 that the illustration therefore showed two different 19 individuals could share 10 common points, it was decided 20 that the 12-point standard was not high enough and it 21 was raised to 16. 22 There is evidence that, despite the adoption of this 23 standard, practice varied and some fingerprint experts 24 were prepared to give identifications on less than 25 16 points. In 1953, an expert gave evidence at trial page 20 1 identifying two prints, one having 12 points of 2 similarity and the other 15. The defendant was 3 convicted but the Home Secretary was concerned that if 4 evidence was given of identification on less than 5 16 points the defence might successfully challenge the 6 evidence, thereby tending to discredit fingerprint 7 evidence as a whole. A meeting was held at which it was 8 decided that a common standard would be observed, 9 "... in order that there should be little risk of such 10 evidence being challenged." 11 Evett and Williams cite two exceptions to the 12 standard subsequently recognised by the National 13 Conference of Fingerprint Experts. The first exception 14 dates from 1978. The practice evolved of fingerprint 15 officers giving "non-provable" identifications based on 16 the finding of 8 to 15 points, the object being to give 17 the police a lead in the investigation while recognising 18 that, save in cases falling within the second exception, 19 the officer could not take that evidence to court. As 20 to the origins of 8 points as the lower end of this 21 range Evett and Williams quote the 1978 National 22 Conference of Fingerprint Experts who said: 23 "There was general agreement amongst fingerprint 24 officers that if there were 8 points of resemblance 25 present, that was sufficient to establish identity page 21 1 beyond all reasonable doubt." 2 The second exception dates from 1984 when it was 3 agreed that evidence might be given of an identification 4 on less than 16 points in a case of particular 5 importance, though the evidence would have to come from 6 an expert of long experience and high standing and it 7 might be necessary for the expert to say that though he 8 was personally satisfied as to the identification, it 9 did not meet the national standard. 10 Evett and Williams had been commissioned by the Home 11 Office in 1988 and reported in 1989. As part of their 12 study, they located a copy of the original Bertillon 13 publication. By scrutinising better quality copies of 14 the prints than had been available to New Scotland Yard, 15 they found that the prints had been touched up. 16 Professor Margot of Lausanne University confirmed that 17 of the ten points originally accepted by New Scotland 18 Yard, 5 had in fact been altered by the addition of ink 19 lines. This finding coincided with an article published 20 in 1914 by Locard who said "... certain of the points 21 are patently fabricated." 22 Consequently Evett and Williams concluded this: 23 "The original decision to adopt a standard of 24 16 points at New Scotland Yard was clearly based on 25 incomplete and misleading information." page 22 1 If I stop and move through the text that others may 2 have and come back in a minute. 3 This may be a suitable point to say something about 4 terminology. Not every impression or mark is 5 identifiable. Where there is too little detail of 6 comparison the mark will be set aside as fragmentary and 7 inconclusive. 8 The 16 point standard was relevant only to marks 9 that were otherwise of sufficient quality to admit of 10 comparison. 11 Where the mark and the fingerprint of a known 12 individual matched with at least 16 characteristics in 13 common and no unexplained differences, the legal test to 14 the 16 point standard were satisfied and practitioners 15 would refer to such a mark as an identification. 16 As noted, at latest from 1978, fingerprint 17 practitioners might be certain of the match with 8 to 15 18 characteristics in common and no unexplained differences 19 but evidence of such a match was not generally 20 admissible in court. Fingerprints matched to that lower 21 standard were referred to as eliminations, particularly 22 when speaking of prints of individuals who are not 23 suspects in the crime: an example being prints of 24 Miss Ross found in her own home. 25 It is crucial to observe, under reference to Evett & page 23 1 Williams at page 26, that the distinction between an 2 identification and an elimination is a consequence of 3 legal practice and not necessarily a substantive 4 difference for a fingerprint practitioner. A 5 fingerprint practitioner may be equally certain in 6 relation to an elimination as he or she would be in 7 relation to an identification. The difference between 8 the two is that, save in exceptional circumstances, 9 legal practice in 1997 to 1999 had reservations about 10 the match to the lower standard. 11 However, it has to be said that there were 12 variations in terminology and, more particularly, 13 practice. 14 (This is me back on to the text 1.2.3.) The HMICS 15 report records a lack of consistency worldwide on the 16 description of characteristics that could affect the 17 application of this standard. Thus, some practitioners 18 might characterise the same feature as either a short 19 ridge (counting as 2 points) or an island (one point). 20 If. 21 I turn to Scottish case law. Hamilton v HMA 22 reported in 1934 is authority for the proposition that 23 in Scotland an accused may be convicted on fingerprint 24 evidence alone. That remains good law and was 25 relevantly recently applied in a murder, Lanagan, case page 24 1 in 1989. However, the fingerprint must be found in 2 incriminating circumstances. For example, just because 3 an accused's print is on a false number plate used in a 4 getaway car does not justify a conviction in the absence 5 of any other incriminating evidence because a print 6 could have been put on the plate at any time and not 7 just during preparation for the crime, Reilly 1986. 8 Hamilton was a case of theft committed by breaking 9 into a shop. The accused's print was found on a bottle 10 in the shop, the bottle having been wrapped before the 11 crime and being found unwrapped and with a fingerprint 12 on it after the crime. Evidence was led from 13 Fingerprint experts from Scotland Yard. Lord Justice 14 General Clyde summarised the evidence and comments on 15 the approach to its sufficiency: 16 "Evidence was given by two Scotland Yard experts who 17 deponed that, in the first 16 of the recognised points 18 of comparison, there was complete identity between the 19 fingerprint mark on the bottle and the print of one of 20 the appellant's fingers. The experts further deponed 21 that identity to the extent of the first 16 points was, 22 in their opinion, more than sufficient to warrant the 23 inference of identity between the finger which made the 24 mark on the bottle and the finger from which the print 25 was taken. Lastly, they deponed that this method of page 25 1 identification has been widely followed not only in this 2 country but elsewhere for many years; and that -- so 3 far, at any rate -- no case of identity in the ridges of 4 the skin of the fingers of two different persons has 5 been discovered. They went as far as to claim for the 6 fingerprint method of identification the quality of 7 infallibility. This may well be thought (in words at 8 least) to put the case too high, but the substance of 9 their evidence was that, over an area of experience of 10 great extent, and over a tract of time of highly 11 significant duration, the fingerprint method of 12 identification has never once proved to be unreliable. 13 There was no counterevidence. 14 "In these circumstances the Sheriff-substitute 15 [that's the judge] left it to the jury to decide whether 16 they believed the fingerprint evidence, and -- if they 17 did -- whether they were convinced by it of the 18 appellant's guilt. That is challenged; and the 19 questions according are whether -- there being nothing 20 before the jury except the fact of the appellant's 21 residence near the scene of the crime and the 22 fingerprint evidence -- the Sheriff-substitute [the 23 judge] was right in leaving the question of guilt to the 24 jury as he did, and whether the jury acted unreasonably 25 in convicting the appellant. page 26 1 "Fingerprint evidence is undoubtedly competent; that 2 is settled. If it is believed, it constitutes real 3 evidence of the presence of the accused at the scene of 4 the crime, in something the same way as a fragment of 5 clothing (left behind by the criminal) or his boot-mark 6 might be. There was nothing in the present case to 7 support, or indeed to suggest, any possibility of the 8 finger-mark having been made on the surface of the 9 bottle by the appellant, or by anyone else, at any time 10 other than that at which the crime was committed. The 11 materials for a chain of circumstances evidence are thus 12 provided. But then no chain is stronger than its 13 weakest link. The value of fingerprint evidence depends 14 on the reliance which can be placed on the result of 15 expert investigation and experience -- in an immense 16 number of cases, examined over an extended period of 17 years -- to the effect that identity is never found to 18 be exist between the skin ridges on two different 19 persons' fingers. This is what leads the experts to 20 claim infallibility in the finger mark method. I 21 deprecate the use of the word 'infallibility' in this 22 connection at all. What the experts obviously mean is, 23 not absolute, but practical infallibility -- that is to 24 say, a presumption of truth, the reliability of which 25 may be accepted, not because it is irrebuttable in its page 27 1 own nature, but because long and extensive experience is 2 shown to provide no instance in which it has ever been 3 successfully rebutted. All proof depends at bottom on 4 presumption; even the evidence of two credible and 5 uncontradicted witnesses who speak to the same 6 occurrence is probatio probata not because it is 7 impossible that they should both be mistaken, but 8 because of the high presumption that what two credible 9 witnesses say happened in their presence did actually 10 happen. Accordingly, the strength of the link provided 11 by the fingerprint depends on the degree of reliability 12 which -- on the evidence presented to them -- the 13 jury thought should be attributed to the fingerprint 14 method as applied by the police and the experts in the 15 present case. They evidently thought the presumptions 16 in favour of its reliability so high as to warrant the 17 circumstantial inference that the appellant was the 18 criminal, or one of the criminals, who broke into the 19 shop." 20 It is open to question whether there is any 21 substantive difference between absolute and practical 22 infallibility. The more telling point is that the 23 Lord Justice General cautioned the need to assess the 24 reliability of the evidence. That is clearer from the 25 concurring opinion of Lord Sands, who said: page 28 1 "It is well settled in our criminal law and practice 2 that, if an accused person has left anything by which 3 his presence on the scene at the time of the offence can 4 be proved and he can give no reasonable account of his 5 presence there, the jury may convict him of such an 6 offence as housebreaking or theft. Now, what was left, 7 or used to be left, occasionally in the past was 8 generally garments or such instruments as tools. But I 9 do not see any reason why it should be held on the one 10 hand that to leave a chattel behind which clearly shows 11 the owner's presence warrants a conviction if the jury 12 so judge, while on the other hand, if a man leaves 13 something behind which just as clearly shows his 14 presence in the shape of a finger-mark, it should be 15 unreasonable for the jury to convict. No doubt, in the 16 case of garments or tools, it must be clearly proved 17 that the garment or the tool, the presence of which is 18 founded upon, was really the property or in the 19 possession of the accused. Similarly, as regards 20 finger-marks, if they are to be relied upon and treated 21 as conclusive, it must be clearly proved that they are 22 the finger-marks of the accused person. That is done by 23 calling in persons expert in regard to finger-marks. 24 Now, two witnesses who are expert in the study of 25 finger-marks came and they said, 'We have examined the page 29 1 bottle and we have examined the print of the accused's 2 fingers, and the mark on the bottle is the mark of the 3 accused's finger.' The day may come when that will be 4 enough, but that day has not yet quite come. This is a 5 somewhat novel mode of criminal investigation. It will 6 not do for the Crown simply to lead evidence of two 7 experts who say these were the man's finger-marks. As I 8 say, the day may come when that may be enough, and then 9 it will be for the accused to endeavour to challenge or 10 shake that evidence. But as matters stand, the Crown 11 must proceed to justify the opinion of the experts by 12 eliciting from them upon what their opinion is based. 13 That was done in the present case in the manner which 14 your Lordship in the chair has indicated, and the jury 15 were satisfied with the explanation. Now, it might very 16 well be that such evidence might not satisfy every man, 17 that one might find persons who would say, 'It may be 18 that that evidence is true as regards past experience, 19 but we will not take it that there cannot be two people 20 with identical finger-marks, or that this is such an 21 improbability as to amounts practically to an 22 impossibility.' A or B might say that; but it is a 23 question for the jury. It is for them to judge of the 24 evidence, and, if on the evidence they are satisfied 25 with the explanations of the experts and the reasons page 30 1 they give, I do not think we can interfere. In the 2 present case the jury were satisfied. I do not for a 3 moment say that a jury are bound to accept fingerprint 4 evidence and expert evidence connected with it, in every 5 case as conclusive. It is a question for the jury in 6 the particular case, and, in order to disturb their 7 verdict, it would be necessary to conclude that it was 8 not a view which a jury might reasonably have taken. I 9 am unable to reach that conclusion here." 10 The next case of relevance is Rolley v HMA in 1945 11 in which Lord Justice Clerk Cooper directed a jury that 12 it could convict on palm-print evidence: 13 "Members of the jury, you are the masters of the 14 facts; but there is one fact upon which I think you will 15 have very little difficulty in making up your minds, 16 namely, that what I shall call for short a burglary was 17 committed during the week 11th to 18th September at 9 18 Campbell Road, Edinburgh, and that the unknown burglar 19 appropriated by theft the numerous articles to which 20 Mrs Lindsey and her little boy spoke. The real issue in 21 this case -- and probably you will think the single 22 issue in fact -- is, who was the person who committed 23 that act of housebreaking? Now, as Mr Cunningham quite 24 properly reminded you, it is, of course, for the Crown 25 to satisfy you that the accused was the person who was page 31 1 there and who committed that crime. It is not for the 2 accused to satisfy you of his innocence. This means 3 that, if in the end of the day you should remain in real 4 and genuine doubt -- and it must be real and genuine 5 doubt -- as to where the truth of this matter lies, then 6 you would be bound to give the accused the benefit of 7 that doubt. On the other hand, if you were satisfied on 8 what you have heard that the Crown has succeeded in 9 fastening guilt on the accused -- if you think that it 10 is the just and reasonable inference from the evidence 11 led before you this morning -- equally it is your plain 12 duty to convict. 13 "Now, Mr Cunningham for the defence has accepted the 14 position and I so direct you, that the evidence on which 15 the Crown rely to link the accused with this offence, 16 namely, the palm print, is competent, admissible and 17 sufficient evidence of identification provided you 18 accept it. The value of the evidence is a matter for 19 you. I would like to explain that very briefly on the 20 lines referred to by the Solicitor-General, by pointing 21 out that in all cases of this kind, unless you have an 22 actual eye-witness, or the housebreaker is caught in the 23 act or in recent possession of the stolen goods, the 24 most common method upon which the prosecution rely for 25 bringing home guilt to the accused is to found upon page 32 1 something that the delinquent has left behind, and then 2 by suitable evidence to show that that something is 3 unquestionably associated and identified with the 4 accused. It may be a footprint, it maybe a garment, or 5 a distinctive tool, or something of that kind. In this 6 case it is a palm-print; and it seems to me to make no 7 difference what it is, provided that the evidence in its 8 quality and substance is of a character to carry 9 conviction to the jury, whose duty it is to determine 10 upon its value. Something was said in the course of 11 evidence and in the speeches of learned counsel on the 12 word 'infallibility' and on that topic I want to read to 13 you a sentence or two from a case which dealt not with 14 palm prints but with fingerprints, and in it the late 15 Lord Clyde as Lord Justice General said this: 'The value 16 of fingerprint evidence depends on the reliance which 17 can be placed on result of expert investigation and 18 experience -- in an immense number of cases, examined 19 over a very extended period of years -- to the effect 20 that identity is never found to exist between the skin 21 ridges of two different persons' fingers. This is what 22 leads the experts to claim infallibility for the 23 fingerprint method. I deprecate the use of the word 24 "infallibility" in this connection at all. What the 25 experts obviously means is, not absolute, but practical page 33 1 infallibility -- that is to say, a presumption of truth, 2 the reliability of which should be accepted, not because 3 it is irrebuttable in is own nature, but because long 4 and extensive experience is shown to provide no instance 5 in which it has ever been successfully rebutted. All 6 proof depends at bottom on presumption; even the 7 evidence of two credible and uncontradicted witnesses 8 who speak to the same occurrence is probatio probata not 9 because it is impossible that they should both be 10 mistaken, but because of the high presumption that what 11 two credible witnesses say happened in their presence 12 did actually happen.' Now, that is very like what the 13 Solicitor-General said, and, to apply it to this case, 14 you might figure the situation which would arise if 15 Mrs Lindsey and her little boy had come and said they 16 saw the thief and recognised him. That would not be 17 infallible in any sense. They might be wrong. You are 18 presented not with that type of evidence but with a 19 different type of evidence, and it is for you to 20 consider, and for me in a very few words to assist you 21 in considering, the evidence which has been led on the 22 topic of the palm print and its sufficiency for 23 justifying the conclusion spoken to by the expert 24 witnesses that the palm print impression left on the 25 sideboard of the morning room of 9 Campbell Road was page 34 1 made by the left hand of the accused, and by no-one 2 else. You have had the evidence of four witnesses, and 3 I feel bound to point out to you that they are men of 4 wide and prolonged experience in the matter, and that 5 the witnesses adduced from Scotland Yard are probably as 6 rich in experience in this subject as anybody alive. On 7 the basis of that long experience and study of the 8 subject, including contributions to its study in the 9 shape of the book to which Superintendent Cherrill 10 referred, all four of them, as you will remember, said 11 that as a result of a comparison of the original 12 prints -- I mean by that the small prints -- and of the 13 enlargements which were subsequently made, they had -- 14 and I think they all used the same words or almost the 15 same words -- no doubt whatsoever. In order to make the 16 ground of their conviction more clear to you, they have 17 prepared two sets of photographs, and, in accordance 18 with Mr Cunningham's suggestion, I am willing that you 19 should take them with you when you retire in a few 20 moments -- No 5 the small pair of photographs made in 21 Edinburgh, and No 7 the big pair of enlarged photographs 22 made in London. The photographs made in Edinburgh 23 indicate sixteen points of alleged identity, and the 24 photographs made in London indicate twenty-five points 25 of alleged identity. Please remember what the witnesses page 35 1 said -- that identity on which they rely is the identity 2 of the ridge characteristics, and in particular the 3 sequence of the ridge characteristics, and that they 4 discount and allow for any differences between the 5 impressions which are due to the degree of pressure with 6 which the palm may have been pressed on the surface when 7 the impressions were taken, or any difference in the 8 character of the surfaces on which the palm may have 9 placed. So that in asking you in looking at the 10 photographs I would ask you not to look at them with an 11 uninstructed eye, but with the eye of a person who has 12 heard the explanations of those expert witnesses. 13 "The criticism that was directed by Mr Cunningham 14 against those powerfully-expressed views was, I think, 15 two-fold. He said the area was too small to enable a 16 proper conclusion to be drawn, and you heard the 17 justification which the four witnesses gave -- I think 18 all four were questioned on these lines -- for rejecting 19 that suggestion and showing they had enough to warrant 20 the conviction which they felt and expressed. He said, 21 in the second place, that, as the experts had not 22 examined the palms of everybody in the world or in Great 23 Britain, they could not be certain that the identity of 24 ridge characteristics and of sequence of ridge 25 characteristics was as complete as they asserted. I page 36 1 think the point to keep in view when considering that 2 criticism, as you must, is the very point in the passage 3 from the late Lord Clyde which I read a moment ago, that 4 in this imperfect world absolute certainty is 5 unobtainable by any method known to law or to science, 6 and that what we are looking for is practical 7 infallibility. The real question for you will be 8 whether you are satisfied, from the explanations given 9 by these four gentlemen, that their experience has been 10 gathered over a sufficiently long number of years -- I 11 think twenty-six years in one case -- and has extended 12 over a sufficiently large number of cases to justify the 13 confidence with which their conclusion was expressed. 14 On the other side you will keep in view that the 15 accused, in addition to tendering a plea of not guilty, 16 to which he has adhered -- and that is why we are here 17 today -- has gone into the witness box and has in effect 18 repeated that plea of not guilty under oath, and this 19 also is an element that you will take into account. But 20 the main point for your consideration will be whether, 21 on a consideration of the police and expert evidence, 22 you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the just 23 and proper inference is that the accused was the person 24 who broke into that house, or whether you are not so 25 satisfied." page 37 1 Walkers on Evidence was written in 1964 and 2 discusses fingerprint evidence at paragraph 12 on 3 page 12 and 13. That textbook picks up the observation 4 that fingerprint evidence is not regarded as infallible 5 "but as providing evidence of a degree of probability 6 which is ample for judicial proof". The text goes on to 7 note that in Britain experts would not be prepared to 8 commit themselves to the view that two marks were made 9 by the same person unless there were at least 16 10 identical characteristics, adding that there is no 11 reason why evidence of a lower number of characteristics 12 in common should not be admissible, though perhaps not 13 sufficient in itself to justify conviction. 14 That concluding comment was part of the submission 15 made by the Solicitor-General (Rodger) in the first 16 Scottish case concerning DNA evidence, Welsh v HMA 1992, 17 where parallels were drawn with fingerprint evidence. 18 The Solicitor-General's submission and the conclusion of 19 the court are in the following passages from the opinion 20 of Lord Justice Clerk Ross, who said this: 21 "The Solicitor-General explained that this was the 22 first occasion upon which the appeal court had had to 23 consider evidence of DNA profiling. He maintained, 24 however, that that did not create any difficulty in the 25 present case. The trial judge had corrected reminded page 38 1 the jury that they did not require to be satisfied to 2 the extent of mathematical certainty. Although in 3 practice in fingerprint cases one looked for sixteen 4 points of similarity, there was no reason why evidence 5 should not be given that a smaller number of 6 similarities would suffice. He submitted that it was 7 open to the jury to accept the evidence of the experts 8 to the effect that the blood sample from the appellant 9 was the same blood as had come from the deceased's 10 trousers and the blood spots on the stairs of the close. 11 He submitted that the jury were entitled to be satisfied 12 with the expert evidence to the effect that their method 13 achieved a chance of one in 99 million. That was not to 14 say that in another case it might not be necessary for 15 the court to direct the jury that they could not proceed 16 upon evidence which showed a different figure. He also 17 stressed that the fact that the blood on the stairs 18 was wet was a significant factor as indicating that the 19 appellant must have been there shortly before the 20 arrival of the police. He accordingly submitted that 21 there was sufficient evidence to entitle the jury to 22 conclude not only that the appellant had been present at 23 the locus, but that he had participated in the attack. 24 The Crown case depended upon concert and in his 25 supplementary report the trial judge had correctly page 39 1 summarised the evidence upon which the jury were 2 entitled to rely in reaching the conclusion that there 3 had been a concerted attack by three men upon the 4 deceased. 5 "We are quite satisfied that in this case there was 6 sufficient evidence to entitle the jury to conclude that 7 there was a concerted attack by three men, and that the 8 appellant had participated in that assault and was not 9 merely an onlooker. The fact that the blood spots on 10 the stairs were wet and the fact that the appellant had 11 a fairly severe wound in his arm which he had sustained 12 at about the same time as the deceased met his death are 13 significant pieces evidence. So also is the evidence 14 that the appellant's blood was on the deceased's 15 closing. There is no question of the court laying down 16 as a matter of law that some particular statistical 17 possibility has to be achieved before a jury can proceed 18 upon DNA profiling. DNA profiling, like fingerprint 19 evidence, depends to some extent on theory and 20 statistics, and it is for the jury to assess the 21 evidence and determine whether they accept it as 22 sufficient to warrant conviction. 23 "In the circumstances we are satisfied that there 24 was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to draw the 25 inference not only that the appellant was present at the page 40 1 assault but that he was a participant in the assault. 2 It follows that the appeal against conviction must be 3 refused." 4 Coming now to relaxations of the 16 point standard 5 in Scottish practice, Evett & Williams mentioned two 6 exceptions to the 16 point standard. 7 This is covered from a Scottish perspective in the 8 witness statements of the Scottish Criminal Record 9 Office witnesses. 10 Mr Macpherson gives some insight into the use made 11 in 1997 of fingerprint comparisons with fewer than 12 16 points in sequence and agreement. The Scottish 13 Criminal Record Office could send out a strong suspicion 14 letter to the police if they were able to identify 10 to 15 15 points on a mark. There was also the "ten and ten" 16 rule, whereby the identification of 10 points on each of 17 two digits was sufficient for identification. There was 18 also a "dire and crucial" rule, "where there was no set 19 number of points of comparison because of the serious 20 nature of the crime. Such identifications had to be 21 made by a person of experience." Mr Foley places the 22 decision whether or not such evidence was to be used 23 with the Procurator Fiscal. 24 Mr Mackenzie says that the rule of thumb in the 25 Glasgow Bureau was that if there were less than ten page 41 1 characteristics present in a mark then it would be 2 deemed insufficient for comparison. By contrast, 3 Mr Dunbar, while saying that from a quality assurance 4 perspective there was no strict numeric standard, says 5 that for an elimination, "the number of characteristics 6 in sequence and agreement was probably viewed as 7 somewhere around eight." Miss McBride quotes the same 8 number of characteristics for an elimination. 9 Evett & Williams point to a logical inconsistency in 10 legal practice. They begin from the premise that, "It 11 is important to understand that a fingerprint expert 12 regards any identification as a certainty", and this is 13 whether he has reached that conclusion on 16 points or 14 less. However, with legal practice having set a minimum 15 standard of 16 points, that opinion would not be 16 regarded as" provable" in court, save in a case of 17 particular importance. The logical inconsistency is 18 that the legal system would admit of the application of 19 a lower standard in a more important case. 20 Turning to differences of opinion, in the present 21 case Scottish Criminal Records Office witnesses, 22 addressing practice down to 1997, draw a distinction 23 between a dispute between a fingerprint officers where 24 one says that a mark has not been correctly identified 25 and a case where there is a difference of opinion as to page 42 1 the number of characteristics in sequence or agreement. 2 An example is Mr Macpherson: (a) In a case where an 3 officer thought there had been a mis-identification the 4 matter would have to be reported to the chief inspector 5 in charge of the bureau but (b) where two differed as to 6 the number of points they could discuss the matter or 7 the comparison could be taken to someone else to 8 analyse. 9 Turning to scientific evidence, going back to Welsh, 10 it is worth stressing this, Lord Justice Clerk said: 11 "DNA profiling, like fingerprint evidence, depends 12 to some extent on theory and statistics, and it for the 13 jury to assess the evidence and determine whether they 14 accept it as sufficient to warrant conviction." 15 There are two aspects to this: firstly, what theory 16 and statistics underpin fingerprint evidence; secondly, 17 what is the function of a fingerprint expert as a 18 witness in a case and how does that impact on the proper 19 presentation of fingerprint evidence for assessment by 20 the jury? 21 In 1933 Lord Sands said: 22 "Now, two witnesses who are expert in the study of 23 finger-marks came and they said, 'We have examined the 24 bottle and we have examined the print of the accused's 25 fingers, and the mark on the bottle is the mark of the page 43 1 accused's finger.' The day may come when that will be 2 enough, but that day has not yet come." 3 There is room to argue that in many contexts in 4 Scottish criminal practice that that day had come long 5 before the Asbury and McKie trials. 6 Fingerprint evidence is within the category of 7 "routine evidence" covered initially by section 26 of 8 the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980. Westlaw 9 indicates that that section was repealed with effect 10 from 1st April 1996 but was then replaced by a 11 corresponding provision in section 280 of the Criminal 12 Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. 13 The current statutory background may be taken from 14 subsection 4 of section 280 of the 1995 Act and I quote: 15 "For the purposes of any criminal proceedings, a 16 report purporting to be signed by two authorised 17 forensic scientists shall, subject to subsection (5) 18 below, be sufficient evidence of any fact or conclusion 19 as to fact contained in the report and of the authority 20 of the signatories." 21 The qualification in subsection (5) relates to the 22 requirement that "forensic scientists" must be 23 "authorised" for this purpose by Scottish Ministers. 24 Reading subsections (4) with subsection (6), the 25 section provides that, in the absence of a defence page 44 1 challenge, a report by a duly authorised fingerprint 2 scientist is "sufficient evidence of any fact or 3 conclusion as to fact contained in the report and of the 4 authority of the signatories." 5 Fingerprint practitioners come within the range of 6 "forensic scientists" for this purpose. Accordingly, in 7 the absence of defence challenge the evidence contained 8 in their reports is sufficient evidence of the facts and 9 conclusions of fact contained in it. In other words, 10 the bald statement by a fingerprint practitioner that a 11 crime scene mark and the fingerprint of a particular 12 individual are identical can be enough to prove that 13 fact, without need even for explanation or 14 demonstration. 15 The critical qualification is that that applies only 16 in the absence of challenge by the defence. In 17 assessing the practical significance of that 18 qualification, one has to ask how often fingerprint 19 identifications were challenged in court. The answer to 20 that question, and its practical implications, are to be 21 found in a book by Canadian expert, Mr Ashbaugh, and I 22 refer to page 4 of his introduction to his book 23 "Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis" where 24 he comments: 25 "A fundamental circumstance that helped the new page 45 1 identification process gain acceptance was the fact that 2 few identification specialists were challenged in court. 3 Legal counsel shied away from dwelling on a science that 4 was considered exact and infallible, a belief that was 5 difficult to dispel without adequate and structured 6 literature being available. Most challenges were 7 haphazard at best, usually ill-prepared and often 8 confusing. The majority were doomed to fail. Each 9 failure further entrenched the infallibility of the 10 science." 11 THE CHAIRMAN: Now if it would be convenient, Mr Moynihan, I 12 think, if we stop for 15 minutes. I imagine it is I 13 fairly difficult for the stenographer with the speed 14 with which we are going. So a short rest then for 15 15 minutes and we will sit again at noon. 16 (11.45 am) 17 (A short break) 18 (12.00 pm) 19 MR MOYNIHAN: Dealing with the law of evidence, fingerprint 20 evidence has to be set in the context of Scots Law in 21 relation to proof generally in criminal cases and expert 22 evidence specifically. Three rules require 23 consideration: best evidence; corroboration, and proof 24 beyond reasonable doubt. 25 As far as the best evidence rule is concerned, in page 46 1 addition to producing the report under section 280 of 2 the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, the 3 prosecution would lodge as productions at the criminal 4 trial the two pieces of evidence critical to the 5 identification: the first is a crime scene mark and 6 fingerprint form relating to the individual whose mark 7 it has been identified as. This was supplemented by a 8 Scottish Criminal Record Office booklet containing 9 enlarged copies of the mark and the fingerprint 10 side-by-side with lines pointing to the 16 11 characteristics in each of the two images. 12 Gilchrist states in terms: 13 "The Scottish Criminal Record Office has always 14 stressed that the charting enlargements are used for 15 illustrative purposes only." 16 The rationale for the Scottish Criminal Record 17 Office witnesses describing each case specific 18 enlargements as only "illustrative" may lie in the best 19 evidence rule. That is the rule that prohibits parties 20 from leading evidence by reference to copies of critical 21 documents or exhibits. So in a case where an individual 22 has been stabbed to death by a knife and there is 23 something about the knife that is incriminating the 24 prosecution must lodge the knife and not simply a 25 photograph of it and if a witness were to be asked to page 47 1 comment on the photograph, the defence could 2 successfully object to the witness answering the 3 question. 4 That the best evidence rule may be relevant here is 5 consistent the understanding in the HMICS "Primary 6 Inspection Report" section 3.11. The "best evidence" 7 rule required by law is the crime scene lift or 8 photograph of the mark and the print form. That is 9 consistent with the decision in HMA v Dennison in 1978. 10 An enlargement is merely a visual aid used to explain 11 evidence in court. 12 In one of the oral sessions before the Justice 1 13 Committee Mr Macpherson gave evidence that since 1983, 14 Scottish Criminal Record Office Fingerprint Bureau was 15 the only one in Britain that prepared case-specific 16 enlargements for trial. Other bureaus used generic 17 enlargements. 18 Again, the rationale may be found in the HMICS 19 report. Fingerprint evidence tended to be presented in 20 terms of a brief report amounting to little more than 21 certification of the identification to the 16 point 22 standard. Experts working to the 16 point standard in 23 Scotland did not regularly and fully document their 24 findings, including the nature and location of the 25 identical characteristics found. This was only done page 48 1 when photographic enlargements were requested for court 2 purposes. As noted, these enlargements were visual aids 3 and in some instances they were generic but more often 4 case-specific. The complication for the Scottish 5 Criminal Record Office was that the computer that they 6 latterly used to produce enlargements for court (known 7 as the charting PC) produced poor images that tended to 8 open Scottish Criminal Records Office witnesses to 9 challenge. 10 Turning to corroboration and proof beyond reasonable 11 doubt, Scots law requires corroborated proof of the 12 identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the 13 crime alleged and requires proof beyond reasonable 14 doubt. 15 There are subtleties to each of these two 16 propositions dealing, firstly, with corroboration. 17 The essence of the rule of corroboration is that an 18 individual may not be convicted of a crime in Scotland 19 on the evidence of single witness, no matter how 20 convincing the evidence of that witness may be. There 21 must be at least two witnesses pointing to the guilt of 22 the accused before there can be a conviction. 23 Though it is said that corroboration must come from 24 two independent sources, corroborated proof can come 25 from essentially one piece of evidence, such as a single page 49 1 fingerprint. Provided at least two witnesses speak to 2 each step in the sequence of evidence (that is the 3 finding of the mark at the scene, that the photograph or 4 lift in court relates to that mark, that the fingerprint 5 form relates to the accused and that there is a match 6 between an accused's print and the mark), a single 7 fingerprint can provide corroborated proof, examples 8 being Hamilton and Lanagan. 9 Furthermore, corroboration does not require evidence 10 exclusively indicative of guilt. If there is clear 11 evidence from one witness, corroboration can come from 12 evidence from a second witness consistent with guilt, 13 even if that second source of evidence could be capable 14 of innocent explanation. That is the case of Fox in 15 1998. It is not necessary the second source be more 16 consistent with guilt than innocence; it suffices that 17 it is capable of being consistent with guilt. 18 In particular, corroboration of a positive 19 identification (for example, by a witness well 20 acquainted with the accused) can come from evidence 21 short of positive identification, such as resemblance, 22 even if the second witness is uncertain and cannot point 23 to any peculiar physical characteristic to inform the 24 degree of resemblance. That is the case of Adams in 25 1999. Indeed in one case (Kelly) a conviction was page 50 1 upheld where the corroboration came from a witness who 2 picked out the accused at an identification parade as 3 one of two men on the parade whose build and hairstyle 4 resembled that of one of the individuals who had broken 5 into his house; and that despite the fact that the 6 second person similarly picked out at the parade was a 7 stand-in, and, therefore, known not to have been 8 implicated. 9 Turning now to proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof 10 beyond reasonable doubt does not require proof to the 11 level of mathematical certainty. In Nolan v McLeod in 12 1987 a man was convicted based on two identifications. 13 One came from the complainer (ie the victim), who knew 14 the accused and said that he was 80 per cent certain of 15 his identification, corroboration coming from a stranger 16 who said he was 75 per cent sure. 17 Whether or not there is proof beyond reasonable 18 doubt is a matter for the jury (or judge in a summary 19 trial). It is not permissible to ask a witness whether 20 he is sure beyond reasonable doubt, though he can be 21 questioned relative to the nature and extent of any 22 doubt that he may have. That the case of Nolan v 23 McLeod. 24 In the commentary to Ralston there is a summary of 25 the rules I have just been describing which I will pass page 51 1 over and move to1.8.13. 2 Fingerprint evidence has not traditionally been 3 prepared or presented to the lower standard of 4 "resemblance", as opposed to unique identification. Sir 5 William Rae's reason for the setting up of the ACPOS 6 Presidential Review Group is instructive: 7 "... there was only one acceptable standard of 8 accuracy in relation to fingerprint identification, 9 which was 100 per cent and anything less than 10 100 per cent was unacceptable." 11 Nonetheless, in considering fingerprint evidence it 12 may be necessary to recall that Scots Law does recognise 13 a distinction between "scientific proof", that is the 14 degree of proof that might establish a proposition to 15 the satisfaction of a scientist, and the level of proof 16 required by the court. The difference between 17 "scientific proof" and the civil standard of proof on 18 the balance of probabilities was discussed in the House 19 of Lords case Dingley v Chief Constable in 2000. Even 20 the higher criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable 21 doubt does not require mathematical certainty: in that 22 regard I refer, again to the case of Nolan v McLeod. 23 There are two distinct propositions which may be 24 involved in fingerprint evidence. The first is no two 25 individuals have been known to share the same page 52 1 fingerprint, hence fingerprints can provide a reliable 2 basis for identifying an individual. Second is that the 3 evidence by a particular fingerprint practitioner 4 relating to the presence of a certain number of common 5 characteristics is sufficient to prove that a particular 6 individual is the donor of the particular crime scene 7 mark. 8 The first proposition seems to be commonly accepted, 9 to such an extent that the English Law Commission (in 10 its Consultation Paper "the Admissibility of Expert 11 Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales") 12 has recently cited it as an example of a proposition of 13 which "judicial notice" may be taken. That means that 14 the reliability of the proposition is regarded as being 15 so well founded that any challenge to it in court would 16 be regarded as manifestly unfounded. 17 However, it has been argued by Cole in an article 18 "Is Fingerprint Identification Valid? Rhetorics of 19 Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents' Discourse" that 20 the second proposition does not necessarily flow from 21 the first. 22 Compounding variables include (1) the quality of the 23 crime scene mark and fingerprint of the known 24 individual, (2) the skill training and aptitude of the 25 particular fingerprint practitioner and (3) the criteria page 53 1 by which identification of fingerprints is judged. 2 Linked to (3) is the issue of the statistical incidence 3 of specific combinations of ridge characteristics 4 occurring in the population. 5 There is a range of views here. In the background 6 to the present case there have been differences in 7 detail among even those experts who have agreed that Y7 8 can be attributed to Ms McKie. Each may agree that Y7 9 is the print of Ms McKie, but there is a wide variation 10 in the number of characteristics found by the experts, 11 with some reaching this conclusion with fewer than 12 16 points. 13 Take the Scottish Criminal Record Office witnesses. 14 The four witnesses who signed the court reports (that's 15 Macpherson, Stewart, McKenna and McBride) say that in 16 relation to Y7 they always worked to the 16 point 17 standard, even when that evidence was initially directed 18 only to an elimination exercise at the time of the 19 Asbury trial. Mr Mackenzie observed 10 to 11 points on 20 17th February, 12 or 13 on 18th February and 21 by the 21 time of Tulliallan, on each occasion using different 22 material. Mr Dunbar saw at least 10 but less than 16 23 on 17th February. Mr Bruce found 8 during the blind 24 test and Mr Foley found 10 during the blind test. 25 Evett & Williams report that in 1978 the National page 54 1 Conference of Fingerprint Experts reached general 2 agreement that if there were 8 points of resemblance 3 present, that was sufficient to establish identity 4 beyond all reasonable doubt. 5 However, as a matter of Scots law, the question is 6 not whether any witness personally entertains no 7 reasonable doubt in relation to the proposition to which 8 he speaks. The issue is one for the jury (or judge in a 9 summary case): is the jury satisfied beyond reasonable 10 doubt by the evidence led. 11 This is linked to the second, more specific, issue 12 relating to the proper function of an expert witness in 13 a court case, be it civil or criminal. This is topical 14 because of the recent publication of the English Law 15 Commission consultation paper on the Admissibility of 16 Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and 17 Wales. 18 There is, however, the recent survey of the law by 19 Lord Nimmo Smith in McTear v Imperial Tobacco reaching 20 back to a classic statement by Lord President Cooper in 21 Davie in 1953 that said: 22 "Expert witnesses, however skilled or eminent, can 23 give no more than evidence. They cannot usurp the 24 functions of the jury or judge sitting as a jury, any 25 more than a technical assessor can substitute his advice page 55 1 for the judgment of the court ... their duty is to 2 furnish the judge or jury with the necessary scientific 3 criteria for testing the accuracy of their conclusions, 4 so as to enable the judge or jury to form their own 5 independent judgment by the application of these 6 criteria to the facts proved in evidence. The 7 scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing 8 and tested, becomes a factor (and often an important 9 factor) for consideration along with the whole other 10 evidence in the case, but the decision is for the judge 11 or jury. In particular the bare ipse dixit of a 12 scientist, however eminent, upon the issue in 13 controversy, will normally carry little weight, for it 14 cannot be tested by cross-examination nor independently 15 appraised, and the parties have invoked the decision of 16 a judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronouncement by 17 an expert." 18 Lord Nimmo Smith was also referred to a 19 modern textbook Wilkinson, the Scottish 20 Law of Evidence, which reinforces the 21 guidance in Davie, and there is a quote 22 there that people can just in due course. 23 Section 280 of the Criminal Procedure 24 (Scotland) Act 1995 is a misleading guide 25 here. It applies where fingerprint page 56 1 evidence is truly routine, that is to say 2 where it is unchallenged. If the defence 3 challenges the evidence, then the 4 fingerprint expert comes within the reach 5 of the rules of law pertaining to any 6 expert. His function is not confined to 7 a mere bald assertion of a conclusion on 8 identification. Whilst it is the 9 function of the expert to express an 10 opinion and doubtless to do so in a 11 manner apt to persuade the jury, 12 nonetheless the expert must inform and 13 educate the jury, enabling the jury 14 properly to assess his evidence and to 15 each its own conclusion. 16 Turning to non-numeric and current 17 reporting, current practice has moved to 18 the non-numeric approach. Mr Mackenzie 19 says that the move to non-numeric 20 occurred in Scotland in 2006. 21 Equally, witnesses indicate that the 22 style of report writing has changed. An 23 example is Mr Mackenzie at paragraph 64. 24 He says that in 2006 the Bureau was 25 instructed to cease producing page 57 1 photographic enlargements. 2 Mr Dunbar says that he was present at 3 discussions in relation to the use of 4 non-case specific photographic 5 enlargements with senior figures such as 6 Cathy Jamieson and Mr Gilchrist. He says 7 that those figures were initially opposed 8 but "we felt it was better as it removed 9 the possibility of a jury thinking the 10 enlargement was actual evidence in the 11 case." 12 The now Sheriff Gilchrist has no 13 recollection of this meeting. 14 The numeric and non-numeric approaches 15 have one point in common: in each case 16 the existence of even one unexplained 17 difference between the mark and the 18 fingerprint is fatal to an 19 identification. The difference lies in 20 the approach to an identification in the 21 absence of an unexplained difference. 22 Under the numeric approach, there was a 23 minimum threshold requirement of 24 16 points in common. 25 With the non-numeric there is no page 58 1 minimum threshold. Instead, the emphasis 2 is on the quality, not the quantity, of 3 the similarities between the mark and a 4 fingerprint. So now a fingerprint 5 practitioner can testify to an 6 identification based on common 7 characteristics, provided that a study of 8 the mark and prints as a whole supports 9 the view that the common features are of 10 sufficient quality to be consistent with 11 a unique identification. 12 There is, however, no objective 13 standard of quality. 14 That concludes chapter 1 and the issues 15 that are considered to arise from this 16 are: firstly, the contents of this 17 chapter will primarily be a matter for 18 legal submission in due course. 19 That said, there is an issue whether 20 this chapter contains an accurate account 21 of the 16 point standard, and the 22 exceptions to it, as it was understood in 23 practice in 1997 to 1999. 24 What was the purpose of producing 25 charted enlargements in criminal trials? page 59 1 Was that properly appreciated in 1997 to 2 1999 and were the enlargements produced 3 in the Asbury and McKie cases fit for 4 purpose? 5 An issue for the Inquiry, particularly 6 looking to potential recommendations, is 7 whether the approach to these 8 prosecutions would have been materially 9 different had the non-numeric approach 10 been applied. 11 Some of these questions are a matter 12 for legal analysis, rather than evidence. 13 However, insofar as questions of practice 14 are concerned, the potential witnesses 15 are: Mr Macpherson, Mr Stewart, 16 Ms McBride, Mr McKenna, Mr Foley, 17 Mr Geddes, Mr Dunbar and Mr Mackenzie. 18 To the extent that these witnesses 19 coincide in their views it may not be 20 necessary to ask them all to address 21 these specific points in oral evidence. 22 I now turn, sir, to the chronological 23 sequence and this is chapter 2 of my 24 presentation. We begin with Wednesday 25 8th January 1997. page 60 1 As I have said, on Wednesday 2 8th January Marion Margaret Campbell Ross 3 was found dead in her home at 43 Irvine 4 Road, Kilmarnock. She was 51 years old 5 when she died. 6 She had not been seen since 4.00 pm on 7 Monday, 6th January. About 6.00 pm on 8 8th January her body was found in the 9 bathroom of the house. A relative had 10 become concerned when she had failed to 11 answer her telephone. A neighbour, Alan 12 Kinnaird, who kept a set of keys, and 13 James Campbell, a cousin, gained access, 14 and found Miss Ross. The emergency 15 services were summoned. 16 Miss Ross had formerly worked as a 17 clerk with the Royal Bank of Scotland in 18 Kilmarnock. 19 43 Irvine Road, Kilmarnock, had 20 originally been her parents' house. It 21 was a semi-detached bungalow. It had 22 been extended on two occasions. The more 23 recent of these was in 1995, when an en 24 suite shower room had been added to a 25 rear bedroom, living accommodation had page 61 1 been formed in the roof space, and a 2 porch had been built at the front door. 3 The en suite facilities and the 4 accommodation in the roof space had been 5 virtually unused since their 6 installation. By contrast, the ground 7 floor rooms were in an unkempt condition. 8 To gain access to the front of the 9 house, it was necessary to pass through 10 the porch and a total of three doors. 11 There was no sign of forced entry. The 12 back door was locked with the keys in 13 place. The inner most of the three doors 14 giving access at the front of the house 15 had been found locked with no keys in any 16 of those doors. 17 The first police officers on the scene 18 were PC Hope and PC Stirling. They 19 arrived at about 18.17. They found 20 Mr Kinnaird and Mr Campbell outside the 21 house and ambulance personnel in 22 attendance. A supervisory officer and 23 CID were summoned and a number of police 24 officers arrived. 25 A police surgeon, Dr Lennox, was called page 62 1 and pronounced Miss Ross dead at about 2 18.56. 3 At 18.43 PC William Jamison arrived and 4 started the log. Before the log was 5 started, all of the relevant details were 6 noted in PC Hope's notebook. 7 Detective Chief Inspector Stephen Heath 8 was called at home. He went to 9 Kilmarnock Police Station, where he was 10 met by a pathologist, Dr Cassidy, and 11 Detective Superintendent Malcolm. He was 12 briefed by DC Gray. 13 Detective Chief Inspector Heath says 14 that he arrived at the scene at 20.30, 15 along with the pathologist, Dr Marie 16 Cassidy and Detective Superintendent 17 Malcolm. The log records him as having 18 arrived with Dr Cassidy and Martin 19 Fairley of the forensics laboratory, with 20 Detective Superintendent Malcolm arriving 21 shortly thereafter. He was made aware 22 that there had been a suggestion that 23 there was a possibility of suicide but 24 was of the view that murder was a strong 25 possibility. He says that he treated it page 63 1 as a murder investigation from the 2 outset. He gave instructions that night 3 including that the house be secured and 4 kept under guard, the body be 5 photographed, the locus videoed, and the 6 body moved to the mortuary and 7 house-to-house inquiries commenced. 8 Inspector McAllister also said there 9 was no practical difference in the 10 treatment of the locus as between a 11 suspicious death and a confirmed murder. 12 Dealing with the possibility that Y7 13 was the print of an officer, Detective 14 Constable Gray deposited on 8th January, 15 Scenes of Crime Officer Michael Moffat 16 attended. He arrived at 20.10. He was 17 instructed to take a video and 18 photographs of the scene and did so. His 19 still photographs were production 13 at 20 the Asbury trial. His video was 21 production 106. Mr Moffat placed metal 22 treads on the front porch floor. His 23 evidence gives rise to the first factual 24 contradiction in the evidence and it 25 relates to the suggestion that Y7 may page 64 1 have been the mark of another police 2 officer, Detective Constable Gray, who 3 was working with him on 8th January 1997. 4 Mr Moffat was present on 5 14th January 1997 when Y7 was discovered 6 on the bathroom doorframe. He says that 7 his suspicion at the time was that the 8 mark was that of DC Gray. Mr Moffat 9 recalls seeing DC Gray resting his left 10 hand on the right-hand doorframe of the 11 bathroom about 4 to 5 feet above the 12 ground just before the two of them lifted 13 the deceased's body on 8th January. 14 After they had moved the body Mr Moffat 15 notice that thumb of one of Mr Gray's 16 gloves were burst and Mr Moffat spoke to 17 him about this at the time, advising that 18 he should report to his boss that one of 19 his prints might show up at the scene. 20 He says that on some date that he 21 cannot now recall he phoned Kilmarnock 22 Police Station and left a message for 23 Gray telling him to lodge his elimination 24 prints to pre-empt any disciplinary 25 action. page 65 1 He says he mentioned this suspicion to 2 DI McAllister on 23rd January 1997. 3 He also says that when he was cited as 4 a witness for the McKie case he became 5 aware that the defence case was going to 6 be mis-identification and that he 7 immediately thought of Gray again. He 8 phoned Chief Inspector Hogg and suggested 9 to him that he had Gray's prints 10 compared. Hogg told him not to start 11 going down that road at this stage but he 12 agreed to have Gray's print checked 13 against Y7. The next day Hogg told him 14 that "Charlie" had checked Gray's print 15 and it was not his. 16 Referred to his Operation Alba 17 statement (ie, the statement taken by the 18 team of officers led by Detective Chief 19 Constable Mackay that investigated an 20 allegation of criminal conduct by certain 21 SCRO fingerprint officers in 2000) 22 Mr Moffat says that he recalls Inspector 23 Baillie telling him not to get involved 24 as it was going to get messy. 25 He feels that his career has been page 66 1 blighted as a result of his involvement 2 in the McKie case. 3 A statement has been provided by DC 4 Gray. He says that he was wearing latex 5 gloves and that he does not recall them 6 being damaged at any time. 7 James Kerr was present when Y7 was 8 found on 14th January and he does not 9 recall hearing any speculation as to who 10 might have left the mark, nor did he hear 11 any mention of Gary Gray. 12 Mr Wilson can only speak to office 13 rumour. 14 Mr Thurley has no recollection of 15 conversations about burst gloves. 16 Mr McAllister denies that anything was 17 said to him by Moffat on 23rd January 18 about Gray or a burst glove. 19 However, Mr Hogg confirms that 20 Mr Moffat did raise with him the 21 possibility of Y7 having been left by 22 some other person. He spoke to him about 23 this on several occasions and has a note 24 of having done so on 17th August 2000. 25 The point had arisen before and he had page 67 1 mentioned it to Mr Heath. Mr Hogg cannot 2 now recall the name of the other person 3 mentioned by Mr Moffat but he says that 4 this person's elimination prints would 5 have been checked. 6 A Scottish Criminal Record Office 7 worksheet recording the checking of 8 elimination prints shows the batch of 9 marks Y7 to V9 compared against PC Gary 10 Gray on 20th and 21st February 1997. One 11 of the examiners would appear to be 12 Mr Geddes. The second set of initials is 13 unknown. The Inquiry understands that as 14 marks are identified or eliminated they 15 are removed from the batch and subsequent 16 comparisons are confined only to the 17 remainder. It cannot be determined from 18 this list whether Y7 was checked against 19 Gary Gray or only the other marks that 20 remained in the batch as at that date. 21 Mr Geddes has no recollection of him. 22 Operational Alba (that's Detective 23 Chief Constable Mackay and his team) 24 investigated this matter. Elimination 25 prints, including those of Mr Gray, were page 68 1 sent to the National Training Centre, 2 Durham, to be checked against Y7. The 3 Mackay report concludes that Y7 is not 4 the mark of Detective Constable Gray. 5 The Inquiry has not found a report from 6 the NTC, Durham, relating to the 7 comparison of Gray's print but further 8 inquiries are being made. 9 Turning to Thursday 9th January, a 10 post-mortem examination was instructed. 11 The post-mortem examination was carried 12 out by Professor Vanezis and Dr Cassidy 13 on 9th January 1997. The cause of death 14 was certified as multiple stab wounds to 15 the head and neck. Detective Chief 16 Inspector Heath learned of the results of 17 the post-mortem examination at about 18 2.00 pm on 9th January. It was clearly a 19 murder Inquiry. 20 Strathclyde Police initiated a Major 21 Enquiry. The Senior Investigating 22 Officer was DCI Heath. His deputy was 23 Detective Inspector Alexander McAllister. 24 Inspector James Thomson was appointed 25 office manager. Mr Heath requested that page 69 1 the HOLMES computer system be installed. 2 Officers were drafted in from other parts 3 of Strathclyde Police, including the 4 Centralised Serious Crime Squad. 5 Mr McAllister was also assigned the 6 liaison role linking to the forensic 7 science lab, Identification Bureau and 8 SCRO fingerprints section. In this 9 capacity he spoke throughout the ensuing 10 investigation to Mr Hogg at the 11 identification bureau and his principal 12 contact at SCRO was the team leader, 13 Mr Macpherson. He says that he would 14 have communicated regularly with 15 Mr Macpherson, exchanging information and 16 giving updates on investigative 17 priorities. 18 A briefing was held at 16.10 during 19 which the video of the locus was shown. 20 DC James Kerr and PC McIntyre were 21 appointed to control the locus and assist 22 Identification Bureau and forensic staff. 23 DC Kirkland and PC Stevens were the 24 production officers. The instruction was 25 that with the exception of those officers page 70 1 and the Scenes of Crime 2 Officers/Identification Bureau staff, 3 police officers were not to enter the 4 house. 5 Mr Heath says that there was no need 6 for other officers to enter the house 7 because a video was available. In due 8 course he authorised Michael Orr to visit 9 the locus and he later learned that 10 Mr McAllister had allowed other officers 11 to visit. However, he subsequently 12 became aware that the logging at the 13 locus was not carried out properly and 14 that had to be investigated by Detective 15 Superintendent Malcolm. 16 As for the Scenes of Crime examination, 17 there are some incidental factual issues 18 regarding the proficiency of the Scenes 19 of Crime examination of the house. 20 Chief Inspector Hogg was head of the 21 Identification Bureau. He was informed 22 of the death of 9th January 1997. He was 23 told at the outset that it could be a 24 murder or possibly a suicide. He says 25 that the scene was treated in the same page 71 1 manner as if a murder had been confirmed 2 from the outset. He arrived at the scene 3 at about 10.00 am with Mr Thurley, having 4 also instructed Mr Ferguson to attend. 5 He attended in order to assess the scene 6 and ascertain what resources were 7 required. He believes that a forensic 8 examination had been completed overnight. 9 He entered the house and ascertained that 10 a full examination would take some time. 11 When he left there was an agreed 12 strategy. 13 Mr McAllister says that he was present 14 with Mr Hogg that morning, the purpose 15 being to agree the strategy for the 16 examination of the locus. He says that 17 there were three stages to the 18 examination of the locus: (a) 19 photography/videoing of the locus; (b) 20 forensic examination for blood and other 21 biological material; and (c) examination 22 to develop latent fingerprints. He 23 believes that the forensic examination 24 may have started on 8th January 1997. 25 The scene of crime examination began on page 72 1 the morning of 9th January. Initially 2 Scene of Crime Officers (Thurley, 3 Ferguson, Wilson and Hunter) attended, 4 but Wilson and Hunter were sent away from 5 the scene. Mr Hogg instructed that 6 Thurley and Ferguson do the hall first. 7 Mr Thurley was the team leader. Thurley 8 and Ferguson examined various parts of 9 the locus, including the doorframe of the 10 bathroom, with an aluminium powder. At 11 about 4.00 pm Mr Thurley received a call 12 from the forensic laboratory and removed 13 certain items including the bathroom door 14 itself. 15 Chief Inspector Hogg says that he 16 instructed Thurley to stop what he was 17 doing because forensic scientists wanted 18 to access the house. His recollection is 19 that the forensic scientists were 20 interested in the possibility of 21 obtaining footwear impressions and he was 22 given word that they would rather look at 23 the house again themselves. Hogg says 24 that he did not instruct Thurley to 25 remove the bathroom door. page 73 1 David Ferguson is one of the Scene of 2 Crime Officers who first attended the 3 locus on 9th January 1997. In 4 January 2000 he e-mailed Mr McKie with 5 criticisms of the conduct of the forensic 6 examination, including the suggestion 7 that forensic examination had been 8 delayed pending the post-mortem because 9 of the suggestion that Miss Ross may 10 have committed suicide. 11 In his statement to the Inquiry, 12 Mr Ferguson confirms that the instruction 13 he received at the scene was to treat the 14 incident as murder. He says that with 15 suicides Scene of Crime Officers would 16 not normally carry out an examination, 17 and in particular there would not 18 normally be an examination for 19 fingerprints. In this case, of the four 20 Scene of Crime Officers present, two were 21 sent away as not being required on 22 9th January, leaving him and Thurley to 23 carry out a limited examination. He 24 began an examination for prints around 25 the porch area and Thurley carried out an page 74 1 examination for prints around the 2 bathroom area including the doorframe. 3 Though fingerprints were found that day 4 they were not recorded on Marks Worksheet 5 31 until 10th January. He says that at 6 about 4.00, pm after the death was 7 confirmed as a murder, he and Thurley 8 were instructed to stop what they were 9 doing and seize the bannister, a section 10 of carpet and the bathroom door. He 11 believes the reason for this was that 12 forensics had not carried out any 13 examination. 14 The forensic protocol requires the 15 forensic examination to take place before 16 a fingerprint examination and it seemed 17 to him that "things were working 18 backwards". The correct procedures were 19 not being followed. 20 He said this would not have affected 21 the fingerprinting but may have had a 22 consequence for the forensic examination. 23 He expresses himself surprised that 24 Thurley had decided to use aluminium 25 powder for the fingerprinting. He says page 75 1 that he did not express concern at the 2 time because he was a junior examiner. 3 In his e-mail he wrote that he had 4 disagreed with the use of aluminium 5 powder at the time and that had black 6 powder been used from the outset "the 7 whole sorry affair" would never have 8 happened. 9 Turning to Mr Thurley's evidence, he 10 attended the house on 9th January and it 11 was decided he would remain at the house 12 with Mr Ferguson. Initially the death 13 was being treated as suspicious but the 14 scene would have been protected in the 15 same way as a murder. He found out later 16 that day it was a confirmed murder. At 17 about 4.00 pm he was contacted by the lab 18 and asked to stop his examination and to 19 take possession of the bannister. He 20 also seized the bathroom door and a 21 section of carpet nearby. It was not 22 until 6th March 1997 that he removed the 23 doorframe to preserve Y7. He did not 24 begin his fingerprinting until the 25 forensic scientists told him that they page 76 1 had completed their examination. The 2 Inquiry has his contemporaneous 3 manuscript narrative of the progress of 4 the scenes of crime examination of the 5 house, which records that Y7 was not 6 found until 14th January when Mr Thurley 7 was not in attendance. He refers to Home 8 Office guidance related in the sequence 9 of powders to be used in fingerprinting 10 and defends the decision to begin with 11 aluminium powder as the powder most 12 commonly used first and in any event 13 yielding fingerprints in this case. 14 He was not present on 14th January when 15 black powder was used, but says that it 16 was not uncommon to re-examine surfaces 17 with black powder. He says that the 18 doorframe would have been covered in 19 aluminium powder. He saw Y7 at some 20 stage and says that it would have been 21 difficult to tell if the aluminium powder 22 had been disturbed. 23 Mr Moffat confirms that Mr Thurley told 24 Scene of Crime Officers that he wanted 25 them to use aluminium powder, though he page 77 1 did use black powder on some surfaces. 2 Detective Constable James Kerr says 3 that he had some training on obtaining 4 fingerprint evidence but was not an 5 expert. He would have expected black 6 (not aluminium) powder to have been used. 7 He reports heated debate instigated by 8 Moffat about this. 9 Chief Inspector Hogg says there was no 10 formal protocol regulating the use of 11 aluminium powder, as opposed to black 12 powder. He presents it as essentially a 13 judgment for individual officers. He 14 thinks the decision to start with 15 aluminium powder was reasonable. He says 16 that he was aware of black powder 17 improving the quality of a mark partially 18 revealed by aluminium powder but before 19 the Marion Ross case he had not been 20 aware of a case in which a fingerprint 21 was detected using black powder where 22 aluminium had totally missed it. His 23 initial thought was that the print had 24 been left after the aluminium powder had 25 been applied but he refers to fingerprint page 78 1 marks of the deceased also being found 2 which suggests that there were 3 fingerprint marks on the doorframe which 4 had not been fully revealed using 5 aluminium powder. Some experiments were 6 carried out at the Strathclyde Police 7 Forensic Laboratory to see whether Y7 had 8 been left after the aluminium powder had 9 been applied. They found that the 10 particles of the two powders simply 11 merged and did not sit one on top of the 12 other. 13 The significance of the detail 14 concerning the SOCOs examination of the 15 house for fingerprints lies in the fact 16 that the mark Y7 was found on the second 17 examination of the doorframe when black 18 powder was used on 14th January 1997 and 19 was not discovered during the first 20 examination with aluminium powder on 21 9th January 1997. That bare detail, 22 stripped of any other complication, might 23 suggest that the mark was deposited 24 between the two dates. Given that the 25 house was under police guard, again this page 79 1 bare fact would point to Y7 being the 2 mark of someone involved in the 3 investigation. There are, however, a 4 number of significant complications 5 relating to this theory, not least being 6 that fingerprints of Miss Ross were also 7 discovered on 14th January. The Inquiry 8 will look at the manner in which the 9 crime scene examination was carried out 10 and some of the SOCOs will be called to 11 give evidence at the start of the public 12 hearing. 13 As for Ms McKie, she was then known as 14 Detective Constable Cardwell, had been 15 seconded to a new staff appraisal system 16 but was not required for that work over 17 the festive period. She was temporarily 18 assigned to the Ross Murder Inquiry and 19 paired up with Detective Sergeant 20 Shields. She remained part of the 21 Inquiry team until 14th January 1997. 22 Mr McAllister took the decision to 23 return Ms McKie to divisional duties and 24 the decision was taken for operational 25 and not personal reasons. page 80 1 On 9th January an action was raised 2 instructing Detective Constable Cardwell 3 and Detective Sergeant William Shields to 4 go to the house with Mr Kinnaird in order 5 to check which door had been locked when 6 he went to the house and discovered the 7 body. The HOLMES record records that the 8 keys were uplifted at 17.40 but returned 9 at 17.50. 10 Mr McAllister confirms that he gave 11 this instruction and that it was 12 countermanded by Mr Heath. 13 Mr Heath says that Detective Sergeant 14 Shields asked if they could go into the 15 house or take Mr Kinnaird in. Detective 16 Chief Inspector Heath did not want 17 Mr Kinnaird to be taken back to the scene 18 because of the risk of contamination. 19 Detective Chief Inspector Heath said no 20 to the request. 21 There are what bear to be three 22 contemporaneous police statements for 23 Ms McKie: one on 17th January, one on 24 21st January and one on 14th February, 25 all 1997. Two of those statements page 81 1 (17th January and 14th February) deal 2 with the visit to the house on 3 9th January. They record that Ms McKie 4 and Detective Sergeant Shields 5 interviewed Mr Kinnaird at his own home. 6 After the interview they attended at the 7 house at 19.45. In the statement of 8 17th January it is said that Ms McKie 9 entered the porch area "in order to 10 clearly establish the doors referred to 11 by the witness." She touched no surfaces 12 within the house. 13 In her statement of 14th February she 14 says that she stood on the metal plates, 15 with Detective Sergeant Shields standing 16 on one in front of her. Ms McKie, 17 however, says that she did not write the 18 statement of 17th January and that it is 19 in the handwriting of Detective Sergeant 20 Shields. She had not seen the document 21 before. 22 Ms McKie has provided a statement to 23 the Inquiry. She generally adopts a 24 previous statement 28th July 2000. She 25 accepts that it was made clear at page 82 1 briefings that attendance at the locus 2 was by specific instruction only. She 3 cannot now remember much about the 4 cancelled instruction to check the doors 5 and keys with Mr Kinnaird. However, she 6 gives her recollection of attending the 7 house on 9th January with Detective 8 Sergeant Shields to gain a better 9 understanding of Mr Kinnaird's 10 explanation as to which doors he found 11 locked and which he found unlocked. They 12 only went as far as the porch and stood 13 on the metal foot plates. 14 The log records them as having entered 15 the porch only, and as leaving at 16 19.47 hours. PC Stirling, who was 17 keeping the log at the, time erroneously 18 made an entry for "Cadwell" rather than 19 "Cardwell". 20 The HOLMES record recovered in 21 Operation Alba does not disclose the 22 allocation or cancellation of the 23 particular action relating to 24 reconstruction of unlocking the doors 25 with Mr Kinnaird. It may be, however, page 83 1 that the computerised HOLMES system was 2 not fully in operation at this point on 3 9th January. The Inquiry has one 4 document which seems to relate to this 5 action and it refers to a "manual system 6 action queue" on 10th January, which may 7 mean that the action was originally one 8 recorded on the manual system. 9 Mr Heath recalls (but cannot be sure) 10 that on another occasion over the next 11 few days Detective Sergeant Shields made 12 a request to visit the locus again. If 13 made, it would have been met with a 14 negative response. In his Crown 15 precognition, Detective Chief Inspector 16 Heath seems to indicate that this would 17 have occurred after the request to 18 Detective Constable Kerr (which seems to 19 have been on 11th January, the Saturday). 20 It is not clear why he thinks events took 21 place in that order. Detective Chief 22 Inspector Heath's account at precognition 23 was that he simply said "no". In his 24 statement to Operation Alba, DCI Heath 25 states that he cannot recall the full page 84 1 terms of the conversation, but that he 2 told Detective Sergeant Shields that the 3 Identification Bureau Officers had not 4 completed their examination, and that 5 no-one should go in. 6 Ms McKie also recollects that at some 7 stage Detective Sergeant Shields asked 8 Mr Heath for permission to visit the 9 locus which was refused. She was not 10 present when the request was made. 11 Unless the mark Y7 had been transferred 12 by some means, the proposition that Y7 is 13 the fingerprint of Ms McKie necessarily 14 implies that she entered the house at 15 least as far as the bathroom. She has 16 always denied this and the possibility 17 that she could have gained access to the 18 bathroom has been the subject of close 19 scrutiny and a number of previous 20 investigations with negative results. 21 These investigations have covered her 22 possession of the keys to the house for 23 brief periods. Miss Ross' house was not 24 far from the police station, and could 25 have been reached by car within a very page 85 1 short time. However, the relevance of 2 the keys is not obvious, on the basis 3 that the door was always unlocked but a 4 log keeper on duty. 5 Ms McKie was questioned about access to 6 the keys in her statement to Detective 7 Superintendent Malcolm dated 31st 8 March 1997. PC Allan Stevens was one of 9 the production officers. He is the 10 person Ms McKie asked to give her the 11 keys to the house on 9th January. Though 12 Mr Stevens may have some recollection 13 today of what Ms McKie said to him, that 14 is inconsistent with his previous 15 statements and in the result he cannot 16 remember what was said to him. 17 A statement is to be taken from 18 Detective Sergeant Shields. 19 Turning to 10th January, the Friday. 20 On Friday, 10th January, Mr Thurley and 21 Mr Ferguson continued to examine the 22 scene. They were joined by Moffat, 23 Wilson and Hunter. The examination of 24 the scene carried on during 11th, 12th 25 and 13th. page 86 1 Also on Friday, 10th January, PC Lupton 2 and DC Glass took post-mortem 3 fingerprints from Marion Ross at Glasgow 4 City Mortuary. Lupton delivered a 5 laminated form at the Scottish Criminal 6 Records Office. 7 On 11th January Mr Heath has produced 8 event files showing the key 9 developments down to 11th January. 10 The events of this day have been the 11 subject of close scrutiny on a number of 12 occasions because the log may be 13 incomplete and there had been a 14 persisting rumour that PC Mark Lees may 15 have permitted Ms McKie access to the 16 house. 17 Inspector Thomson provided a statement 18 for Operation Alba in which he states on 19 11th January at about 5.00 pm he issued 20 an instruction to Detective Sergeant 21 Shields (who was working with Ms McKie) 22 to uplift the log so that it could be 23 photocopied and the entries include on 24 HOLMES and then return the log. 25 Ms McKie deals with this in her page 87 1 statement of 14th February 1997. On her 2 own account she went to the house at 3 17.45 with DS Shields. Shields remained 4 in the car. She got the log from PC Mark 5 Lees who was within the porch. She was 6 in the house only a matter of seconds and 7 only entered the porch. She took the log 8 back to the police station, photocopied 9 it and returned to the house with DS 10 Shields. She gave the log back to PC 11 Lees and again was only in the porch and 12 that for a matter of seconds. 13 PC Lees carried out log keeping duties 14 on 10th, 11th and 18th January. On 15 11th January he is noted in the log as 16 having been on duty from 13.55 to 23.00. 17 Ms McKie and PC Lees are in agreement 18 that Ms McKie did uplift and return the 19 log that day but her attendance at the 20 locus is not recorded in the log book. 21 That is not the only suggested error in 22 the log for that day. The log records DC 23 James Kerr as having left at 13.15 and 24 there is no record of him returning that 25 day. However, he says that he worked page 88 1 there that afternoon. On reflection he 2 thinks that he may have used the rear 3 French doors for easier access to the 4 equipment room. 5 In addition to providing a statement to 6 the Inquiry, PC Lees has provided the 7 following statements: on 8 14th February 1997, 11th March 1997, and 9 a statement to Operation Alba on 31st 10 July 2000. In his Inquiry statement PC 11 Lees says that he is aware of the rumours 12 concerning him and they are untrue. He 13 did not let Ms McKie into the house. 14 Ms McKie did collect and return the log 15 on 11th January. On neither occasion did 16 she enter the porch. His interpretation 17 of entry "into the locus" is passing 18 beyond the threshold at the outer door at 19 the front of the porch. When she arrived 20 to collect the log, he asked her if she 21 was coming into the porch but she said 22 words to the effect that could not 23 because of the risk of 24 cross-contamination. He did not log this 25 attendance because she had not crossed page 89 1 the threshold in to the porch and the 2 same applies to her attendance when 3 returning the log. 4 He cannot remember the time of this 5 event and is not aided by prior 6 statements. Asked about DC Kerr, PC Lees 7 notes that there is no entry in the log 8 recording his presence at the locus when 9 Lees was on duty and he says that he did 10 not see Kerr while he (Lees) was at the 11 locus. 12 DC Kerr has similarly provided a number 13 of prior statements: an account of his 14 evidence during HMM against McKie is 15 given in Mr Carle's summary of that 16 trial. Other than some variation as to 17 whether the events in question occurred 18 on 10th or 11th January, the content of 19 his evidence in his Inquiry statement is 20 consistent with these prior statements. 21 DC Kerr's statement to the Inquiry says 22 that on the morning of 11th January 23 Ms McKie asked him if she could look 24 around the house. He says that he told 25 her Mr Heath's instruction that no-one page 90 1 was to go into the house and suggested 2 she speak to DCI Heath if she felt 3 strongly about the matter. In his prior 4 statements, there has been some 5 uncertainty whether this occurred on 10th 6 or 11th January. In his Inquiry 7 statement he expresses himself certain 8 that the conversation took place on 11th 9 January. 10 He saw her later that afternoon at the 11 house, standing in the porch (ie, the 12 entry vestibule) with the log keeper but 13 he did not see her enter the house. He 14 says that the radio was on but the 15 football had not yet begun. He is not 16 now clear about the time. He believes he 17 left around 6.00 pm. He believes that he 18 saw her between 2.30 and 3.00. He thinks 19 that it was closer to 3.00 but it would 20 have been nearer 5.30. He later learned 21 that she had been delegated the task of 22 copying the log. DC Kerr says that he 23 and PC McIntyre had agreed to take 24 alternate weekend days off and that he 25 (Kerr) was on duty on Saturday and page 91 1 McIntyre on Sunday. Kerr says that he 2 went to the high street to get shoe boxes 3 which he used to store door handles taken 4 from the locus. 5 PC McIntyre says that he was at the 6 locus on 11th January and says that he is 7 100 per cent sure that shoe boxes were 8 not used to store productions. He did 9 not see Ms McKie at the house at any time 10 from 9th to 14th January 1997. 11 Ms McKie's evidence is that she has no 12 recollection of asking DC Kerr for 13 permission to enter the house. It was 14 not his decision to take. She attended 15 the house on 11th January at 5.45 pm to 16 collect the log and returned it. The log 17 keeper was Mark Lees. Detective Sergeant 18 Shields remained in the car. Ms McKie 19 stepped in to the porch on both occasions 20 but did not go further than the porch. 21 Turning to 12th January, that is the 22 Sunday, on Sunday 12th January Ms McKie 23 again uplifted the keys from the 24 production officer but returned them 25 shortly afterwards. Her explanation for page 92 1 this is, again, that her instructions 2 were cancelled. The Inquiry has the 3 HOLMES printout confirming movements of 4 the keys and records that the keys were 5 taken out 10.45 am and returned at 11.00 6 am. 7 The Inquiry also has the HOLMES record 8 for this action. It appears to have been 9 allocated to DC Swann at 6.31 pm on 11th. 10 It is not clear why Ms McKie ended up 11 uplifting the keys. Was she working with 12 DC Swann at the time? HOLMES records the 13 action as having been changed to "for 14 referral" on instructions of the Senior 15 Investigating Officer that is DCI Heath 16 at 11.02 on 12th January, which is 17 consistent with the timing of the return 18 of the keys. 19 PC Stevens confirms that the keys were 20 given to Ms McKie and returned by her 21 shortly afterwards, consistent with her 22 instruction having been cancelled. 23 Ms McKie now has no recollection of 24 this episode. 25 On 13th January, Mr Heath attended a page 93 1 meeting with IB, SCRO and lab staff. 2 Mr Macpherson has manuscript notes that 3 may relate to this meeting. 4 Mr McAllister is able to specify who 5 attended this meeting under reference to 6 CO1403. It was a liaison meeting to 7 check progress. 8 Dealing specifically with Ms McKie's 9 rumoured access to the locus, Les Brown 10 e-mailed the Inquiry team with an 11 accusation directed against PC Lees. He 12 has provided a statement and named a 13 number of sources of information supplied 14 to him. The Inquiry team has pursued 15 some of these lines of inquiry and where 16 the individuals in question have been 17 interviewed by the Inquiry team they will 18 be named in this analysis. There are 19 other individuals named by Mr Brown whose 20 information appears to the Inquiry team 21 not to merit further investigation and 22 they have, accordingly, not been 23 interviewed. In fairness to these 24 individuals, because they have not had an 25 opportunity to comment, this analysis page 94 1 omits reference to them by name. 2 This is a summary of what Mr Brown has 3 said to the Inquiry. 4 He is a retired Detective Chief 5 Inspector with Strathclyde Police. He 6 says in March 2006 he was contacted by a 7 reporter (who he names but from whom the 8 Inquiry has not taken a statement) And 9 asked if he would be prepared to help 10 some people from SCRO. He met Fiona 11 McBride and Mr Geddes. 12 He says he agreed to help on the basis 13 that he would investigate the murder of 14 Miss Ross. He has received information 15 anonymously from police officers. At the 16 first meeting he says that the reporter 17 told him that it was well known in the 18 media that Ms McKie had had a romantic 19 liaison at the house. He has spoken to 20 Mr Swann about his involvement. He has 21 also unsuccessfully sought to speak to 22 Mr Herbert Kerrigan, QC (who at one point 23 was instructed on behalf of Ms McKie in 24 relation to the perjury case). He spoke 25 to Mr Kinnaird and learned that there was page 95 1 a 15-hour delay before the police 2 declared a murder inquiry. He is 3 surprised by this. He has unsuccessfully 4 tried to speak to Mr Heath. 5 He has interviewed Detective Sergeant 6 Shields and accepts that there was no 7 romantic link with him. 8 He says that he understands that three 9 weeks after Ms McKie and Shields were 10 split up as a team, DI McAllister phoned 11 SCRO and asked that Ms McKie's prints be 12 compared against all outstanding 13 fingerprints. He also says that another 14 named individual (from whom the Inquiry 15 has not taken a statement) has told him 16 that DI McAllister knew that Ms McKie had 17 been in the house. He has unsuccessfully 18 applied to speak to Mr McAllister. He 19 has made inquiries specific to PC Lees. 20 He has unsuccessfully tried to interview 21 PC Lees. He says that a SOCO officer, 22 Kerr, has told him that he heard Lees and 23 McKie having a heated discussion in the 24 porch during the course of which Ms McKie 25 used the word "contamination". The SOCO page 96 1 was dismantling door handles and the date 2 was around 13th January 1997. He also 3 spoke to PC Kerr Reid who told him of a 4 conversation with a Kilmarnock police 5 officer who said that he had let Ms McKie 6 into the house because he fancied her and 7 who told Reid: 8 "That bitch will get us done. It was 9 me that let her into the house." 10 Despite checking, Brown has been unable 11 to ascertain who was on duty with Reid. 12 He has been told that during the perjury 13 trial Lees and McKie were seeing arguing 14 ferociously in the car park and he says 15 that this may have been about the 16 contradiction in their evidence regarding 17 the presence of Ms McKie in the porch. 18 He was told by SCRO fingerprint officers 19 about a conversation between Colette 20 McKay and PC Morgan. He interviewed 21 Morgan who told him that he had been 22 trying to impress McKay and was making 23 out that he knew more than he did. The 24 person he had in mind was Lees but that 25 was based on rumour. He has spoken to page 97 1 Mr Carle about his conversation with PC 2 Lees. After he was unsuccessful in his 3 attempt to interview PC Lees, he 4 complained to the Assistant Chief 5 Constable of Strathclyde Police and this 6 led to an investigation by Nicolson and 7 Mitchell. He says that he was told 8 anonymously that a person named by him 9 (again from whom the Inquiry has not 10 taken a statement) had been saying that a 11 Kilmarnock police officer had all the 12 answers. He makes an allegation that Ms 13 McKie committed perjury at the perjury 14 trial. (It must be stressed that this is 15 an allegation made by Mr Brown and that 16 Counsel to the Inquiry has reached no 17 conclusion in relation to that.) 18 Ms McKie says that the rumours that PC Lees allowed 19 her access to the house beyond the porch are untrue. 20 She also says that she had no contact with PC Lees 21 during her trial. She has provided a written statement 22 appended to her Inquiry statement responding to the 23 allegation that she gave perjured evidence at the 24 perjury trial regarding knowledge of other experts 25 having advised in relation to Y7. page 98 1 Kerr Reid has provided a statement. He has 2 confirmed that while on duty at the High Court in 3 Paisley he was party to a conversation with a second 4 (unnamed) officer from U Division who said that "his 5 neighbour" (a third officer also unnamed) had let 6 Ms McKie into the house and the officer may also have 7 said that the neighbour had a wee thing for Ms McKie. 8 He denies that the officer made the specific statement 9 recounted by Brown. Colette McKay says that in 2004 or 10 2005 a probationary officer, Officer Morgan, told her 11 that she worked with a guy in Stewarton who had let 12 Ms McKie into the house and who now feels bad for what 13 happened to the four experts. She told McKenna or 14 Macpherson about this conversation. 15 PC Alistair Morgan has provided a statement. He did 16 attend SCRO as a probationer officer and did speak to a 17 female member of staff. However, he says that he did 18 not discuss the McKie case. He also says that he has no 19 knowledge of any officer allowing Ms McKie entry to the 20 house. 21 Statements have also been taken from Detective Chief 22 Superintendent Nicolson and Detective Superintendent 23 Mitchell. They confirm that they did investigate 24 Mr Brown's allegations in February/March 2007. They 25 spoke to Kerr Reid at the time. He confirmed that he page 99 1 had had a conversation with a young police officer in 2 Paisley High Court, the conversation being of a general 3 nature. Mr Mitchell tried to identify the young officer 4 through police records but the relevant records had been 5 destroyed by the time of his Inquiry. Mr Mitchell also 6 interviewed Colette McKay of SCRO who reported that PC 7 Morgan had told her that she worked with someone at 8 Stewarton who had allegedly allowed Ms McKie into the 9 house. Mr Mitchell interviewed Mr Morgan but he denied 10 the conversation. 11 Mr Mitchell refers to PC Lees having been 12 interviewed in the past but nothing that Mr Mitchell 13 discovered in his inquiry would have allowed him to go 14 back and question him. He also mentioned that PC Morgan 15 was interviewed by the complaints and disciplinary team 16 on 8th December 2006. 17 A statement has also been taken from Chief Inspector 18 Carle. He became an inspector in November 1998 based at 19 Kilmarnock. He acted as a police observer both at the 20 Asbury and McKie trials. Before the McKie trial PC Lees 21 approached him for advice. PC Lees told him the trial 22 was approaching and that there was gossip that he had 23 let Ms McKie into the house. PC Lees said that he had 24 not let her into the house and there was no hint of 25 uncertainty. Mr Carle reminded him that he would be page 100 1 giving evidence under oath and that he had to be 2 truthful and forthright. Mr Carle's notes of the trial 3 are available to the Inquiry. At paragraph 33.12 he 4 notes that PC Lees appeared uncomfortable while giving 5 evidence-in-chief. 6 The issues that emerged from that analysis of 7 chapter 2 are whether Mr Moffat gave accounts to DI 8 McAllister that he thought that Y7 was the mark of Gary 9 Gray; whether J7 is the mark of Gary Gray; whether the 10 fingerprint investigation was in any way impeded by the 11 fact that designation as a murder inquiry only took 12 place after the post-mortem examination; whether any 13 significance can properly be attached to the fact that 14 Y7 was disclosed by black powder but not by aluminium 15 powder; and whether there was any substance to the 16 rumours concerning the alleged access of Ms McKie to 43 17 Irvine Road, Kilmarnock, beyond the porch. 18 I have then given a list of witnesses who will be 19 called in that regard. I will not take up time reading 20 out that. 21 THE CHAIRMAN: We will stop now until 1.50. 22 (1.00 pm) 23 (Luncheon Adjournment) 24 (1.50 pm) 25 MR MOYNIHAN: I am now going to turn to chapter 3 to deal page 101 1 with marks XF, QD2 and QI2 and as part of that narrative 2 that deals with the detention of Mr Asbury. 3 XF and the location of the Christmas gift. Mark XF 4 was found on a tag attached to a Christmas present. The 5 present on which this gift tag was found is shown in one 6 of the photographs on a coffee table. The photograph 7 was taken by Mr Moffat. From Mr Moffat's statement 8 there is a possibility that it had been moved to this 9 position to allow for a better photograph. He has a 10 vague recollection of the package being on a wooden unit 11 in a back room. He says that the original location of 12 the gift should be shown on the video. 13 It is possible that the coffee table on which the 14 gift was photographed is to be seen in another 15 photograph but the quality of that photograph shown to 16 Mr Moffat was too poor for him to comment. 17 The Inquiry has the video taken by Mr Moffat. It 18 will be shown to him to clarify where the gift was 19 originally located. 20 Mr McAllister speaks of the gift being found on a 21 settee. 22 The finding of the mark XF. On 13th January 1997 23 the SOCOs Gibbens and MacNeil discovered mark XF on the 24 gift tag. MacNeil has provided a statement. He says 25 that the work was done by Gibbens with MacNeil page 102 1 corroborating. To the best of his recollection Gibbens 2 used black magna powder, found the mark and marked it up 3 with a label. MacNeil took the photographs of the gift 4 set, production 16. He is uncertain who took the 5 photograph of the mark though he thinks that they were 6 taken by Gibbens. 7 Dealing with the identification of XF by the 8 fingerprint officers, at some stage it seems to have 9 been conveyed to SCRO that the Christmas present on 10 which the gift tag was found was of interest to the 11 police. A piece of paper within the SCRO case envelope 12 number 7 contains a scribbled note that reads 13 "Apparently current Xmas present??" Mr Macpherson 14 accepts that he would note such information because it 15 would help him to build up a picture to prioritise his 16 work. On 21st January 1997 a mark found on the gift tag 17 was identified as that of David Asbury. The photograph 18 used by SCRO is available to the Inquiry. 19 The Inquiry has the original of the photograph of 20 the Christmas gift tag on which the SCRO fingerprint 21 officers made markings relative to the identification. 22 Perhaps if we could bring up CO1987, please, that 23 fingerprint. If we could display front and back at the 24 same time if possible. 25 The front of the photograph bears the initials HM, page 103 1 AG, AMcK and a further illegible initial, which 2 according to Ms McBride, is that of Mr Padden. Above 3 the initials the word "screen" is written indicating 4 (according to Mr Geddes) that the comparator has been 5 used. Mr Macpherson agrees that that is what the word 6 signifies. The photograph bears a note in black that 7 the mark was eliminated as that of David Asbury. This 8 has been crossed out, and, in red ink, it has been noted 9 that David Asbury was identified. This reflects 10 Mr Asbury's change in status when he became an accused 11 person. 12 Mr Padden has no recollection of dealing with the 13 mark XF. He accepts that the initials on the 14 photograph may be his, though not exactly the same as 15 the current appearance of his initials. His reason for 16 lack of recollection of any involvement is that at the 17 time it was not unusual for staff to examine an 18 impression on the comparator. 19 On the back of the photograph Mr Macpherson wrote: 20 "DC Kirkland informed of ident info being passed on 21 to DI McAllister. Impression overleaf checked against 22 current form OK. Reversal requested from IB." 23 Mr Macpherson explains that the stickers on the 24 photograph indicate that it was searched on AFR, that's 25 the fingerprint database. He is not sure why image page 104 1 reversal was requested. We have the reversal image. 2 SCRO worksheet BY31 bears an entry by Mr Macpherson 3 in relation to XF. Again, it is recorded in black ink 4 that the mark is eliminated as Mr Asbury's and then is 5 overwritten in red to show that it was identified as 6 David Asbury's. There is, however, nothing on the SCRO 7 worksheet "elimination page 2", the elimination sheet on 8 which XF, was listed, to indicate that it was checked. 9 Mr Macpherson says that it was his practice to go 10 back and write on the photograph when the print was 11 identified. He has been asked about the absence of any 12 record of this identification on the elimination sheet 13 BY6. 14 He says that his initial statement erroneously 15 contains a reference to elimination sheet 4 and not to 16 elimination page 2 as a document that would record the 17 examination of XF. Assuming that that is just a 18 clerical error his explanation for the absence of an 19 entry on the elimination sheet corresponding to the 20 examination of XF is that once the mark had been 21 identified and marked by four experts, there would be 22 need to complete that sheet. 23 His supplementary statement addresses the correct 24 document and he explains that XF had been compared 25 against a number of other individuals before being page 105 1 identified as Mr Asbury. It would have been superfluous 2 to record the finding on BY6 given that it was recorded 3 on BY31 and the photograph. 4 Mr Macpherson says that he compared XF initially 5 against the Asbury elimination print form, had it 6 checked by other experts and then phoned out the result. 7 He says that after the arrest he probably double checked 8 the comparison using the fingerprint form taken on 9 arrest. 10 Mr Geddes says only that the photo of XF records his 11 initials and that the word "screen" shows that it had 12 been done on a comparator. 13 Mr McKenna was involved in the identification of XF. 14 His initials are on the image and the word "screen" 15 means that he examined it on the comparator. The image 16 bears an entry, "Charge form OK". The charge form would 17 have had to be checked against the image when the report 18 was being prepared and the four experts would have to be 19 satisfied with the identification using the charge form. 20 A reversal would have been ordered to have the mark in 21 correct colour sequence. 22 Dealing now with the detention and arrest of 23 Mr Asbury and his first appearance at court. 24 Mr Asbury's grandfather Nimrod Asbury had a building 25 firm that had built the extension to Miss Ross' house. page 106 1 The murder inquiry team had known from 14th January 1997 2 that Nimrod Asbury's grandson had been reported missing. 3 An event file records that this had come to light as 4 part of Inquiry by Detective Sergeant Shields relating 5 to the construction of the extension to Miss Ross' 6 house. As part of that Inquiry Sergeant Shields and 7 Ms McKie attended David Asbury's house and found £1,795 8 in a jar in his room. 9 Ms McKie deals with this in her handwritten police 10 statement dated 21st January and in her Inquiry 11 statement from paragraph 47 to 53. She says that when 12 they found the money in the tin they did not count it 13 exactly but only made a rough estimate relative to the 14 bundles. 15 Mr Asbury returned home on 14th January and was 16 interviewed by police and a statement taken from him on 17 the 16th. At that stage his fingerprints were taken for 18 the purposes of elimination. 19 Mr Heath says that he probably became aware of David 20 Asbury for the first time at a briefing on 14th January. 21 At 2.00 pm on the 21st DC Kirkland told him of the 22 identification of mark XF as David Asbury's. Mr Heath 23 regarded this as an important development. At this 24 point dating the gift became a focus of the Inquiry. 25 David Asbury was now a "TIE suspect", that is to say a page 107 1 suspect required to be traced, interviewed, and 2 eliminated. 3 On 21st January Chief Inspector Heath met staff at 4 the Fiscal's office, John McLellan and John McMeneny. 5 He also prepared a report to the Procurator Fiscal 6 requesting a warrant to search David Asbury's home. The 7 warrant was granted that day. 8 Mr McAllister's evidence. He explains that the 9 Christmas gift was an item of significance to the 10 police. The identification of the mark would have been 11 communicated by him to SCRO and he described it as "a 12 very meaningful identification" to which he attached 13 great significance. He discussed it with Mr Heath and 14 it was enough to consider David Asbury a suspect. 15 On 22nd January Asbury was detained under section 14 16 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 and his 17 house was searched. 18 A number of police officers attended David Asbury's 19 home to carry out the search. Geraldine Davidson, a 20 Forensic Biologist, attended to provide scientific 21 support in case any blood stains should be found. 22 Police Constable John Greer video recorded the search. 23 The Marks & Spencer's tin containing money was 24 recovered, sealed and labelled and taken to Kilmarnock 25 Police Station. It was found to contain £2,240 in page 108 1 notes, that is £445 more than when first examined by 2 Ms McKie and Sergeant Shields on 14th January. 3 Mr Asbury was taken to a police station for 4 interview. At interview he denied being within the 5 house of the deceased since the renovation work was 6 undertaken. He, accordingly, advanced no explanation 7 for his fingerprint being found on the gift tag. He 8 also delayed for 38 seconds before replying in the 9 negative to the direct question whether or not he 10 murdered Miss Ross. At the conclusion of the interview 11 Mr Heath instructed the interviewers (Shield and 12 Ferguson) to arrest David Asbury and charge him with 13 murder. 14 While his arrest prints were being taken, he started 15 to make a voluntary statement admitting having been in 16 the house to use the phone when his car broke down two 17 or three days before the murder. Mr Heath arranged for 18 officers previously unconnected with the inquiry to be 19 brought in and his voluntary statement was tape recorded 20 in their presence. This was to the effect that he had 21 called at the house of the deceased because his car had 22 broken down and he wanted to call his mother. He then 23 said that he had realised that the car had run out of 24 petrol and had therefore not placed the call. He said 25 that the deceased had shown him around the house and page 109 1 that he had used the toilet and then left. On a point 2 of detail, there seems to have been some discrepancy 3 between the taped interview and DI 4 McDonald's handwritten record of the voluntary 5 statement. Reference was made to a note by the Advocate 6 Depute to the Lord Advocate regarding this. 7 On 23rd January David Asbury appeared on petition at 8 Kilmarnock Sheriff Court and was remanded in custody for 9 further examination. 10 Turning to the Christmas gift tag, the police 11 inquiries indicated that David Asbury could not have 12 placed the mark on the tag during the time he worked at 13 the house in 1995. The Narrative of Facts in the 14 precognition for HMA v Asbury summarises the evidence in 15 this regard. 16 The gift was a wrapped boxed set of soap. Although 17 the tag was of a type that had been on sale for 18 Christmas 1995 and 1996, a receipt was found in 19 Miss Ross' house indicating a purchase of gift tags and 20 wrapping paper on 18th November 1996. The boxed set of 21 soap was of a type not manufactured before 1996. 22 The police summary is dated 22nd January 1997 and 23 Mr Heath says that it was given to the Procurator Fiscal 24 on 23rd January. It records the evidence that the 25 police then had against Mr Asbury. It also indicated page 110 1 that the police were following a positive line of 2 Inquiry regarding the possibility that the money, and 3 perhaps also the tin, had been taken from the deceased. 4 The police summary states that: "the £2,240 recovered in 5 the bedroom of the accused on 22nd January 1997 will be 6 examined for blood and the fingerprints of the 7 deceased." 8 This is reinforced by examination of the HOLMES 9 event file. The entry for 23rd January includes the 10 following: 11 "The money found in his house with the clothing and 12 the footwear to be a priority for examination. 13 Financial profile of Asbury required ASAP. The sweet 14 jar/tin found in the house containing money from 15 Marks & Spencers to be fingerprinted." 16 On Thursday 23rd January, Lupton and PC Donald 17 MacKay took further impressions from the deceased in 18 order to obtain prints of the flexure areas between the 19 fingers and palms. Mr Macpherson explains that the 20 fingerprints were retaken in connection with his 21 investigation of a horseshoe shape on a chair in 22 Miss Ross' house. 23 The Inquiry has a copy of a register showing receipt 24 at the forensic laboratory of "cash contained in tin". 25 The date of receipt is not clear from this document. page 111 1 However, the Inquiry also has a laboratory receipt dated 2 the 23rd relating to "£2,240 cash contained in 3 Marks & Spencers tin". There's a further document date 4 stamped, 27th January, by the Strathclyde Police 5 Forensic Laboratory, and it includes in the list of 6 articles submitted "£2,240 cash in Marks & Spencers 7 tin". 8 On Friday 24th January Geraldine Davidson examined 9 the Marks & Spencers tin at the Strathclyde 10 Forensic Science Laboratory. She examined it visually 11 for blood staining, and did not find any. She did not 12 carry out chemical tests because it was intended 13 to examine the tin for fingerprints. 14 Mr MacNeil says that the cash (and presumably the 15 tin) were handed to the identification branch on 24th 16 January and he signed for them. The IB had the cash and 17 tin until 27th January until their work was completed. 18 SCRO case envelope vii contains the following note 19 written by Charles Stewart to Hugh Macpherson. It 20 reads: 21 "DI McAllister was in on Saturday. He did not know 22 about other mark eliminated, he is getting elims for the 23 two plumbers who installed the shower, et cetera. Told 24 him marks (if any) from money not with us yet. Sunday 25 Stevie Heath brought in accused tin print number 3.30.1 page 112 1 and elims." 2 That's the end of the note. 3 The Saturday would have been 25th January and the 4 Sunday would have been the 26th. Mr Heath confirms that 5 McAllister had been in to SCRO on the 25th and that he 6 visited on the Sunday. 7 Mr Macpherson says it was normal to send notes like 8 this. 9 By 25th January the police were aware of evidence 10 that the money found in the tin was folded in a way that 11 Miss Ross had folded money when she was employed in the 12 bank. This is noted in a briefing paper of that date in 13 the handwriting of Mr McAllister. In a manuscript note 14 Mr McAllister updated Mr Heath with more detail from DS 15 Shields regarding the money. 16 Mr Heath does not doubt that SCRO would have been 17 told that the police regarded the tin and the money as 18 significant and been asked to direct their resources 19 towards examination of marks on these items. 20 At some stage SCRO were made aware that the tin 21 containing cash was of particular interest to the 22 police. There is a handwritten note in the SCRO case 23 envelope vii in these terms: 24 "Gift tag bought 18/11/96. They are hopeful about 25 the tin the money was in. There is an area the same page 113 1 size as the tin on her bedside table, clearly seen with 2 dust around it. Tin recovered at accused's." 3 The note was written by Charles Stewart. He does 4 not recall writing it, but would have passed the note to 5 Mr Macpherson. Mr Macpherson accepts that he must have 6 read the note at the time but he has no recollection of 7 it now. Mr Heath accepts that the use of the word 8 "hope" could be viewed in some quarters as inappropriate 9 but may be only over exuberance. 10 The "shape in dust" is mentioned in the HOLMES 11 policy file for 26th January, and it may be reasonable 12 to infer that it was about this time (around the weekend 13 of 25th or 26th January) that the information about this 14 line of Inquiry was passed to SCRO. 15 Mr Heath has no recollection of anything to do with 16 shapes in dust. He views this as a matter of 17 significance and finds it unusual that he was not 18 informed of it at the time. 19 Mr McAllister's evidence: at one point in his 20 statement he says he has no recollection of this, later 21 saying that the note refers to someone having thought 22 that there had been a dust mark in Miss Ross' house that 23 may have fitted the shape of the tin, "but it was no 24 more than a thought". There was a discussion but he has 25 no recollection of how the "dust mark theory" page 114 1 progressed. 2 He does not know who supplied this information to 3 SCRO but it was the sort of information that would be 4 mentioned at debriefs or contact meetings. Speaking 5 specifically of the first part of the message, relating 6 to the gift tag, he says that the amount of information 7 given to SCRO was a mater for the discretion of the 8 senior investigating officer and there were variations 9 between officers in that regard. Then he makes this 10 personal observation: 11 "The benefit of communicating this type of 12 information was, on a fundamental level of motivation 13 and team working, making every department, including 14 back room staff, involved with the case a part of the 15 investigating team." 16 Mr Brown says that he has received information about 17 a dust free shape on a shelf in Miss Ross' house 18 identical to the shape of the tin found in Asbury's 19 room. He regards this as crucial evidence and has tried 20 to identify the source of the information. He 21 understands that Charles Stewart, the fingerprint 22 officer, has the answer and he refers to a note in the 23 "case papers". 24 On 27th January Mr Heath submitted a follow-up 25 report to the Procurator Fiscal concentrating on the page 115 1 manner in which the bank notes found in the tin had been 2 folded. The report states that fingerprint, forensic 3 and handwriting examinations were to take place to 4 endeavour to prove that the money belonged to Miss Ross. 5 Turning to Mr MacNeil, on Monday 27th January 6 Mr MacNeil and Leslie Gibbens examined the tin for 7 fingerprints. They used superglue, basic yellow and 8 Quaser light methods. 9 Examination disclosed two prints on the lid (QE2 10 through QF2) and six others on the outside of the tin. 11 QI2 was one of those found on the outside. The use of 12 the letter Q indicates the use of Quaser light 13 examination. 14 He is reasonably certain that he photographed the 15 marks. 16 The negatives were retained by the identification 17 branch in lift envelope 97. 18 QD2, this is mark QD2 now. On the same day, 27th 19 January, Gibbens and MacNeil also examined the money 20 which had been submitted for examination. They used a 21 chemical developer and Quaser light to find mark QD2. 22 They took a photograph of QD2 though Mr MacNeil has no 23 recollection of preparing a reverse image. 24 To the best of his recollection Mr MacNeil knew at 25 the time that the police regarded the money and the tin page 116 1 as significant but he cannot now recollect how that was 2 communicated to him. 3 I will deal now with form 13B and perhaps if we 4 could bring up the document DB0251, this is the form 5 13B. Mr MacNeil and Mr Gibbens completed that form 13B 6 relating to the series of marks QB2 to QL2. It is a 7 form that is used when fingerprints are sent to SCRO. 8 The series of marks to which this form relates includes 9 both QI2 and QD2. 10 The specific form 13B relating to the marks QB2 to 11 QL2 is one of the series of documents that the Inquiry 12 has and contains an entry in Mr MacNeil's handwriting: 13 "ident required for deceased." 14 None of the other form 13Bs relating to marks in 15 this case contains a similar entry. Mr MacNeil explains 16 that this would be the type of expression that would be 17 used where a scene of crimes officer has some knowledge 18 of the potential significance of the production to the 19 criminal investigation and wanted to ensure that it was 20 not overlooked. He concedes that the word "comparison" 21 might have been more appropriate than "ident". 22 Mr Heath attended at the lab, IB and SCRO meeting on 23 29th January and fingerprint officers may have been 24 present but he cannot recall. The purpose of such a 25 meeting was to explain the priorities in the case. His page 117 1 briefing notes for the 29th refer to elimination of 2 prints and he observes that this was critical at this 3 stage. 4 SCRO crime scene Marks Worksheet BY31 bears a record 5 that Alister Geddes received the photograph of QI2 at 6 SCRO on 29th January. That is consistent with the date 7 stamp on form 13B. 8 Turning to the identification of QD2 and the 9 photograph of that is SG0691 and 2. We have here the 10 front and back of the photograph. This mark was 11 received in SCRO on 29th January and identified that 12 same day as the right little finger of David Asbury. 13 The entry on Marks Worksheet BY31 relating to QD2 14 was completed by Mr Macpherson. 15 For the purposes of the later civil proceedings the 16 Scottish Executive commissioned a report by Michael Pass 17 dated 30th January 2006. Attached to that report is a 18 copy of an image of QD2 with manuscript writing relating 19 to the identification and a manuscript note ostensibly 20 from the reverse of that image recording that QD2 21 identification was reported to DI McAllister that day. 22 That note was written by Mr Macpherson. 23 The Inquiry does not have the original of that 24 annotated image of QD2. However, the Inquiry does have 25 a photographic original of this mark lodged by the page 118 1 prosecution at the Asbury trial and has the negatives of 2 that image. 3 The copy of QD2 is annotated with four sets of 4 initials. Though Mr Macpherson is not sure about the 5 third set of initials, the consensus is that the 6 initials are those of Macpherson, Geddes, Orr and 7 McBride. 8 Mr Geddes says that the initials are his, 9 Mr Macpherson, James Orr and (possibly) Miss McBride. 10 He understands the image to have been received and the 11 result phoned out all on 29th January 1997. 12 Shown the copy of QD2 Ms McBride says her initials 13 are on it and therefore she must have been one of those 14 who initially either identified or eliminated the mark 15 as that of David Asbury. The others were Macpherson, 16 Orr and Geddes. 17 In due course QD2 was reported in a joint report 18 dated 17th March 1997 by Macpherson, Stewart, McBride 19 and McKenna. That became production 100 in the Asbury 20 trial. 21 Mr McKenna was not involved with QD2 at the 22 investigation stage. 23 Turning to the full committal of Mr Asbury, while 24 the fingerprint comparison work was ongoing the 25 Kilmarnock Procurator Fiscal sent a report to Crown page 119 1 Office, known as the three-day report, with a view to 2 obtaining Crown counsel's instructions on full 3 committal. 4 The preliminary stages in a murder case are as 5 follows: there are two hearings in court. At the first 6 hearing the accused person appears on petition and may 7 be judicially examined. The second hearing occurs not 8 later than eight clear days after the first hearing. At 9 the second hearing the accused will be fully committed 10 for trial and, at that time, a charge of murder would 11 invariably result in the accused being remanded in 12 custody. 13 The decision to place the accused on petition is a 14 matter for the local Procurator Fiscal but an accused 15 person may only be fully committed for trial if Crown 16 Counsel (that is to one say of the Lord Advocate's 17 deputes working in the Crown Office in Edinburgh) has 18 authorised the application to the Sheriff. The local 19 fiscal is required to submit a report to the Crown 20 Office within three days of the accused first appearing 21 on petition. This report is known as a "three day 22 report" and its purpose is to inform the decision by 23 Crown Counsel whether there is sufficient evidence to 24 commit the accused for trial on a charge of murder. 25 The author of the three day report was page 120 1 Mr MacTaggart, a Procurator Fiscal Depute. The report 2 was dated 28th January, and was received at Crown Office 3 on 29th January. 4 The three day report was studied by William 5 Gallacher, a Procurator Fiscal Depute who was then the 6 head of the High Court Unit in Crown Office, and passed 7 by him to the Duty Advocate Depute for instructions. 8 Mr Gallacher appended a note on a yellow slip. I will 9 read part of that. He wrote: 10 "I have asked the Procurator Fiscal to clarify what 11 the evidence is of his family regarding 5th to 12 7th January. Police say they cannot support the 13 accused -- I have asked him just what they say. At JE 14 [that's judicial examination] the accused says he was in 15 the house on 4th January '97 and at home between 5th and 16 7th January. As for money I have asked for an 17 explanation as to the differences in amounts, whether 18 all the money is folded unusually and for what the 19 accused actually says about it." 20 The immediately following slip, dated 30th January, 21 is from Ronnie Clancy and simply reads: 22 "CC [that is Crown Counsel] instruct FC [that is 23 full committal] murder." 24 That is the traditionally brief instruction from an 25 Advocate Depute (Crown Counsel) authorising the local page 121 1 Procurator Fiscal Depute to apply to the court to have 2 Mr Asbury fully committed for trial. 3 Mr Heath confirms that the Fiscal did contact him on 4 30th January and he met with Mr MacTaggart that day to 5 discuss two matters. The first was the way the money 6 was folded and the second was the evidence regarding 7 David Asbury's whereabouts from 6th January. Mr Heath 8 has provided notes that he prepared for that meeting. 9 Mr Heath recalls Mr McMenemy saying to him at some 10 point that it was "a fairly circumstantial case". He 11 says that this was more likely when he delivered the 12 "Custody Case", which (read in context) is presumably a 13 reference back to 23rd January. 14 Mr Asbury was fully committed for trial on 31st 15 January 1997. 16 The now Sheriff Crowe met Mr McMenemy on 17 30th July 2000 when, as Depute Crown Agent, he went to 18 Kilmarnock to view fingerprints with Rasmusson and 19 Rokkjaer. Sheriff Crowe notes that a prime facie case 20 was required for full committal and adds: 21 "Mr McMenemy's recollection is that at the very last 22 minute the police were able to produce the Marion Ross 23 fingerprint on the biscuit tin found in David Asbury's 24 home and he had been slightly suspicious about that at 25 the time. He was aware that it was an evidentially thin page 122 1 case from the outset and police (sic) had been 2 especially thorough in their search for evidence." 3 Turning now to the separate matter of the 4 identification of QI2, photograph which is at DB0001. 5 QI2 was not identified until 31st January. Again, the 6 Inquiry has the original of the photograph with markings 7 by SCRO fingerprint officers relating to the 8 identification. The back of the photograph -- which I 9 think is the next image -- bears a record dated 31st 10 January 1997 written by Mr Macpherson. The initials 11 refer to Hugh Macpherson, Alister Geddes, Charles 12 Stewart and Edward Bruce and it reads: 13 "Deceased's on screen 31/01/97 HMcP/CS/AG/EB 14 (written in red ink). Accused's on screen 15 31/01/97 HMcP/AG/EB/CS (red ink), D/IMCDonald informed 16 31/01/97 12.25 of above idents. Info to be passed onto 17 D/McAllister ..." and that's in black ink. 18 There is a record also on Crime Scene Marks 19 Worksheet BY31 where against QI2 there appears "QI2 20 (part of) IDENT'D NO'2 of DECEASED" (in red ink). The 21 photograph and Mark Worksheet also contain references to 22 two further crime scene marks within the cluster 23 labelled QI2 as having been identified as belonging to 24 David Asbury. 25 In contrast to what is seen on the image of XF and page 123 1 in the entry in the Marks Worksheet in relation to XF 2 where black entries are changed to red, there is no 3 indication that what is being done in relation to QI2 is 4 an elimination process which then becomes an 5 identification process. 6 Mr Heath confirms that he was told of this 7 identification by Mr McDonald on 31st January and that 8 he passed this information on to the Fiscal, 9 Mr McMenemy. 10 That was the day of the full committal hearing but 11 the day after Crown Counsel had instructed full 12 committal. 13 The points that are noted in relation to QI2 -- if 14 we could bring up again DB0251 and also C00197H3 -- I am 15 sorry, DB0251 -- and that's the one 13 at the top and 16 then the worksheet below. There are two points peculiar 17 to QI2. The form 13B relating to the series QB2 to QL2 18 uniquely contained the specific line of inquiry -- the 19 entry: "IDENT REQUIRED FOR DECEASED". 20 There is no record of this series being checked 21 against anyone other than Mr Asbury and Miss Ross. That 22 is the lower sheet you see just now. 23 Mr McKenna describes the use of this language as 24 unprofessional and concedes that it is open to 25 misinterpretation but says that SCRO experts were a hard page 124 1 group to pressurise. He had no involvement with QI2 at 2 the investigation stage. 3 Mr Mackenzie is unable to explain why the 4 elimination of Miss Ross' fingerprint as matched to QI2 5 is not documented in elimination worksheet BY6, which is 6 the lower of the two documents on the screen. 7 Fiona McBride, although not involved in the initial 8 identification of this mark, suggests that the notation 9 "ident required for the deceased" was to let the 10 fingerprint examiners know that the mark was important, 11 and was to be examined to the identification (ie 16 12 point) standard and not merely as an ordinary 13 elimination. Charles Stewart's reading of this is 14 similar to Fiona McBride's -- it signifies that the mark 15 is of particular interest to the Senior Investigating 16 Officer. Neither would read it as a command to make an 17 identification. 18 Equally, Fiona McBride explains that it would be 19 logical to examine the mark against Asbury (it was found 20 on a tin in his house) and Miss Ross before anyone else. 21 Mr Macpherson explains his ordinary method of 22 working in his principal statement. Having firstly 23 determined which marks to set aside as fragmentary and 24 insufficient, his second stage was to check marks 25 against elimination forms and then, thirdly, check marks page 125 1 against the suspects in the case. 2 Mr Macpherson deals with the two specific points 3 relating to QI2 in his supplementary statement. "Ident 4 required for deceased": means a request to compare the 5 marks against the deceased's prints. It was an 6 important identification because the tin was found in 7 Asbury's house and was not like the other 8 identifications of marks of the deceased (ie, of things 9 found in her house). 10 As for the fact that QI2 may have been compared only 11 against Asbury and Miss Ross he gives the same 12 explanation as Miss McBride: in light of the information 13 that SCRO had about the tin it would be logical to 14 compare against these two. The information that SCRO 15 would have had would have included the manuscript note 16 DB0256 that told them that the police were interested in 17 the tin and any involvement of Miss Ross with it. 18 The cross through the columns in the elimination 19 worksheet BY6 for marks QB2 to QL2 signifies that there 20 was no need to compare these marks against the persons 21 listed. Marks Worksheet BY31 shows that all of the 22 marks in this bundle were determined to be fragmentary 23 and insufficient or identified as that of Asbury or 24 Miss Ross and there was therefore no more work to be 25 done on them. page 126 1 Mr Heath says that Mr McAllister was responsible for 2 liaison with SCRO and he has no doubt that SCRO would 3 have been told that the tin and the money were 4 significant. Logically the police would want marks on 5 the tin and money compared with Mr Asbury and Miss Ross 6 but they would have been interested in all marks on the 7 tin because in Heath's view it was likely that there was 8 more than one person involved. 9 Mr McAllister does not know the purpose of the note 10 "ident required". He does, though, accept that in his 11 liaison role he would have given an indication to SCRO 12 of which prints he would like eliminated as a priority 13 and, for example, in relation to the money in the tin he 14 faxed SCRO names of known associates of Mr Asbury and 15 would have asked that they be checked against the money. 16 In the SCRO case envelope murder (vii) There are 17 manuscript notes that relate to a debrief on 18 13th January 1997. On page 3 of those notes there are 19 entries indicating that SCRO would receive an exhaustive 20 series of eliminations and Mr Thurley was to act as the 21 liaison officer in relation to the comparisons. The 22 notes were written by Mr Macpherson. 23 Similarly it may be noted that manuscript numbers 24 have been inserted against the individuals name on the 25 elimination work sheets BY6, for example, in page number page 127 1 2 and 4. On BY6 page numbered 2 is marked that those 2 numbers show the order in which to proceed. That would 3 be consistent with the SCRO working to a ranking 4 prioritising the people to be checked. 5 An issue that the Inquiry will have to explore is 6 whether this exchange of information between the police 7 and the fingerprint officers was an appropriate 8 operational matter necessary to prioritise the work of 9 the fingerprint officers or was a practice that posed 10 the risk of subconsciously influencing the 11 identification process. 12 Turning then to the SCRO examination of QI2 and QI2 13 is again DB0001, the identification of part of QI2 as a 14 fingerprint of Miss Ross is the subject of dispute and 15 therefore it is necessary to look closely at the 16 evidence relating to this identification. 17 A distinction has to be drawn between the initial 18 examination and the preparation of the report for court. 19 The notation on the back of the image of QI2 records 20 that it was examined by Hugh Macpherson, Alister Geddes, 21 Charles Stewart, and Edward Bruce. The SCRO report for 22 the Asbury trial is dated 17th March. It was signed by 23 Hugh Macpherson, Charles Stewart, Fiona McBride, Anthony 24 McKenna. This chapter is considering matters 25 chronologically and will review the evidence relating to page 128 1 the initial examination. The preparation of the report 2 will be addressed in chapter 6. 3 So the evidence of the fingerprint examiners. 4 Mr Macpherson's evidence: he was the first fingerprint 5 examiner to examine QI2. He did not tend to keep 6 working notes and therefore there is no permanent record 7 of the specific characteristics that he used in forming 8 his opinion. (Keep up DB0001 and keep them up 9 side-by-side). 10 He thinks he may have known that the tin came from 11 the accused's house. From memory, he thought it had 12 come from the accused's bedroom. That would be 13 consistent with the entry in the "serious and noteworthy 14 crimes" SCRO fingerprint bulletin. Two marks were 15 identified on QI2: one was finger 2 of Marion Ross and 16 the other was finger 3 of David Asbury. His 17 identification of these two fingers is recorded on the 18 image of QI2. He found a further digit which he 19 considered was number 6 of the accused but did not find 20 16 points of similarity (it was less than 10 points). 21 He used the original prints from Miss Ross in making 22 his comparison. He would use fingerprint glasses for 23 his initial comparison. He used both the crime scene 24 mark and the known print at the time at the same time. 25 He did not look at one first and then identify minutiae page 129 1 before considering the other. 2 Once he had identified a match, he would use the 3 comparator machine to mark the points of comparison. 4 The following examiner would check his findings and 5 that person would tend to do their first assessment on 6 the comparator, taking the items away and looking at 7 them under glass if they were not satisfied. When the 8 second examiner came along, the first examiner's work 9 would still be on screen and it was for the second 10 examiner to decide to rub them off or not. Examiners 11 would initial the screen as a tracking log, with the 12 initials being marked on the photograph later. 13 He says that it looks as if the next person to view 14 QI2 in relation to the deceased's mark was Charles 15 Stewart. The second person looking at the mark in 16 relation to David Asbury was Mr Geddes. 17 The note on the back of QI2 records that both 18 identifications in QI2 were passed to DI MacDonald at 19 12.25 on 31st January, the information then passed on to 20 Mr McAllister. This records a telephone call that 21 Mr Macpherson made. In his supplementary statement, he 22 addresses the fact that in the marks worksheet BY31 the 23 mark is referred to as "identified" as the deceased, 24 whereas for other marks it was "eliminated" as the 25 deceased. The explanation is that QI2 was important. page 130 1 It was the finding of the deceased's print on an object 2 in Mr Asbury's house and not the finding of her print on 3 an object in her own house. 4 Mr Foley also says that second, third or fourth 5 checker might look at the mark on the comparator. The 6 checker might find a colleague's markings on screen to 7 see what they could see, but would wipe the screen and 8 start afresh to satisfy himself that he could find 16 9 characteristics. This he describes as a form of 10 discussion between the experts. He adds that the final 11 checker would put the initials of those who had checked 12 the mark on the back of the photograph. 13 Ms McBride has no memory of being involved with the 14 initial identification but reads the markings on the 15 back of QI2 as indicating that it was viewed on the 16 comparator. 17 Turning to Charles Stewart, he too did not keep 18 notes. There would be regular dialogue between the 19 Senior Investigating Officer and the fingerprint officer 20 with the police setting the priorities for SCRO. The 21 fingerprint officer would take care as to what 22 information he passed on to his team letting them know 23 only what they needed to know. 24 Though he has no memory of it, he accepts that he 25 wrote, and would have passed on to Mr Macpherson the page 131 1 note that reads: 2 "They are hopeful about the tin the money was in. 3 There is an area the same size as the tin on her bedside 4 table, clearly seen with dust round it. Tin recovered 5 at accused's." 6 He also does not recall seeing the form 13B relating 7 to the mark. 8 He does not recall being told anything about the 9 mark beforehand by Mr Macpherson. 10 He construes the term "on screen" on the image as 11 meaning no more than the individuals had been offered 12 the chance to look at the marks on the comparator. 13 He has no recollection of using the comparator 14 machine. He cannot remember if he saw anyone else's 15 markings on the screen. He may have marked up the 16 screen with his views but he does not think he used the 17 machine. 18 He would have carried out the comparison in the 19 usual way. He would have used glasses and would have 20 looked at the mark and the print simultaneously. Once 21 he had identified 16 characteristics in sequence and 22 agreement he would have stopped. There would have been 23 no point in continuing. 24 He would have used the print taken from Miss Ross on 25 10th January because they were clearer. page 132 1 Mr Geddes: in 1997 it was not his practice to keep 2 working notes of his comparisons. Looking at the words 3 "on screen" written on the back of QI2, he says that the 4 mark and the photograph have been placed on the 5 comparator for various experts to view. 6 They are likely to have looked at the marks in the 7 order in which the initials were marked on the 8 photograph assuming that Mr Macpherson wrote the 9 initials in the same sequence. 10 The expert would mark the screen and initial it. 11 He recalls being asked to do the third check on QI2. 12 The mark was of poor quality but better than Y7. He 13 identified the mark as Miss Ross and found 16 14 characteristics on the comparator. Later in the 15 statement he says that he compared QI2 against Miss Ross 16 and Mr Asbury either under the glasses or on the 17 comparator. 18 There would have been markings on the screen before 19 he started but he would have wiped them. He also 20 accepts that he may have known from the Marks Worksheet 21 which finger he was dealing with. 22 His recollection is that QI2 was not a clear cut, 23 run-of-the-mill mark. He thinks that there had been 24 interference with the mark which made ridge detail 25 difficult to find but he was able to make an page 133 1 identification. 2 The lines through elimination worksheet BY6 mean 3 that the prints have all been dealt with, though he 4 accepts that technically that sheet should have been 5 completed. It is all accounted for on BY31. 6 Turning to Edward Bruce's evidence, he has no memory 7 of being involved with QI2. His signature does not 8 appear on any of the documentation. His initials on the 9 photograph of QI2 were not written by him. This is 10 consistent with the possibility that he may have seen it 11 on the comparator. He says that only those who 12 identified 16 characteristics would sign the case 13 envelope. Then he says: 14 "As I had not identified 16 characteristics, I did 15 not sign the envelope." 16 The envelope that relates to QI2, both the 17 part identified as Miss Ross and the part identified 18 Mr Asbury, is available to the Inquiry. Mr Macpherson 19 says that it is signed by Macpherson, Stewart, Geddes, 20 McKenna and McBride. Miss McBride agrees that list of 21 signatories, including confirming that she signed the 22 case envelope, though she cannot remember doing so. On 23 the other hand, Mr McKenna seems to think that 24 Mr Bruce's signature is on the envelope, though he 25 cannot explain why that would be so. page 134 1 Mr Macpherson explains the absence of Mr Bruce's 2 signature by saying that the persons by whom it was 3 signed would depend on who was available to him at the 4 time. Miss McBride cannot explain why he did not sign 5 it. 6 In addition to the original material prepared for 7 the criminal trials the Inquiry also has also been 8 provided with productions prepared for the proof in 9 Ms McKie's damages claim. One of those in the booklet 10 bearing the signature of Mr Bruce and relating to QI2. 11 Mr Bruce comments on that booklet saying it was: 12 "A charting [he] was asked to prepare of what [he] 13 thought [he] might have seen in 1997." 14 He thinks that he was working from copies and not 15 the originals of the mark. He marked 12 points of 16 comparison and adds: 17 "I think I marked about 12 points of comparison [and 18 that's correct] but stated the quality of the mark was 19 poor and I would not have gone to court to say this was 20 an identification. At best it was an elimination." 21 Mr Bruce gave two statements to Operation Alba with 22 reference to QI2 dated 21st and 26th September. Those 23 statements are as vague as his statement to the Inquiry 24 and are at best conjectural that his initials on the 25 photograph imply that he may have seen QI2 on a page 135 1 comparator at the time. 2 That concludes the chapter 3 analysis on which the 3 issues are: what was the nature and extent of the 4 information supplied to SCRO fingerprint examiners about 5 the marks found on the Marks & Spencers tin? Why did 6 the form 13B prepared in relation to the group of marks 7 including QI2 contain the message "ident required for 8 deceased"? What discussions took place between police 9 and Crown regarding the sufficiency of the case 10 against David Asbury prior to full committal? What 11 steps were taken in relation to the identification and 12 verification of marks XF, QI2 and QD2? In particular, 13 to what extent were checks on the initial identification 14 of each of these marks based only on examinations on the 15 comparator? Finally, why are the elimination and 16 identification of QI2 not more fully documented? There 17 is a list given of the individuals as witnesses I have 18 named. 19 Turning to chapter 4 and this is the finding of Y7 20 and Z7 and perhaps if we could bring up, please, the 21 three items here DB0003, AA0002 page 4 and the Y7 22 photograph which is PS0002. 23 The photographs, top left-hand corner PS0002. Mark 24 Y7 was found on 14th January 1997. It was found at the 25 same time as, and in close proximity to, a partial page 136 1 palm-print Z7. Scene of Crime Officers Mr Moffat, 2 Wilson and Hunter were redusting the area around 3 Miss Ross' body with black powder after James Kerr or Mr 4 Moffat had drawn attention to a mark on skirting board 5 that had not shown up well with aluminium powder. 6 Mr Moffat says that the Scene of Crime Officers 7 present decided to redust the area with the black powder 8 and that he was aware from past experience that the use 9 of black powder could enhance the quality of a print. 10 Mr Wilson says that because the door was near the 11 kitchen and bathroom they thought the surfaces might be 12 contaminated by grease and subject to condensation and 13 that black powder might bring up something where 14 aluminium powder might not. 15 Mr Wilson was brushing the surface with Mr Hunter 16 shining the torch. Mr Moffat photographed the prints 17 that appeared. His recollection is that they brought up 18 another 12 or so marks. A register of the marks found 19 is available to the Inquiry. If we could look in the 20 image which is at the top right-hand corner and blow up, 21 there is Y7 just now there marked in yellow. Y7 down 22 to ... blow up the bottom quarter of the right-hand 23 section. In the right-hand page halfway down the page 24 you will find in the middle column the first entry in 25 the column to Y7. Can you blow up the bottom right-hand page 137 1 corner. 2 So Mr Wilson was dusting the surface with Mr Hunter 3 shining the torch and Mr Moffat photographed the prints 4 that appeared. His recollection is that brought up 5 another 12 or so marks. We have a register of them. 6 Mr Moffat noted the location and used arrow heads to 7 depict the orientation of Y7 in his notebook AA0002 and 8 that's what's highlighted on the screen at present. He 9 wrote: 10 "Y7 right-hand side hallway bathroom door surround 11 5 feet", and then an arrow pointing straight up. He 12 marks ditto for Z7 and there is a corresponding entry 13 for A8 found on the left-hand side of the bathroom door 14 facing. Beneath these three entries he wrote "possible, 15 sweat print, appears fresh". He explains this in 48 to 16 50 of his statement. 17 This is a non-scientific description, with "fresh" 18 signifying that Y7 showed up well with good contrast or 19 good definition between the ridges. He says of mark A8 20 that he was hoping that it was not linked to Y7 and Z7 21 because "it appeared fresh and possibly the 22 assailant's." 23 If we could side-by-side with that also the IMDE333, 24 page 17 and on this occasion it's the top three lines. 25 That should be fine. Take the top three lines and page 138 1 highlight them. It says right-hand side hallway door 2 surround Y7. He also recorded the finding of these 3 prints on mark worksheet BY31. He has not been able to 4 explain to difference in the direction of the arrow for 5 A8 as between his own notebook and the work sheet. Both 6 should be pointing straight up. 7 Mr Moffat says that he took his photographs on the 8 14th and the film would have gone for development on the 9 14th before being received by SCRO. He says that the Y7 10 image bearing handwriting of SCRO officers on PS0002 is 11 a copy of the photograph that may have been taken by 12 him. He also confirms that the negatives of the marks 13 Y7 to T9 in the envelope are the negatives of the 14 photographs taken by him. 15 DC Kerr was present when Y7 was found. He noted 16 tape marks where the initial aluminium lifts had been 17 removed from the doorframe. He did not find the 18 discovery of additional marks unusual. He says that 19 Stuart Wilson may have commented that Y7 may have come 20 from a child or young woman. It looked to him like a 21 plain print and was not a smear mark. It looked to him 22 like a pressed print image. 23 Mr Wilson says he has no recollection now of where 24 Y7 and Z7 were found. To the best of his recollection 25 Y7 was not visible before he started dusting with black page 139 1 powder and there was no sign of disturbance of the 2 aluminium powder. 3 He is, accordingly, of the opinion that the prints 4 found with the black powder had been there before the 5 application of aluminium powder. This is consistent 6 with his Operation Alba statement in July 2000, however, 7 the precognition noted from him by the Procurator Fiscal 8 on 8th December 1997 for the McKie case contains the 9 opposite opinion. Mr Wilson says that that precognition 10 does not reflect his views then or now. 11 Mr Carle's note of Mr Wilson's evidence at the McKie 12 trial indicates that Mr Wilson's evidence is consistent 13 with his statement to the Inquiry: his opinion was that 14 Y7 was on the doorframe before the application of the 15 aluminium powder. His evidence is in section 34 of that 16 note. 17 Just dealing with the visit by Mr Macpherson and 18 Geddes on 17th January 1997. Mr Macpherson visited the 19 locus on 17th January 1997 with Mr Geddes to view a 20 print on a chair. He believed that he saw Y7 at that 21 time because it was an important mark. 22 Mr Geddes similarly says that Y7 was viewed. He 23 noted its position and could see that it was potentially 24 going to be a thumb print but there was no discussion. 25 The visit did not confirm it as a left or a right. You page 140 1 don't know where the person was when they made it. 2 That may be a good point to stop. 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, we will stop now until 3.00. 4 (2.48 pm) 5 (A short break) 6 (3.00 pm) 7 MR MOYNIHAN: Having spoken about the visit by fingerprint 8 officers on 17th January, I am now going to turn to the 9 second visit on 23rd January by Mr McAllister and 10 Mr Moffat. Mr Moffat speaks to a visit to the house on 11 23rd January. He was asked by Mr McAllister to go to 12 the locus to review some of the fingerprints. He had 13 not done that before. On reflection, he now has 14 concerns as to why he was asked to visit the scene. 15 Mr McAllister wanted to ask for an opinion on certain 16 marks at the scene. He was mainly interested in Y7 and 17 Z7 but also discussed A8. Mr McAllister asked about the 18 age of the prints. Mr Moffat says that he told 19 Mr McAllister that he was sure that they were Gray's 20 prints and that he recounted the incident with the burst 21 glove. Mr Moffat says this: 22 "DI McAllister clearly indicated that the prints 23 were not Gary Gray's and that they had been identified 24 as belonging to another police officer. He made no 25 indication as to the name, age or sex of the officer. page 141 1 By his tone I thought now would not be a good time to 2 say any more." 3 Turning to Mr McAllister's evidence, can I put on 4 screen a copy of his manuscript notes, computer 5 reference to which is CO1706. He says that he attended 6 the locus on 23rd January as part of his liaison role. 7 He says that he was ultimately hoping to provide an 8 assurance to the Crown Office that all marks had been 9 identified or eliminated. Mr Moffat was there to point 10 out the various outstanding marks to him. 11 He says that it is untrue that he confided to 12 Mr Moffat that he knew that Y7 had been identified as 13 the mark of a police officer. He had no knowledge at 14 that time that would have enabled him to make that 15 observation. 16 He has no recall of expressing the view that Y7 17 could be the mark of a woman or a child. 18 Y7 was of interest to him because of its proximity 19 to the body. 20 After this meeting, he prepared his own aide-memoire 21 (CO1706 which is on screen). In this he noted Y7 may 22 possibly have been the right little finger of palmar 23 print Z7 because of their proximity. He also noted the 24 thought that it may have been left by someone leaning in 25 with their hand on the right-hand side of the doorframe page 142 1 to look at the body. 2 Mr Wilson says he was at the locus that day but has 3 no recollection of any conversation. 4 Mr Thurley likewise has no recollection of 5 Mr McAllister saying anything about Y7. PC McIntyre has 6 a recollection of DI McAllister visiting the locus and 7 that he showed him Y7. He now has no memory beyond 8 that. However, he has seen the statement that he gave 9 to Chief Inspector Wilson dated 10th July 1997 and says 10 that he believes that that statement would be correct. 11 In that statement he dates the visit vaguely as a few 12 days after Y7 was found, towards the end of the Inquiry 13 "probably in February 1997". The statement notes 14 Mr McAllister having said of Y7 that "it looked like a 15 child or a female, but was not more explicit than that." 16 Turning then to the examination of Y7 to V9, a 17 bundle of prints, contemporaneous records do record the 18 dates on which the print batch Y7 to V9 was examined. 19 It was being worked on from 19th January. BY6 20 elimination page number 2 shows the batch being compared 21 against Miss Ross and the others from 19th January. BY3 22 suspect page shows the batch compared against suspects 23 from 20th January. In the SCRO case envelope murder vii 24 there is a manuscript sheet in these terms: 25 "Checked against Y7 to V9 Graham Hunter, Michael page 143 1 Moffat, David Thurley, David Ferguson, Stewart Wilson." 2 The manuscript sheet has initials (possibly Mr Orr) 3 and is dated 23rd January. That would be consistent 4 with Y7 being checked against SOCOs. 5 The worksheet BY4 elimination page containing police 6 shows the batch including Y7 being examined against a 7 list of police officers from 3rd February. This is a 8 sheet that contains a record of the comparison against 9 Ms McKie dated 10th February. 10 BY6 shows the batch comparing against PC Gary Gray 11 on 20th and 21st February. One of the examiners would 12 appear to be Mr Geddes. The second set of initials is 13 unknown. It cannot be determined from this list whether 14 Y7 was checked against Gary Gray or only the other marks 15 that remained unidentified or had not otherwise been 16 eliminated by that date. 17 Mr Heath's briefing notes record that by 18 4th February the number of un-eliminated prints was down 19 to 4, including one on bathroom door facing. SCRO 20 requested Ms McKie's prints, among others, on 21 6th February. 22 The telephoned request for her fingerprints on 23 6th February, the taking of her fingerprint by Sergeant 24 Shields and the supply of these to SCRO on 7th February 25 1997 are all recorded on the HOLMES system. page 144 1 Hugh Macpherson states that the request would have 2 come either from him or Mr Geddes. Geddes says the 3 same. 4 Elimination page containing police staff BY4 bears a 5 record that Ms McKie's elimination form was received at 6 SCRO on Friday 7th and that entry was written by 7 Mr Geddes. 8 The elimination form became production 153 in the 9 Asbury case. Sergeant Shields obtained the impressions 10 from Ms McKie. The Inquiry has the original form. 11 Ms McKie says that she raised the need to compare 12 her prints on 6th February. This was after she became 13 aware that Mr Asbury had been arrested and that the tin 14 had been recovered. She explained to a member of the 15 HOLMES unit that she had handled the tin and that her 16 prints should be compared against any impressions found 17 on the tin. Her prints could not be found and Sergeant 18 Shields took another set for her. 19 Dealing with Z7: Z7 was excluded as fragmentary and 20 insufficient. This is recorded on page 21 of BY31. The 21 date on which this was done and the person by whom it 22 was done are not recorded. Mr Geddes says that the 23 writing on the worksheet relating to Z7 is his. 24 Mr Macpherson makes the point that once a mark is 25 deemed fragmentary and insufficient it is removed from page 145 1 the bundle and not then used in the elimination 2 exercise. 3 Turning to Y7 and the SCRO evidence relating to the 4 initial elimination as Ms McKie on 10th and 11th 5 February -- it might be just as well to bring up Y7 6 which is PS0002. We may also want the back image. 7 Thank you. 8 So since this is likely to be an area of contention 9 this analysis will primarily precis the evidence that 10 each witness has provided, cross-referenced as 11 appropriate to contemporaneous documents. 12 The Inquiry has the originals of both the photograph 13 of Y7 on which SCRO officers wrote markings relative to 14 their identification and the elimination fingerprint 15 form for Ms McKie used in comparison and what is on 16 screen is a copy of the original photograph of Y7 with, 17 beneath it, Z7 as well. 18 The Inquiry also has the negatives of that 19 photograph of Y7. 20 Mr Macpherson's evidence: he or Mr Geddes asked for 21 elimination prints from Ms McKie because her prints were 22 not filed. 23 Mr Macpherson accepts that he was the first person 24 to eliminate Y7 as the fingerprint of Ms McKie. 25 Mr Macpherson had visited the locus on page 146 1 17th January 1997 with Mr Geddes and believes that he 2 might have seen Y7 at that time. He did not have the 3 photos with him and does not remember trying to 4 orientate the mark. 5 His knowledge of the locus would have helped his 6 analysis of Y7. When he was doing the comparison of Y7 7 he was looking at left thumb prints, the reason given 8 being because of its position on the doorframe. 9 The first recorded check of Y7 against Ms McKie 10 appears on elimination page BY4 under marks Y7 to V9. 11 The bundle was being worked on from 10th January and it 12 was just random that he picked up Ms McKie's form for 13 comparison. He would have looked at the elimination 14 sheet to see who was next to be compared. On BY4, under 15 the heading COMP, are the initials HM (Macpherson) dated 16 "10th February". In his statement Mr Macpherson says, 17 at one point, that he identified Y7 on 11th February but 18 later says that he is not sure when he actually got to 19 comparing Y7 with Ms McKie. The result was phoned out 20 to Police Detective Chief Inspector Heath having been 21 compared by four experts on 11th February. Y7 was not 22 compared to any other prints after it had been 23 identified as being Ms McKie. 24 According to Mr Macpherson the process he would have 25 followed would have been to look at the mark and the page 147 1 elimination form, both under glass. He would only use a 2 comparator if he got an identification. He would have 3 identified 16 points under fingerprint glasses and then 4 would have marked them on the comparator. 5 He used the 16 point standard for both 6 identifications and eliminations, and says that this was 7 not unusual to do so for elimination in special cases. 8 He took a long time to identify Y7 as Ms McKie's and 9 describes it as a distorted mark, which looked as if it 10 had been twisted and pulled down at the tip. 11 After his identification Y7 would have gone off to 12 be compared as an identification by being placed on the 13 comparator and checked as described in relation to XF. 14 On the reverse of Y7 the initials of the checkers are 15 marked and the word "glass" is noted against Ms McBride, 16 which means that she examined it under glass and not on 17 the comparator. Mr Macpherson says that she might have 18 written the initials on the photograph to ensure that 19 information written on the comparator screen was not 20 lost. 21 He asked Mr Geddes to do the second check. He 22 states that he may have told Alister Geddes that the 23 mark was that of a police officer and may have indicated 24 that there might be repercussions because the mark was 25 found so close to the body of the victim. page 148 1 The explanation that he gave for conveying this 2 information to Mr Geddes is that the elimination prints 3 had been taken on a normal elimination form and it would 4 not have been readily known that this was a police 5 officer. However, it may be observed that on the 6 elimination sheet Ms McKie was described as "Shirley 7 Cardwell D/C" and in the elimination print form dated 8 6th February the name given is "Shirley Cardwell D.C." 9 Alister Geddes could not find 16 points but was, 10 according to Mr Macpherson, happy with the 11 identification. Mr Macpherson went to the comparator 12 and discussed his point of the comparison with Mr Geddes 13 but Mr Geddes did not alter his views. Had Mr Geddes 14 said this was a mis-identification Mr Macpherson would 15 have had to report to the chief inspector but the fact 16 that it was only a difference of opinion as to the 17 number of characteristics in an otherwise agreed 18 identification meant that Mr Macpherson could go to 19 another fingerprint officer. 20 Mr Macpherson does not discuss his contact with any 21 other SCRO officer. What he says is that the result was 22 phoned out to the police (DCI Heath) having been 23 compared by four experts on 11th February . 24 Part of the writing on the reverse of the image Y7 25 is Mr Macpherson's and part is Ms McBride's. Fiona page 149 1 McBride records that four officers have identified Y7 2 and they are these two plus Stewart and McKenna. There 3 is no explanation why there was no reference to 4 Mr Geddes. 5 Mr Macpherson says that after the first call to 6 phone out the identification he got a return call from 7 Mr McAllister who wanted to make sure that the 8 identification had been confirmed. Mr McAllister told 9 him there might be some difficulty and to leave it with 10 him. 11 Mr Geddes' evidence: Mr Geddes had viewed the mark 12 in situ at the locus on 17th January. He noted the 13 position of Y7 and how it was orientated and saw that it 14 was potentially a thumb print. 15 He says that importance was placed on it by the 16 police. 17 The documentation shows that Y7 was compared against 18 police officers up until 7th February. 19 According to Mr Geddes, when Mr Macpherson succeeded 20 in finding the elimination he asked him to do the second 21 check and would have told him that he had eliminated Y7 22 as a police officer. Mr Geddes says he verified the 23 elimination of Y7 as Shirley McKie's and says that he 24 was happy that it was her left thumb. 25 Mr Macpherson asked him if he managed to get 16 points page 150 1 but he said he had not. 2 Mr Geddes' recollection is that Y7 was handed to him 3 in paper form and was not on the comparator. He says 4 that he initially examined the mark under glasses and 5 then put it on the comparator. 6 Mr Geddes describes Y7 as a complex mark and says 7 that it seems to have been subjected to movement as if 8 it had been placed on to the doorframe and then twisted. 9 In his view, if it is looked at up from the core it 10 becomes elongated, indicating severe movement. He says 11 that when he could not work from top to bottom due to 12 the movement he concentrated on the bottom of the mark 13 and found sufficient in the lower part on the mark to 14 permit him to be able to assign ownership of the mark. 15 He counted ten points of comparison. 16 After he told Mr Macpherson that he was happy to 17 eliminate it he says that Mr Macpherson asked him to get 18 16 points. Mr Geddes looked at the mark further on his 19 own to see if he could find 16 points. He and 20 Mr Macpherson then discussed the mark. Mr Macpherson 21 then used the comparator and marked up the point that he 22 could see. Mr Geddes explained his difficulty and then 23 marked up what he saw. He told Mr Macpherson that he 24 was not comfortable identifying 16 points. He could see 25 the sequence marked by Mr Macpherson but was not page 151 1 confident enough of some of the points. Mr Geddes says 2 that there was no pressure on him to find 16 points. 3 At that time Mr Geddes had been qualified for only 4 three years. He speculates that he did not manage 5 to find 16 points because of his relatively limited 6 experience at the time. When he looked at the mark 7 again in 2005 (that's to say when he was charting for 8 the civil action), he was able to identify 16 points and 9 he attributes that to the experience that he gained in 10 the intervening period. 11 Mr Geddes says that what he did was an elimination, 12 just not to 16 points. He did not sign the elimination 13 sheet because Mr Macpherson was looking for a full 14 identification to 16 points. 15 Mr Geddes also recollects a conversation with 16 Mr Dunbar when he told him that he had verified it as 17 the left thumb of Ms McKie but could not get 16 points. 18 Mr Geddes gave a statement to Operation Alba. In 19 that statement he relates that Mr Macpherson said it was 20 an important mark and it would be beneficial if 21 16 points could be found by the expert second checking 22 it. 23 In his written submission to the Scottish Parliament 24 Justice 1 Committee, Mr Geddes stated that he had no 25 doubt as to the identification of the mark as page 152 1 Ms McKie's. He stated that Mr Macpherson said it would 2 be better if he could find 16 points. He asked why and 3 was given four reasons: (1) the print was found on a 4 second visit; (2) it was on a doorframe near where the 5 deceased was found; (3) the investigating officers were 6 excited at the potential; (4) the donor was a serving 7 officer who would receive a reprimand from the OIC. 8 Presumably officer in charge of the case. 9 Charles Stewart's evidence: Mr Stewart was asked to 10 look at the mark and Ms McKie's ten-print form by Mr 11 Macpherson. He does not think that he was aware at the 12 time of Mr Geddes' involvement. He says that he was not 13 given background information but that the photograph may 14 have been marked number 6 with an arrow on it to 15 indicate that it was a left thumb and the direction of 16 the mark. 17 He carried out the comparison using glasses. He 18 looked at the mark and the known print at the same time. 19 He does not remember using the comparator screen but he 20 would have done so. 21 He says that once he had reached 16 points in 22 sequence and agreement he would have stopped because 23 16 points was the requisite standard and there was no 24 need to go beyond that. 25 It was not a quick and easy mark. He regarded the page 153 1 mark as complex. 2 Once he completed his comparison he gave the mark 3 back to Mr Macpherson and told him his conclusion. 4 Mr Macpherson told him that he wanted four experts 5 to confirm the elimination to the 16 point standard and 6 Mr Stewart regarded that as a matter for Mr Macpherson. 7 He did not, personally, favour the procedure whereby 8 photographs were marked so as to record who had 9 identified a mark. He says there was no standard 10 procedure as to how such matters were recorded. 11 Turning to Ms McBride, Ms McBride was asked by 12 Mr Macpherson to compare Y7. He told her that it 13 appeared that the mark had been made by a police officer 14 near to the body of Miss Ross so he was taking a belt 15 and braces approach, that is eliminating to a 16 point 16 standard. He explained to her that Mr Geddes had 17 examined the mark but could not find 16 points of 18 similarity. She interpreted Mr Macpherson are we are 19 was a difficult one and that she was not under any 20 pressure to find 16 characteristics in sequence and 21 agreement. She spent a long time on the mark. 22 Mr Macpherson came round and asked her if she were 23 finished but she told him she was not and to go away. 24 She similarly presents the decision to use four 25 experts for an elimination as a belt and braces approach page 154 1 that seemed normal to her in a whodunit. She used linen 2 glasses rather than the comparator. She makes the 3 following observations: there was a breakage across the 4 mark. 5 At first she thought that Y7 was a right thumb 6 before determining it was Ms McKie's left thumb. She 7 stated that she had regard to both the plain and rolled 8 impressions on the ten print form. She states also that 9 neither the rolled nor plain impression alone showed the 10 full extent of the crime scene mark, but that when 11 viewed together they did. 12 It was not her practice to take notes. She does not 13 remember how many points of similarity she found but she 14 suspects that she did not find many over 16. 15 She handed the mark and ten-print form back to 16 Mr Macpherson and told him her conclusion. He then went 17 to someone else. 18 Although it was not standard practice to initial the 19 back of a photograph, she was aware of another expert, 20 Mr Kenny Graham, did so. She asked Mr Macpherson if she 21 should follow this procedure. He thought about the 22 matter and agreed that she should. The photograph bears 23 this writing: 24 "HMcP 11/02/97, CS, [Fiona McBride's illegible 25 initials followed by 'glass'], AMcK, D/C/I HEATH -- page 155 1 informed of elimination overleaf by HMcP 1605 on 2 11/02/97." 3 The first three sets of initials (those of 4 Macpherson Stewart and McBride) were written by 5 Ms McBride. That would be consistent with that part of 6 the markings having been made on the image before it was 7 passed to Mr McMenemy. Mr McKenna himself says that the 8 first three initials were on the image before he saw it 9 and then he added his own initials. 10 Mr McKenna's evidence. He was asked to look at the 11 mark by Mr Macpherson. He was not given any information 12 before he looked at it and was not aware of the prior 13 involvement of Mr Geddes. 14 He makes the following observations: he removed Y7 15 from the comparator and carried out a comparison at his 16 desk. When he was satisfied with his identification he 17 put it back on the comparator to confirm that he had 18 16 points in sequence and agreement. The comparator 19 would assist him to see if he could identify 16 points. 20 He would have stopped if he found 16 points in sequence 21 and agreement because there was no need to go beyond 16. 22 All that was required for court purposes was 16 points 23 in sequence and agreement. 24 The initials of Macpherson, Stewart and McBride were 25 already on the image. He added his initials. Signing page 156 1 the back of the photograph is described as a standard 2 practice and he would do it especially if he had looked 3 at it on a comparator. It was a way to track who had 4 seen it. 5 He handed the mark and the image back to 6 Mr Macpherson and told him his conclusion. 7 He does add that it was not normal to ask four 8 officers to agree an elimination. In the past it was 9 done for suspect eliminations or in the case of an 10 "Internal Enquiry". 11 Looking specifically at the practice of signing 12 photographs, Ms McBride's explanation for marking 13 initials on Y7 can be viewed in the context of the 14 evidence of other SCRO witnesses. Mr Dunbar describes 15 this is as a practice that is involved in cases where 16 there was a high volume of marks. It was a means of 17 knowing to whom the case should be sent back for 18 signing, which could be months later. 19 Mr Macpherson had himself marked initials on XF and 20 QI2 and he says that that was his practice. 21 Mr Macpherson in his supplementary statement lists a 22 number of other photographs with initials on them. 23 Mr Geddes says that the diary pages were new and 24 older practitioners were in the habit of marking the 25 photos. page 157 1 Mr Stewart describes the marking of initials on Y7 2 as not standard practice and he disapproved of making 3 unnecessary markings on photographs. He accepts though 4 that it was done to keep track of who had identified the 5 mark. He also says that the photos would be marked to 6 indicate that they had been viewed on the comparator. 7 Mr McKenna says it was standard practice for special 8 cases and a means of tracking. 9 Turning to Mr Macpherson's recollection of the 10 immediate aftermath of the initial elimination. 11 Mr Macpherson phoned out the result. After that he 12 recalls that he got a call from DI McAllister who wanted 13 to make sure that the identification had been confirmed. 14 He asked Mr Macpherson whether he was definite in his 15 conclusion that Y7 was left by DC McKie. 16 Mr Macpherson replied that he was and that it had been 17 signed up to by four experts, including himself. He was 18 not asked to recheck. DI McAllister sais that there 19 might be some difficulty, but to leave it with him. He 20 did not explain the nature of the difficulty. There was 21 no follow up to this call. 22 Other material, principally the disciplinary 23 investigation carried out by Chief Inspector Wilson, 24 gives a more complete picture and has the benefit of 25 being closer to the time of the events. page 158 1 Looking at Y7 between 11th and the 2 14th February 1997. Mr Heath's statement to the Wilson 3 investigation is dated 19th June 1997. The case against 4 Mr Asbury was based on fingerprints and it was 5 imperative to eliminate as many of the fingerprint marks 6 as possible to reduce any defence inference that some 7 other identified person had committed the murder. 8 After the arrest considerable work was done to 9 eliminate marks and to trace and alibi those who had 10 access to the house. In particular, work was being done 11 to eliminate four identified marks: Y7, C8, Z8 and L4. 12 Mr Heath said that two of those four marks were a 13 cause of some concern to him. They were J7 and C8 found 14 on the right-hand facing of the bedroom door. 15 On 11th February 1997 Mr Heath was in Kilmarnock 16 Police Station and was contacted by SCRO and told that 17 Y7 had been identified as the print of Ms McKie. In his 18 Inquiry statement Mr Heath says that he was told by 19 McAllister or McDonald. He contacted Mr McAllister and 20 asked him to inform Ms McKie and require her to provide 21 a statement relating to the presence of her fingerprint 22 in the house. 23 Coincidentally he overheard Ms McKie in 24 conversation in Kilmarnock Police Station. She was 25 denying loudly that she had been in the house. page 159 1 Heath told McAllister to tell her that this was not 2 a matter for conversation and that she should think 3 carefully about the identification of the print. She 4 was due off until 14th February and Heath decided to 5 give her that time to reflect. 6 Meantime on 11th February he instructed McAllister 7 to liaise with IB and SCRO to verify the situation, and 8 this included rephotographing Y7. Mr Heath now has no 9 recollection of this. 10 Mr Heath says that he gave that instruction despite 11 having no doubt himself because of the paramount 12 importance of fingerprints to the case. 13 On 12th/13th February he was told by McAllister that 14 the identification was not in doubt. 15 On 14th February at about 8.00 am Ms McKie went to 16 see Heath and asked him if the fingerprint 17 identification had been resolved. He told her that the 18 fingerprint belonged to her. Ms McKie said that was not 19 possible and vociferously denied having been in the 20 house. 21 Mr Heath had a second conversation with her later 22 that morning, in the presence of Sergeant Shields. She 23 again vociferously denied having been in the house and 24 was backed up by Shields. 25 Ms McKie wanted to see the print. Heath arranged page 160 1 for it to be viewed that morning by him, McAllister, 2 McKie and Shields. McKie repeated her denial and was 3 supported by Shields. The atmosphere by then had become 4 heated. 5 Mr Heath realised that the matter had to be dealt 6 with formally. On return to the police station he 7 placed an instruction through helps HOLMES for Ms McKie 8 and Sergeant Shields to provide witness statements. 9 Ms McKie's statement was provided later that day. 10 Mr Heath then compiled a report for Chief 11 Superintendent Cameron. 12 The narrative in the report by Mr Heath to Chief 13 Superintendent Cameron dated 14th February 1997 is 14 consistent with the above. In drawing up this report he 15 would have had access to a summary of IB activity at the 16 locus. 17 His Inquiry statement similarly is consistent 18 although he does add two points, under reference to 19 page 62 of his police notebook he is able to add that he 20 had a meeting at SCRO on 13th February to discuss 21 identification of Ms McKie's print, but he cannot now 22 recall who he met. He states that at some point when 23 Lunardi gave him statements from Sergeant Shields and 24 Ms McKie she informed him that Ms McKie had left her 25 print at a crime scene before. page 161 1 Mr McAllister's Wilson statement is dated 26th June. 2 In his Inquiry statement he says, firstly, that the 3 elimination of Y7 as the fingerprint of Ms McKie was 4 communicated to him on 11th February. He was not 5 surprised that a police officer's print had been found 6 because that is not uncommon but when he spoke to 7 Ms McKie she immediately said that she had not been in 8 the house and there must be a mistake. 9 He phoned SCRO and spoke to Mr Macpherson that 10 afternoon, told him that Ms McKie said that the mark was 11 not hers and asked him to double-check and confirm the 12 elimination. He was subsequently called back and told 13 that it was confirmed. 14 He advised Ms McKie that the identification had been 15 confirmed. 16 He now has no recollection of the mark being 17 rephotographed on 12th February. 18 On 14th February he went with Ms McKie and others to 19 the scene to let her view the mark. Ms McKie said that 20 she had been at the front porch but not in the house. 21 Ms McKie's evidence. She generally refers to her 22 previous statements in relation to her contact with 23 Mr McAllister on 11th February. 24 She does likewise for 14th February. 25 She says that when she viewed Y7 at the scene she page 162 1 knew from its position and the shape of the doorframe 2 that it would have been very difficult for it to have 3 been a left thumb. She also felt that it could only 4 have been made after the door had been taken off. He 5 explained that to Mr Heath and the others who were 6 present. 7 Police Inspector Thomas Fraser of Strathclyde Police 8 IB has been interviewed by the Inquiry and his statement 9 is awaited. He provided a statement to the Wilson 10 investigation in which he is noted as saying on 12th 11 February he received a request from Heath to have a mark 12 rephotographed and, in turn, instructed SOCO Wilson. 13 Fraser says that two photographs were produced. He says 14 that they were taken to SCRO where they were examined by 15 Macpherson and compared against the elimination form for 16 Ms McKie and the identification confirmed. Fraser then 17 instructed Mr Wilson to convey the photographs and a 18 photo copy of the elimination form to Mr Heath. 19 Mr Fraser's statement to Operation Alba on 11th 20 September 2000 adds that he had personally taken the 21 photographs to Mr Macpherson. 22 It is understood on 12th February Mr Wilson 23 photographed Y7 in the presence of PC Allan Stevens. 24 Mr Wilson's evidence, he can only now say that he 25 photographed Y7 at some point between 11th and page 163 1 14th February but has no reason to doubt 12th February. 2 He was asked to do so by Mr Heath and also by 3 Mr Fraser. He photographed Y7 in the presence of PC 4 Stevens. 5 He took the film back to Pitt Street and gave it to 6 Fraser. After the film was developed he accompanied 7 Fraser to SCRO. They spoke to SCRO staff and he is able 8 to give a description of one of them. 9 Mr Fraser put a ten print form with one of the 10 prints circled in red in an envelope and asked him to 11 take it to Mr Heath. 12 PC Allan Stevens speaks to a conversation with 13 Mr McAllister the day before the mark was 14 re-photographed by Mr Wilson and being present when the 15 mark was re-photographed. There is nothing of note in 16 the reported conversation. 17 Mr Macpherson's statement to the Wilson 18 investigation is dated 24th June 1997. 19 The initial telephone conversation in which he had 20 confirmed the identification of the print to McAllister 21 occurred on 11th February. 22 He confirms that there was contact with Fraser on 23 12th but he does not go so far as to say that he carried 24 out a comparison. He says he was asked to confirm and 25 did confirm that a photograph that Fraser gave him of Y7 page 164 1 was the same impression that he had received on 16th. 2 He says that he was also asked to provide and did 3 provide a photocopy of Ms McKie's elimination form. 4 Mr Macpherson now has no recollection of any 5 "rephoto" being delivered to him or comparing any photo 6 with the prints. He does recall that both photographs 7 were put in the productions book. However, it is to be 8 observed that the second image in the court productions 9 may be that of 18th February. 10 Mr Heath has no memory or not of the mark being 11 rephotographed. 12 The late Chief Superintendent John Scott Thomson 13 gave a statement to Operation Alba. He interviewed 14 Ms McKie on 17th February. In his Alba statement he 15 refers to a second photograph as having been taken and 16 also identified as hers. Mr Stewart speaks from memory 17 and acknowledges that the mark was re-photographed on 18 12th February and believes that fresh elimination prints 19 were taken. He says: 20 "I think that I subsequently compared the new 21 photograph against the new fingerprint form." 22 Ms McBride has no recollection of the photographs of 23 12th February nor does Mr McKenna. According to the 24 Mackay report, there is no official record of the 25 12th February images being received at SCRO. page 165 1 Mr Hogg says that negatives of these photographs 2 were found by Mr Thurley on 12th June 2006. He says 3 that he produced a report for Assistant Chief Constable 4 Malcolm and the latter took possession of them. He 5 understands that Assistant Chief Constable Malcolm 6 contacted the Crown. 7 The negatives of these photographs have since been 8 found by Strathclyde Police and passed to the Inquiry. 9 The Inquiry will have them developed. 10 The computer printout that accompanies the negatives 11 suggests that the negatives were first developed on 12 13th February 1997. The Inquiry will have to hear 13 evidence relating to the re-photographing of the mark on 14 12th February and the Chairman will require to decide 15 whether are confirmatory comparison of the mark was 16 carried out and if so by whom. 17 Turn to Ms McKie's police statement, Ms McKie 18 provided a statement on 14th February in response to the 19 instruction from Mr Heath. This is the third police 20 statement in her name. There are two routine police 21 statements, one on 17th January and the second on 21st 22 January. However, in her Inquiry statement she says 23 that she did not write the statement of 17th January and 24 that it is in the handwriting of Sergeant Shields. She 25 has not seen the document before. page 166 1 So far as Mr Heath is concerned, he submitted a 2 report to Chief Superintendent Cameron dated 3 14th February 1997. Mr Heath had a meeting with Thomson 4 and Cameron on 14th February and during this meeting 5 Norman Gibb (Head of Complaints and Discipline) was 6 contacted by phone. In a statement to Operation Alba 7 Mr Heath is recorded as having said that he reported 8 that he felt compromised relative to Ms McKie. It was 9 decided that her absence management would be overviewed 10 by Thomson and the investigation into the presence of 11 her print in the house then passed to Detective 12 Superintendent Malcolm. Mr Heath says that at this 13 meeting the three officers decided to keep the matter 14 within the division and not to take any formal 15 disciplinary steps at that stage. 16 According to the late Chief 17 Superintendent John Scott Thomson's Operation Alba 18 statement it was agreed following consultation with 19 Detective Chief Superintendent Jim Orr, Chief 20 Superintendent Norman Gibb and Mr Cameron that he 21 (Thomson) should interview Shirley McKie on Monday, 17th 22 February in order to establish "if a resolution could be 23 found to the issue." 24 Mr Heath says that Ms McKie phoned him on 25 15th February. He told her that she had to report to page 167 1 Thomson on the 17th and she told him that she was 2 convinced it was a terrible mistake. Ms McKie denies 3 phoning Mr Heath at home on 15th February or any other 4 day. 5 Looking now to Y7 in the period 17th to 6 18th February and including the blind test, on Monday 7 17th February Ms McKie was interviewed by Chief 8 Superintendent Thomson. She again said that it was a 9 mistake that was made. Following this meeting 10 arrangements were made to obtain a new (ie, third) 11 photograph to be taken of Y7 and fresh elimination 12 prints. Ms McKie asked to attend SCRO to see the 13 comparison process. 14 The Thomson statement to Operation Alba presents the 15 re-examination as an initiative by senior officers. It 16 was agreed at the meeting with Heath and Cameron on 17 Friday 14th that if no resolution could be achieved they 18 would go through the whole process of photographing the 19 mark and demonstrating the identification process to 20 Ms McKie. This was to be done on 18th February. 21 Superintendent Thomson contacted Chief Inspector 22 O'Neill and requested that he facilitate the 23 demonstration. 24 On 18th February Chief Superintendent Ferry phoned 25 him to say that SCRO had a difficulty with such an ad page 168 1 hoc request but would attempt to do so if officially 2 requested. 3 Thomson relayed this back to Cameron and understood 4 that it was decided by Cameron, Orr and Gibb not to make 5 an official request to SCRO but to accept the findings 6 of the experts in relation to the new photograph of the 7 mark and new ten-print from Ms McKie. 8 Later that day Ferry phoned Thomson to say that 9 three of his top experts had examined the mark and were 10 adamant that it was Ms McKie's print. 11 There is no support in Mr Heath's statement for the 12 proposition that the re-photographing had been agreed by 13 senior officers on the 14th. Ms McKie refers to her 14 statement in relation to her interview with Chief 15 Superintendent Thomson but presents the re-photographing 16 of the mark and her attendance at a new comparison 17 exercise as being requests that she made. 18 Whomsoever was responsible for the initiative, it 19 would seem that in considering what happened next it is 20 necessary for three matters to be kept separate. An 21 examination of the mark and prints by Mackenzie and 22 Mr Dunbar on 17th February, blind testing on 23 17th February, and re-photographing the mark and taking 24 fresh prints from Ms McKie on 18th February. 25 The Mackay report suggests that the common page 169 1 background was the contact between Chief Superintendent 2 Thomson and Chief Inspector O'Neill to facilitate a 3 demonstration to the identification of Y7. In effect 4 O'Neill instigated an informal internal review on 5 17th February before a third image and second set of 6 elimination prints were obtained on 18th February and 7 resubmitted. 8 The internal review itself comprised two stages: an 9 examination of the mark and prints of Ms McKie by 10 Mr Mackenzie and Mr Dunbar with the identification being 11 confirmed. O'Neill instructing Dunbar to conduct the 12 blind test. Looking specifically at the review by 13 Mackenzie and Dunbar, Mr Mackenzie explains that he was 14 the most senior fingerprint officer in the bureau at the 15 time. He held the title of Assistant Chief Fingerprint 16 Officer there was no chief, that role falling to the 17 Head of Bureau, a police officer. That post came to be 18 redesignated as Deputy Head of Bureau, Mr Dunbar was 19 junior to him as quality assurance officer/training 20 officer for the Glasgow Fingerprint Bureau. 21 Mr Mackenzie confirms that the background to the 22 examination on 17th February was the request by the 23 police in Kilmarnock for elimination of Y7 to be 24 checked. The request came to Chief Inspector O'Neill. 25 The rechecking was done by him and Dunbar. They acted page 170 1 independently. Dunbar got the material from the file 2 and was first to do a comparison. The material was then 3 passed to Mackenzie. Mackenzie used an actual size 4 photographer of Y7 and an elimination print from 5 Ms McKie. PS0002 is of a similar quality to the image 6 that he saw on 17th February but he cannot now recollect 7 if this was an image with writing on the back. 8 He used two magnifying glasses augmented by the 9 comparator. He confirmed the eliminations as the 10 left thumb of Ms McKie, as did Dunbar. They each told 11 O'Neill their findings and this was relayed to 12 Kilmarnock. Mr Mackenzie recalls that before carrying 13 out his comparison, he knew that it had been eliminated 14 as the left thumb print of an officer. He recalls at 15 the time noting 10 to 11 points in sequence and 16 agreement. He was approaching it as an elimination and 17 not looking to the 16 point standard for an 18 identification. Mark Y7 was significantly distorted due 19 to major movement. There was a fault line from right to 20 left dissecting the mark. His initial assessment was in 21 the area below the fault line. 22 Mr Dunbar's evidence. He and Mr Mackenzie were 23 asked by O'Neill to re-examine the mark independently. 24 He knew that the identity of the mark had already been 25 reported to the police as belonging to a fingerprint page 171 1 officer and SCRO was being asked to re-examine it. 2 He discussed the matter with Mackenzie because this 3 was an unusual request. He says that he was not given a 4 specific instruction whether to eliminate or identify 5 the mark. 6 He approached this as a quality assurance exercise, 7 essentially on a non-numeric basis. There is no magic 8 number when an expert will be satisfied, the requirement 9 for 16 characteristics being for court purposes. He was 10 accordingly not looking in particular for 16 11 characteristics in sequence and agreement. From memory, 12 he could see at least ten characteristics but less than 13 16. Subsequently he says that he cannot recall the 14 number of characteristics he found. 15 The mark was quite complex. He describes seeing a 16 fault line in the mark and was trying to reconcile the 17 top where there was movement or distortion for the 18 bottom. 19 He used glass and also the comparator to see if it 20 would assist with the area above the line, which it did 21 not. 22 He says that the elimination form could have been 23 clearer. It had not been rolled enough. He would have 24 preferred to have had another form to compare. However, 25 despite these shortcomings he says this: page 172 1 "There was nothing to suggest using the elimination 2 form I had on 17th February that this was not the 3 individual and indeed there was far too much information 4 to suggest that it was." 5 His findings are reported in this way: 6 "I remember seeing an area of concern in the mark. 7 The area was the presence of a possible in a movement of 8 distortion in the mark or potentially a double touch. 9 Everything below this area I considered to be identical 10 and in sequence and agreement with the ridge 11 characteristics form on the elimination of Shirley 12 McKie. Although I could not account for certain 13 characteristics in the top half of the mark against that 14 form there was far too much detail in the bottom of the 15 mark in sequence and agreement for it not to be this 16 individual. There has always got to be a reason for 17 things not to be in agreement and I was satisfied that 18 the movement and distortion in that area of the mark 19 meant I couldn't see anything from that area and that 20 was sufficient justification as to why there were 21 disagreements in that part of the mark and the 22 elimination form." 23 He was happy to eliminate the mark as that of the 24 officer. 25 After both had carried out independent examinations page 173 1 he and Mackenzie discussed their findings in front of 2 O'Neill. This information was relayed to Ferry on that 3 day. He recorded his findings in his diary that night. 4 In 2006 when shown enlargements by the Scottish 5 Executive lawyers he was able to see characteristics 6 above the fault line. One unusual characteristic that 7 he had not seen in 1997 but saw in 2006 is described as 8 a hawk-eye. Its location is consistent with the move or 9 distortion in the corresponding area of the mark. His 10 statement is not clear as to what enlargement he is 11 referring to. 12 Turning to the blind test, the following were not 13 involved in the blind test: Mr Stewart and Mr McKenna. 14 Fiona McBride was present in the office when blind 15 testing was being done but was not personally involved. 16 Those on the backshift were involved. She believes that 17 a list of those involved has since been lost but she 18 names the persons she understands to have been asked to 19 participate. Mr Geddes was not involved in the blind 20 test but does recall a conversation with Mr Dunbar who 21 asked him his opinion about Y7 and told him that he had 22 verified it as a left thumb print of Ms McKie but could 23 not get 16 points. Mr Mackenzie presents the blind 24 testing as a training exercise a competency test of the 25 SCRO staff in relation to the complex mark which would page 174 1 be good to use in training material. No blind test had 2 been carried out before. Dunbar was to administer it. 3 Staff were to be told only that it was an elimination 4 comparison and were to be asked if they would eliminate 5 the mark. Mr Dunbar told him the result. He has no 6 recollection of the numbers involved but it was at least 7 four. The result was that at least two officers 8 concluded that there was sufficient detail to eliminate 9 the mark. He understands that one other asked for 10 photographic enlargements and another had inadequate 11 time to complete the comparison. 12 Mr Dunbar. He says that the test was instructed 13 by O'Neill or Ferry. As many people as possible were to 14 look at the mark without being given any detail. 15 He says that he voiced opposition because by then 16 six experts had made a comparison and were of the same 17 view. He does not know what the exercise would prove. 18 He thinks that the only reason the exercise was being 19 conducted was to find someone who did not agree. This 20 was voiced to O'Neill but he was instructed to proceed. 21 A comparator was moved into Ferry's room and copies 22 of the mark and elimination form were placed on the 23 comparator. 24 Individuals were asked if they would eliminate the 25 mark. page 175 1 Dunbar approached officers to take part. To 2 summarise: two officers asked to continue the 3 comparison, the following morning but the exercise was 4 stopped when he reached a total of 12 in agreement, 5 including the 6 who had previously expressed an opinion 6 with none in disagreement. The initials of the 12 were 7 on a slip of paper given to O'Neill. Those he recalls 8 were Foley and Bruce. Halliday was involved at some 9 stage probably on 18th February. 10 Of those involved statements have been obtained from 11 Jean McClure, Greg Padden, Edward Bruce and Terence 12 Foley. A statement has also been obtained from 13 Mr Halliday and will be addressed later. 14 What Jean McClure says. Mr Dunbar asked her to 15 follow him to Ferry's room. The mark and print were 16 already on a comparator machine. Dunbar asked her to 17 look at them and tell him what she thought. He told her 18 nothing else and left the room to let her carry out a 19 comparison. The screen was clear. 20 She struggled because it was not her normal practice 21 to begin a comparison on the comparison machine. The 22 mark was poor and she could see there was movement in 23 it. When Mr Dunbar returned she had no answer for him. 24 She asked to look at the mark again in the morning when 25 her eyes were less tired. Dunbar said that was fine but page 176 1 that was the last she saw of the mark. 2 Greg Padden says this: he was told that this was 3 part of a quality assurance test and not a live case. 4 He was asked to go to Ferry's room by Mr Dunbar. 5 The images were set up on a comparator screen and he 6 was asked to give an opinion. The comparator screen was 7 already marked with the previous officer's markings 8 which was a bit sloppy. He had a quick look and told 9 Dunbar that he did not think that all the markings were 10 correct and was told to wipe them and start again. The 11 previous officer may have been Mr Foley. 12 He thought the mark close to insufficient for 13 comparison and was having difficulty finding 14 characteristics between the known and the unknown. He 15 could not reach a conclusion and asked to see the print 16 under the current circumstances (under glass and not on 17 the comparator). Dunbar declined and asked him to give 18 his opinion now. Padden said that he was not prepared 19 to do so and Dunbar said that that was fine. 20 Mr Edward Bruce's evidence. He says that his 21 recollection is vague. 22 He was asked by Mr Mackenzie or Dunbar to look at a 23 mark on a comparator machine as part of a quality 24 assurance exercise. He cannot remember whether the 25 screen was clear. page 177 1 It was quite a complex mark and he struggled to see 2 anything at first. There was quite a bit of movement in 3 the mark. 4 From memory he thinks he got 8 points of comparison. 5 With only 8 points he could not identify in court. 6 He advised that he thought it was not the best mark 7 and that he had found 8 points of comparison and he was 8 told that that was fine. Operation Alba noted a 9 statement on 17th August 2000. He says that he was not 10 given the chance to correct that statement. That said, 11 it is broadly consistent with his Inquiry statement, 12 though in that he is noted as having said that 8 points 13 would have been sufficient for an elimination. 14 Terence Foley. He was asked by Dunbar to look at 15 the comparator screen set up in Ferry's office. The 16 mark and the print were already on the comparator and 17 the screen was blank. Dunbar asked him to have a look 18 and emphasised that he was not to worry if he could not 19 see anything. He was asked if he saw enough in the mark 20 to eliminate it with the impression next to it. 21 He studied the marks for about 20 minutes or perhaps 22 longer. He noticed distortion. He assumed it was a 23 double touch or twist. He saw a crease from above the 24 core. He did not go near the area above that line but 25 concentrated on the area just above and to the right of page 178 1 the core. It was not a very nice mark in quality terms. 2 He believes that he found ten points in sequence and 3 agreement and was satisfied to eliminate the mark 4 without going near the distorted area. If he had been 5 asked to make an identification to 16 points standard he 6 would have needed more time. 7 He told Dunbar his conclusion. He disputes that he 8 was a dater. He eliminated the mark as that of 9 Ms McKie. Later in February 2006 he did a charting for 10 the civil action and was able to find 16 points in 11 sequence and agreement. He attributes the increased 12 number of characteristics observed to greater experience 13 on his part. 14 The re-photographing of Y7 and fresh prints on 15 18th February. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: I am wondering is this a fairly lengthy 17 passage? 18 MR MOYNIHAN: It is. It is also a new chapter. So it may 19 be as well to stop. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we might stop now. Could I just say 21 that tomorrow morning we go to the earlier time of 10.15 22 to start . 23 (3.55 pm) 24 (Adjourned until 10.15 am the following morning) 25