Introduction
10.1. In 1998 the decision was made to prosecute Ms McKie for perjury. This chapter deals with the period between summer 1997, when the trial of Mr Asbury concluded, and the service of the indictment on Ms McKie in late January 1999.
The exercise of the Crown's discretion to prosecute
10.2. The exercise of the Crown's discretion in deciding to prosecute Ms McKie on a charge of perjury does not fall within the terms of reference of the Inquiry. Although this chapter covers the period during which the decision to prosecute was taken, the matters of significance to the Inquiry are in relation to the collection and assessment by the Crown of the fingerprint evidence and any evidence having a bearing on the reliability of the fingerprint evidence.
10.3. An issue which arose for consideration and investigation was whether the Crown fell to be criticised for not having instructed an English fingerprint examiner to provide an opinion as to the identification of Y7. At one stage an instruction was recorded in the Crown Office papers to the effect that such an opinion might be appropriate but, in the event, it was not obtained.
Crown Office papers
10.4. The Inquiry did not recover all of the Crown Office papers in relation to the prosecution of Ms McKie. There is a period of the preparation of the case against Ms McKie (from 19 October 1998 to 19 January 1999) in relation to which the written records and correspondence are incomplete. This is significant because the local procurator fiscal's papers indicate that a Crown Office instruction that may have had some relevance to the instruction of a comparison of Y7 by an English examiner was given on or about 9 November 19981 but there are no internal Crown Office papers available to the Inquiry to assist the recollection of witnesses or otherwise shed light on either the specific matters discussed within Crown Office or the identities of those involved.
10.5. I record here the steps that were taken to recover papers from Crown Office.
10.6. In September 2008 a request was made to Crown Office for all documentation relating to the prosecutions in HMA v Asbury and HMA v McKie. Mr Scott Pattison, then Director of Operations for the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS),2 sent documents to the Inquiry under cover of a letter dated 3 October 2008. In this he indicated that the materials provided included all documents relating to HMA v Asbury and all documents relating to HMA v McKie. Examination of the papers indicated that there might be further documents that fell to be provided.
10.7. A meeting was held between COPFS and the Inquiry on 19 November 2008. It was agreed that COPFS would look for, amongst other things, the "missing part 1 of the Precognition and Full Committal Report relating to David Asbury". In January 2009, COPFS delivered "volume 1 of the Precognition against David Asbury and the Procurator Fiscal's report to Crown Office following committal for further examination¿along with further papers relating to the prosecution of David Asbury" to the Inquiry. A tranche of papers relating to HMA v McKie3 was included in this.
10.8. COPFS wrote to the Inquiry in February 2009, regarding the Crown Office High Court file relating to the prosecution of Ms McKie. High Court papers are contained in a buff coloured file. The letter said that although it appeared that the buff file for the McKie case did not exist in its complete form, it was clear that the typical contents of such a file had already been provided to the Inquiry as part of the documents disclosed to the Inquiry by COPFS in October 2008 and in January 2009. It said that the prosecutions of Ms McKie and Mr Asbury were closely linked, and papers which would have formed part of the buff file for the McKie case were actually enclosed in the High Court file relating to the prosecution of Mr Asbury.
10.9. By letter of 1 June 2009 Mr Pattison explained that the Inquiry had been provided with papers relating to HMA v McKie for the period to 19 October 1998.
10.10. In the course of Mr John McMenemy's evidence on 11 June 2009, it became apparent that there might be further papers - particularly working papers from Kilmarnock - that had existed, but which were not available to the Inquiry.4 As a result, Mr McMenemy visited the Inquiry offices and identified that the Inquiry was not in possession of the "principal police report to Procurator Fiscal's Office" or the "correspondence file that would have police subjects sheets in it" with regard to HMA v Asbury.
10.11. On 19 June 2009, Mr Pattison wrote to the Inquiry stating that in the continual search for documents relevant to the Inquiry, papers relating to the file of HMA v Asbury had been located at the Kilmarnock procurator fiscal's office. The Inquiry was given these original documents.
10.12. Thus, with regard to HMA v Asbury, the Inquiry obtained the Crown Office file (containing loose papers from Crown Office and the High Court); the full Precognition; and the Kilmarnock file.
10.13. In relation to the case of HMA v McKie COPFS initially could not find the buff folder - that Ms Climie described in oral evidence as her indicter's file - relating to the prosecution but provided the Inquiry with some of the relevant papers: the Glasgow procurator fiscal's file relating to the case; the full Precognition; and some internal Crown Office papers that had been placed in the file for HMA v Asbury. The papers available to the Inquiry at the time of the hearings did not include the buff file, and the other available papers did not cover the period from about 19 October 1998 to 19 January 1999.
10.14. After the hearings were concluded the buff file5 was located by COPFS and provided to the Inquiry under cover of a letter dated 25 February 2011.6 With the exception of a copy of a manuscript note dated 20 February 1998 (relating to placing Ms McKie on petition) and a typed note dated 17 November 1998 on the application of the best evidence rule to transcripts of evidence at trial, the earliest correspondence on the file is a copy of the letter dated 19 January 19997 written by Ms Climie to Mrs Denise Greaves, a procurator fiscal in Glasgow. The signed original8 of this letter is in the papers of the Glasgow procurator fiscal's office and was available at the time of the hearing. The discovery of the buff file does not fill the gap in the papers that were available to the Inquiry at the time of the hearing relating to the three months from 19 October 1998 to 19 January 1999 and, therefore, does not assist with the resolution of the issue concerning the explanation for the failure by Crown Office to instruct a review of the comparison of Y7 by a fingerprint examiner from outside SCRO.
10.15. Mr Pattison explained in evidence on 17 November 2009 that the Crown's papers had, in the years since the trials to which they related, been supplied to other inquiries and investigations. As a result, the file relating to HMA v McKie had, he said, become fragmented.9 Notwithstanding the discovery of the buff folder that stands as the explanation for the residual gap from October 1998 to January 1999.
Personnel involved in 1997-1999
10.16. Among those involved in the prosecution of Ms McKie were:
10.17. In the ordinary course a Law Officer does not take a decision to prosecute. Prosecutions are normally authorised by an advocate depute. Ms McKie was a serving police officer when the decision was taken to prosecute her. The policy at Crown Office was that any decision relating to the possible prosecution of a serving police officer had to be taken by a Law Officer, normally the Solicitor General.13 This reflected the gravity of a decision to prosecute. Lord Boyd said that it was a long standing policy.14
10.18. The fact that the instruction to place Ms McKie on petition was made by a Law Officer is, therefore, explained by her status as a serving police officer.
Views in Scotland on fingerprint evidence in 1997-1999
10.19. Any potential criticism of an institution or individual for not considering the possibility that Y7 was incorrectly identified must be seen in the context of the views generally held at the time regarding the reliability, or otherwise, of fingerprint evidence. It was generally regarded as infallible and was approached as routine evidence, rarely challenged and, indeed, often agreed between prosecution and defence without need for a fingerprint examiner to give any evidence at the trial.15
Infallibility
10.20. Lord Boyd said that at this time fingerprint evidence was regarded as being 100% reliable.16 There were no concerns about the reliability of fingerprint evidence around 1998. At the time, the presence of a fingerprint on something immoveable, such as a door surround, was viewed as almost irrefutable evidence that the person had been in the locus.17
10.21. Mrs Greaves told the Inquiry that in late 1997 it was her view that there was little scope for doubt in fingerprint evidence, and that the general perception was that it was infallible.18 Her impression was that the police viewed it as infallible.19 Ms Climie said that she "laboured in 1998 on the assumption that fingerprint evidence was infallible".20 Mr Murphy said that fingerprint evidence was regarded as reliable.21
10.22. Ms McBride's view at the time was that SCRO's system was infallible and she gave evidence to that effect at the trial.22 Until the involvement of Mr Wertheim shortly before the trial that was a view that Mr and Ms McKie both shared.
How often was fingerprint evidence challenged in Scotland?
10.23. Lord Boyd, who had been an advocate depute for three years before his appointment as Solicitor General, said that fingerprint evidence was only very occasionally challenged.23
10.24. Mr Murphy had, at that time, almost ten years' experience as a criminal practitioner. He could not remember a single case in which fingerprint evidence had been challenged. If there was a challenge it was about how the fingerprint came to be left on an object and not about the identity of the person who made the print.24
10.25. Mrs Greaves said that at the time she had no personal knowledge of a contested fingerprint case.25 Ms Climie said that it was almost unheard of for fingerprint identifications to be challenged by defence evidence.26 So far as she was aware there had never been a successful challenge to SCRO evidence.27
10.26. Mr Crowe, then Deputy Crown Agent, had a sense from a review meeting of 20 May 1999, after the trial, that the SCRO examiners who gave evidence at the trial, Mr MacPherson, Mr Stewart and Ms McBride, had never been challenged so systematically before and so vigorously.28 They had never so far as he could make out "had a head-to-head challenge on the identification of the subject of who had made the mark".29
10.27. That is confirmed by the evidence of Mr MacPherson, who said that HMA v McKie was the first time he had faced a direct challenge to an identification of his in court. The turn of events was a surprise. As far as he was aware it was the first challenge to an identification by SCRO.30 It was also the first time one of Mr Stewart's identifications had been challenged in court.31
To what extent did fingerprint examiners have to give evidence in court?
10.28. As discussed in Chapter 31, in practice fingerprint evidence was regarded as routine and was normally a matter of agreement between prosecution and defence.
10.29. Mrs Greaves had been employed by the procurator fiscal service since August 1987,32 and so had almost ten years' experience by the time of HMA v Asbury. In her experience prior to HMA v Asbury fingerprint officers had not been asked to attend court.33 She could not remember ever having to call a fingerprint examiner to give evidence.34 She explained that fingerprint evidence was very often the subject of agreement between the prosecution and defence.35 Ms Climie told the Inquiry that she had been in the fiscal service for 24 years and never had to lead fingerprint evidence in court.36
10.30. As at the date of the trial Mr Stewart had 28 years experience as a fingerprint officer and had been qualified for 22 years. He said that it was rare for SCRO examiners to speak in court to all of the characteristics in an actual comparison. They sometimes used enlargements to show the jury what the fingerprint pattern was and what the different characteristics were, as an illustration, but the SCRO examiners did not have much experience of having to demonstrate all of the points. Indeed, Mr Stewart said that HMA v McKie, which involved detailed examination and cross-examination on the substance of his opinion, was a learning experience. The demonstration of points was a new experience. They had not done it in such depth before. Mr Stewart said "we were virtually making it up as we were going along".37
The preparation process
Summer 1997: the instruction to prepare a Precognition
10.31. The trial in HMA v Asbury ended on 4 June 1997. After the trial, the advocate depute, Mr Dewar, submitted a note to the then Lord Advocate, Lord Hardie,38 dated 5 June 1997.39 Mr Dewar's note read:
"This was the case in which the fingerprint of DC Cardwell was found on the bathroom door standard....
The question arises whether DC Cardwell should be prosecuted for perjury as she gave evidence during the trial to the effect that she had never been in the house. She had, of course, no authority to be there.
An extensive police inquiry has taken place as to how the fingerprint came to be in the house and disciplinary proceedings against DC Cardwell have been commenced. On the basis of my knowledge of the case... there would appear to be no other sensible conclusion than that the DC must have been in the house, without authority, at some stage. On oath, she denied, on a number of occasions, that she had been.
The matter is a very serious one as the jury might have acquitted Asbury on the basis that they could not rely on the other (incriminating) fingerprint evidence in the case. Thankfully, they did not.....
In these circumstances my recommendation, at this stage, is that perjury proceedings should be taken. As a starting point... a transcript of DC Cardwell's evidence will require to be obtained...."
Steps taken at Crown Office following Mr Dewar's note
10.32. Cases involving the crime of perjury at a trial were handled in a special way. The first stage in the process was to obtain a transcript of Ms McKie's evidence. On 9 June the Lord Advocate instructed the Home Advocate Depute40 to obtain a transcript41 and he relayed that instruction to the then head of the High Court Unit, Mr Gallacher,42 by minute dated 16 June.43 Following receipt of the transcript Mr Gallacher wrote a minute to the duty advocate depute dated 29 July seeking instructions.44 The duty advocate depute ("PHB" - thought to be Philip Brodie Q.C.)45 instructed that the procurator fiscal Glasgow precognosce the case without Ms McKie being placed on petition.46 Mr Gallacher conveyed that instruction to the procurator fiscal by letter dated 30 July.47
10.33. In mid-August the Regional Procurator Fiscal for Glasgow and Strathkelvin instructed Mrs Greaves to precognosce the case.48
Mr Asbury's appeal
10.34. Mr Asbury lodged a Note of Appeal against his conviction dated 5 August.49 The Note of Appeal did not dispute the identification by SCRO of QI2 (Ross) or XF (Asbury), which were the material marks in the case against him.
August 1997: Disciplinary proceedings against Ms McKie: Mr Wilson's report
10.35. Strathclyde Police had initiated a disciplinary investigation into possible misconduct by Ms McKie in May 1997.50 The police anticipated a possible prosecution. The Deputy Chief Constable of Strathclyde Police wrote to the Regional Procurator Fiscal, Paisley by letter dated 4 August 1997,51 to ask if a misconduct hearing would affect any action that the Crown might be considering. The correspondence was referred to Crown Office and the Deputy Crown Agent (Mr Norman McFadyen) advised the Regional Procurator Fiscal that because perjury was being investigated he "imagined" that the Deputy Chief Constable would not wish to proceed with misconduct proceedings at present.52 The Regional Procurator Fiscal replied to say he would update the Deputy Chief Constable in terms of Mr McFadyen's letter.53
10.36. As part of the disciplinary investigation Mr Wilson prepared a report into the matter dated 26 August 1997.54 The report recommended disciplinary proceedings. The report contained statements, noted as taken by Mr Wilson on 24 June 1997 at SCRO, from Mr MacPherson, Mr Stewart and Ms McBride. Mr Wilson's view of fingerprint evidence at the time was that it was "incontrovertible" or "bombproof". He had no doubts that the identification was correct and that this meant Ms McKie had been inside the house.55
Meeting with Mr Gibb and Mr Wilson
10.37. Mrs Greaves met with Mr Gibb56 and Mr Wilson.57 She did not recollect either officer expressing concerns to her about the prospects of a conviction because police witnesses spoke to Ms McKie not being in the locus and the only evidence that placed Ms McKie in the locus was Y7. She noted that no mention is made of such concerns in the Precognition. Had she known of such concerns she said that she would have included them in the Precognition. She was aware that the log keeping was problematic.58 After their discussions Mr Wilson provided Mrs Greaves in January 1998 with a report on four murder cases, other than that of Marion Ross, that Ms McKie had previously worked on during her career with Strathclyde Police.59
Precognition of Mr Kerr, Mr Stewart and Mr MacPherson
10.38. Among the witnesses precognosced by Mrs Greaves were Mr Kerr, Mr Stewart and Mr MacPherson.
10.39. Mrs Greaves took notes during her meeting with Mr Kerr60 which recorded Mr Kerr as saying that Ms McKie had asked him just before the Saturday lunchtime at Kilmarnock police office if she could visit the locus. The notes also recorded that he saw her at the house just after lunch and that he left at around 3pm in the afternoon. The typewritten precognition,61 prepared after the meeting, reflected Mrs Greaves' understanding of what Mr Kerr had told her. Mrs Greaves' practice was to prepare the formal typewritten precognition soon after the relevant discussion so that matters would be fresh in her mind62 but precognitions are not sent to witnesses to confirm the accuracy of what has been noted.
10.40. Mrs Greaves also took handwritten notes when she precognosced Mr Stewart63 and Mr MacPherson.64 A file provided to the Inquiry contains precognitions of Mr Stewart dated 2 October 199765 and 16 December 1997.66 It also contains a precognition of Mr MacPherson dated 8 October 1997.67
10.41. Mrs Greaves did not think that at the stage of precognoscing Mr Stewart and Mr MacPherson it had occurred to her that a line of defence might be that the SCRO identification of Y7 was wrong. She did not ask them whether they could have made a mistake. At the time when she was precognoscing them the anticipated line of defence was that the mark had been planted or transposed68 and she may also have been influenced by knowledge that the defence expert for Mr Asbury in HMA v Asbury had reached a similar conclusion.69 She could remember no other case where she discussed the number of points of comparison with examiners70 and, in the context of HMA v McKie, she did not attempt to discuss the points found with reference to the charted enlargements. The reason, she said, was that she was not an expert and had no training.71 She accepted that she could have asked them about such matters, but she did not. She did not regard it as part of her function to do so. She presumed that they used specialist equipment when they carried out their examinations which she did not have in her office where she met them.72 She was not, therefore, in a position to look at prints, in the way that they would have done, under specialist conditions.73 She thought that Mr MacPherson and Mr Stewart explained how they carried out comparisons and what they looked for. Mr Stewart did, however, offer to prepare an example for the jury74 and, in due course, a generic production (Production 181)75 was prepared and lodged.
Completion of Precognition
10.42. Having completed the Precognition Mrs Greaves discussed it with the Regional Procurator Fiscal before sending it to Crown Office for a decision.76 The Precognition contained an 'analysis of evidence'77 which was signed by Mrs Greaves and countersigned by Mr Vannet, the Regional Procurator Fiscal. The Precognition was dispatched to Crown Office on 19 December 1997 and received there on 22 December 1997.78
The terms of the Precognition submitted to Crown Office
10.43. Much of the focus of the analysis of evidence prepared by Mrs Greaves was on the question of planting. The analysis of evidence proceeded on the hypothesis that the matching of Y7 with Ms McKie was not in doubt: "There is no doubt that the comparison shows her prints and the impression to be identical."79 It expressly made reference to the infallibility of fingerprint examination stating that Ms McKie "called into question the reliability and infallibility of fingerprint evidence... Given the reliability and status of fingerprint evidence, the only conclusion to be drawn is that she has told lies on oath."
10.44. Although there was no doubt about the correctness of SCRO's conclusions the analysis, on the page numbered 37 in manuscript,80 contained a suggestion that was to be the subject of further consideration in Crown Office:
"While SCRO (fingerprints) are independent from Strathclyde Police and have compared the fingerprint forms provided and the impression 'Y7' found in the house of Marion Ross, Crown Counsel may wish to consider whether or not an expert unconnected with the case should make a further comparison. In relation to the articles which Chief Inspector Hogg has provided relating to transplanted and faked fingerprints, Crown Counsel are asked whether an expert in this field should be instructed. Chief Inspector Hogg does not consider himself an expert in transplanted and faked fingerprints. The name Dr [sic] Terry Kent of the Home Office at Sandwich has been mentioned as a possible expert."81
10.45. The analysis also conveyed the concern on the part of the police that the jury might not understand the infallibility of fingerprint evidence:
"The precognoscer is aware that the police are extremely concerned that should the case against Shirley Cardwell proceed to a trial that a jury may not fully understand the complexities of the case and the infallible nature of fingerprint evidence."82
10.46. Mrs Greaves also submitted a document entitled 'Problems/ Observations/ Comments'.83 This document contemplated a comparison of Y7 by someone unconnected with the case and, separately, the instruction of an expert in relation to planting.
10.47. Mrs Greaves explained that at the time of the Precognition the primary issue was the possibility of forgery or planting and the problem with the identification only crystallised later during the trial.84 She did not have any information that led her to question SCRO's identification85 but she thought it necessary to get a further view on the identification of Y7.86 Her reason for suggesting a further comparison was to ensure that the investigation was complete and that every aspect had been looked at, so that there was information on all matters that could potentially be raised at the trial.87
January 1998: the decision to place Ms McKie on petition
10.48. The Deputy Crown Agent, Mr McFadyen, dealt with the Precognition on 2 January 1998 and he referred it to Ms Climie for comment. Ms Climie suggests that this was because she had been involved in HMA v Asbury.88 His note89 stated that it would be helpful if Crown Counsel could have Ms Climie's comments. The note included the following observation:
"...it is improbable that fingerprints would have been planted in this case, but given the observations on Cardwell's plausibility it may indeed make sense to involve an independent expert - both on the question of transfer/planting and on the general basis for concluding that fingerprint identification is 100% reliable." [Original underlining]
The observation on "plausibility" derived from the analysis which reported that the police were concerned that Ms McKie would present well in court.90
10.49. Ms Climie's understanding of Mr McFadyen's suggestion regarding 100% reliability was that it related to the reliability of fingerprint evidence.91 She did not know who the relevant expert would be, that was for the fiscal to find out.92 Ms Climie agreed that it was incomprehensible that fingerprints should have been planted in this case.93
10.50. Ms Climie submitted her comments to the duty advocate depute for instruction on 15 January 1998.94
"I recommend that the further fingerprint expert evidence be pursued - see page 37 of the Precognition. The Home Office expert should be asked to give expert evidence on (a) the plausibility of transfer/planting of the print and (b) the general basis for concluding that fingerprint identification is 100% reliable (I understand, although I do not know the detail, that the English standard for matching prints is more stringent than that used in Scotland altho' even in Scotland the number of points of comparison required before a match is declared is higher than the number required in some other jurisdictions. It might be an idea to pursue whether Y7 can be matched to Shirley Cardwell on the English standard. Presumably the Home Office Expert could deal with this)." [Original underlining]
Ms Climie's letter of 30 January 199895 suggests that the possibility of a difference between English and Scottish standards may have come from Mrs Greaves;96 and Mrs Greaves thought she might have obtained this information from Mr Hogg.97
10.51. Ms Climie's note sought Crown Counsel's instructions. The duty advocate depute ("JCP" - thought to be the late Jane Paterson) gave an instruction98 to Ms Climie and the Deputy Crown Agent dated 15 January 1998.99 She instructed that Ms McKie should be indicted to the High Court. She endorsed the recommendation to instruct an independent expert not only on the two points mentioned by the Deputy Crown Agent but also Ms Climie's suggestion regarding a comparison by an English expert. The duty advocate depute's instruction on that matter was in these terms:
"If the English requirement is more stringent, it would be helpful if the expert making yet another comparison could do so to the English requirements."
10.52. Ms Climie then wrote a note to the Deputy Crown Agent on the same day.100 In the note she said that the appropriate first step should be to place Ms McKie on petition. In so doing she took issue with Crown Counsel's instructions, pointing out that Ms McKie had not appeared on petition, and that placing her on petition would be the appropriate first step (rather than indicting her to the High Court). She also said that she thought that Ms McKie should not be placed on petition until the further fingerprint evidence was pursued and that this might take some time. She noted that placing Ms McKie on petition would result in Ms McKie being suspended from duty while on the other hand it would enable her to instruct solicitors in what would undoubtedly be a contested case.
10.53. Ms Climie also expanded on what was understood to be the more stringent English requirement. She understood that Scots practitioners would count a "lake" in the ridges as two separate ridge characteristics towards the total of 16, whereas English practitioners would count it as only one. Ms Climie explained that the reason behind the suggestion of an approach to the English expert was that on an extreme example, whereas a Scottish examiner would count 16 characteristics, the English examiner would count eight even though both Scottish and English examiners ostensibly operated to the same 16-point standard. She did not doubt the SCRO identification. She also thought that she knew at the time that an independent expert had agreed with the identification.101
10.54. The Deputy Crown Agent then reported the matter to the Solicitor General, then Mr Colin Boyd Q.C., by minute dated 16 January.102 He expressed his reluctance to delay in placing Ms McKie on petition. The Solicitor General responded by minute dated 20 January.103 It was his opinion that Ms McKie should be put on petition in early course. He told the Inquiry that until placed on petition an accused person is left in a kind of limbo and cannot apply for legal aid and instruct their own advisers.104 He endorsed the need for an independent expert: "Clearly we need a further independent expert but that need not hold up the petition."
10.55. On 26 January 1998 the Solicitor General gave the instruction that Ms McKie should be placed on petition.105 Lord Boyd could not remember giving any further instruction after that stage.106 There is a manuscript instruction from the Solicitor General following a discussion, dated 26 January:107 "DCA As discussed please arrange for Cardwell to be placed on petition."
10.56. As Lord Boyd explained the decision to commence criminal proceedings against a police officer was most serious. He told the Inquiry that before reaching this decision he would have read much of the Precognition, the analysis of the evidence and the conclusions. He would also have looked at much of the additional material in the Precognition.108 Lord Boyd remembered a discussion with the Deputy Crown Agent and recollected that the log did not disclose that Ms McKie had been at the locus, but there were issues about the reliability of the log and his conclusion, at the time, was that this was a matter for the jury.109
10.57. Lord Boyd did not think that the instructions in relation to the fingerprint evidence reflected a concern as to the sufficiency of the evidence. There was at the time no reason to cast any doubt on the reliability of fingerprint evidence or on the independence, either collectively or individually, of the SCRO examiners.110 He did not envisage a challenge other than on the basis of forgery or planting, and did not envisage any question relating to the reliability of the fingerprint evidence itself. He would have been surprised if anyone had a doubt about the fingerprint evidence.111 It seemed to him that if an expert had been asked to deal with the issue of planting then it would have been inconceivable not to ask him also to look at the issue of comparison. Had that not been done, the expert and the Crown might have been open to criticism at the trial.112
Instructions to Mrs Greaves
10.58. The Solicitor General's minute was passed by the Deputy Crown Agent to Ms Climie along with a note to her from the Deputy Crown Agent.113
10.59. Ms Climie then wrote to Mrs Greaves, by letter dated 30 January.114 The letter stated that Crown Counsel had instructed that Ms McKie be placed on petition. The letter then gave instructions about fingerprint evidence:
"In the meantime please would you proceed as quickly as possible with the fingerprint expert enquiry referred to in the second paragraph of page 37 of the Precognition.115 A suitable English expert should be sought who can give evidence regarding the following matters
10.60. Ms Climie's letter continued in the following terms:
"I understand from discussion with Mrs Greaves, that the English practice for identifying points of similarity is more stringent that the Scottish practice. If this is indeed the case, then the English expert should be asked to look at Y7 and confirm that, on the basis of the English practice, the print can be identified as being that of [Ms McKie].
The English expert should be precognosced ....In particular it would be helpful if the expert could explain how the English practice for identifying points of similarity compares (and is more stringent) than the Scottish practice.
On arrest [Ms McKie] should be fingerprinted. The comparison between [Ms McKie]'s prints and Y7 by the English expert should be on the basis of the prints taken from [Ms McKie] on arrest."
10.61. Ms Climie drew the attention of the Inquiry to the conditionality of the instruction as regards re-comparison. The first question was whether the English practice for identifying points of similarity was more stringent. If so, then the check was required. If it was not then no check was required. No general cross check was envisaged, if it had been she would have asked for this to be done whatever the case was.116 The need for a cross check of Y7 had been ruled out.117
10.62. The letter contained a further instruction in these terms: "In addition you should instruct the Scottish fingerprint experts to carry out a further comparison of Y7 against the prints taken from [Ms McKie] on arrest." This was not viewed by Ms Climie as a legal requirement, but was viewed as a cross check of the identification.118
Ms McKie placed on petition
10.63. Ms McKie was placed on petition on 6 March 1998 and released on bail. She had to be brought to trial within twelve months, unless, as happened, the court adjourned the first trial diet and extended the time bar. A form F32 with the date 15 March 1998119 recorded that the time bar was due to expire on 6 March 1999.120
Failure to exhaust instructions
10.64. In the event no fingerprint examiner from outside SCRO carried out a comparison of Y7 on behalf of the prosecution. I examined closely how this failure occurred.
April-May 1998: the instruction of and production of Mr Kent's report
10.65. Mr Terence Kent was at this time the Head of the Crime Investigation Sector and IT at the Home Office Police Scientific Development Branch.121 Mrs Greaves said that she thought that Mr Kent was an expert on transplanted and fake prints and that he would also be in position to look at the comparison of the print Y7.122 The suggestion of Mr Kent's name seems to have come from Mr Hogg, who had looked at the possibility of planting and believed that he gave Mrs Greaves a report on the subject.123
10.66. Mr Kent was instructed by letter124 from Mrs Greaves dated 12 March 1998.125 The letter referred to previous telephone conversations. Mrs Greaves had discussions with Mr Kent around this time but she had no recollection of any discussion with him regarding the terms of the instructions.126 The only discussion she could recall was about the logistics of delivering the door-frame to him127
10.67. The points that she instructed be covered in a report by Mr Kent were as follows:
"(1) A narration of your expertise relative to fingerprints;
(2) An analysis of fingerprint planting and manufacture;
(3) The quality of the fingerprint Y7;
(4) Any concerns that you may have regarding the fingerprint Y7;
(5) Any comment that you may wish to make on the SCRO 16 point comparison of fingerprints and the statistical basis for duplication of fingerprints;
(6) If you are able to make any comment on the identity of the fingerprint compared with [Ms McKie]'s fingerprint form this should also be included."
10.68. Mrs Greaves explained to the Inquiry what she meant by points 2-6 and gave further detail about the letter.128
10.69. The terms of Mrs Greaves' letter to Mr Kent did not match precisely the "shopping list" in Ms Climie's letter of 30 January. This is apparent with hindsight. Given, however, that neither doubted the reliability of fingerprint evidence, it is open to question whether the significance of the differences between the two instructions would have been fully appreciated at the time.
Progress
10.70. On 3 April 1998 Ms Climie wrote to the procurator fiscal, Glasgow asking for an indication as to when the finalised Precognition would be submitted.129 On 15 April 1998 Mrs Greaves wrote to Mr Kent.130 She asked Mr Kent to contact her and asked when the report was likely to be submitted. Mrs Greaves responded to Ms Climie by letter of the same date. She wrote that she had been unable to contact Mr Kent by telephone and that she had written to him asking him (i) when the report would be likely to be ready and (ii) to discuss the matter with her.131 Mrs Greaves wrote to Mr Kent again on 22 April 1988.132 The letter refers to a telephone conversation. Mrs Greaves had no recollection of this conversation.133
Receipt of Mr Kent's report
10.71. Mr Kent's report was dated 13 May 1998.134 In due course it was lodged as a production by the Crown in HMA v McKie.135 It should be noted that Mr Kent said that the possibility that SCRO had made a mistake did not occur to him until the trial.136
10.72. Two points emerge from the report:
10.73. Not all of the points raised in Ms Climie's letter of 30 January 1998 were dealt with in the report.
10.74. Mr Kent's report also made no comment about point 5 in Mrs Greaves' letter of instruction: the SCRO 16-point comparison of fingerprints and the statistical basis for duplication of fingerprints.
Instructions from Crown Counsel
10.75. The issues raised in the letter of instruction to Mr Kent derived from instructions given by Crown Counsel. Mr Murphy explained the hierarchical structure within Crown Office: matters such as this were for Crown Counsel and not left to the discretion of procurator fiscal deputes. A duty advocate depute's instruction was a direct instruction to the High Court Unit from Crown Counsel and one would expect it to be implemented exactly as it stood.137 Mr Murphy explained that if the matter was to be dropped or amended it should have been raised with an advocate depute.138 If instructions of Crown Counsel had not been carried out that would be picked up by the fiscal or referred back to the original Crown Counsel for further instruction.139
10.76. Reflecting that background, and given that Mr Kent had not exhausted the points raised in the letter of instruction, Mrs Greaves had the option of either continuing to investigate matters, perhaps with a further expert, or to seek further instructions from Crown Office. She adopted that second course.
10.77. Mrs Greaves copied Mr Kent's report to Crown Office under cover of her letter of 15 May 1998.140 She sought comment and further instructions. She highlighted one specific matter in the report. As Mrs Greaves observed, the fact that the subsequent dusting with black powder had disclosed not only Y7 but also other marks identified as having been made by Miss Ross cast considerable doubt on Mr Kent's conclusion that Y7 must have been deposited after the SOCOs had treated the door-frame with aluminium powder. Mrs Greaves' expectation was that she would be asked to do further work in relation to his report, to precognosce Mr Kent, and perhaps further investigations would be required, for instance, speaking to an independent expert. This did not take place.141
10.78. Mrs Greaves said that whilst she did not refer in the letter to the fact that Mr Kent had not compared Y7 she discussed the lack of a comparison with Ms Climie.142 She emphasised that Mr Kent's report referred to the lack of a comparison by him. That was one of the things that Crown Counsel had initially instructed to be done. Her recollection was that she discussed things informally with Ms Climie as well as putting them down in letters.143 She asked Ms Climie whether she should obtain a further expert report on the issue. She did not receive an instruction.144 The decision as to how to proceed was for Crown Counsel. She expected that Ms Climie would liaise with Crown Counsel to obtain such instructions.145 Her opinion was that it was necessary to get a further view on the identification of Y7 and she thinks that she told Ms Climie this.146 She regarded the need for a further expert opinion as a matter for Crown Counsel to consider.147
10.79. Ms Climie said that she had no recollection of seeing Mr Kent's report or Mrs Greaves' correspondence about Mr Kent's report.148 She had no recollection of any discussions with Mrs Greaves about the fact that Mr Kent was unable to give a view on the identification. Ms Climie doubted that such discussions took place. The reason for this was that Mrs Greaves' letter of 15 May to Ms Climie did not mention the lack of a comparison.149 It must also be noted that Ms Climie had moved from being an indicter in early October 1998 and she explained that the move was planned to be in June or July 1998 but was postponed.150 She suggested that it may be that around April 1998 the responsibility for the McKie case was transferred to someone else, although she could not be sure.151 Mrs Greaves accepted that it was possible that somebody else was involved; however she could not remember dealing with anyone else.152 The fact that correspondence was addressed to Ms Climie does not necessarily mean that she was then dealing with the substance of the matter at Crown Office.
10.80. It is at this point that the gap in the Crown Office material becomes critical. From such papers as have been provided it is clear that there was a wider context to the discussion of the terms of Mr Kent's report.
Mr and Ms McKie and Mr Swann, Implementation of Crown Counsel's instructions after Mr Kent's report was issued
10.81. By this time Ms McKie had engaged Levy & McRae, solicitors, to act for her in connection with the criminal proceedings.
10.82. Around May 1998 Mr McKie and Ms McKie contacted Mr Swann. Mr Swann is a fingerprint examiner from Yorkshire of many years' experience. He had held the rank of Superintendent and had been an advisor to the Home Office on fingerprints. Mr and Ms McKie met Mr Swann in his office at Wakefield in May 1998.153 They had a full discussion about the work they wished him to carry out.154 They requested that Mr Swann act as Ms McKie's defence expert and carry out an examination of the productions to ascertain if the print Y7 had been forged or transplanted at the scene.155 Mr Swann said they spent the better part of the day discussing fingerprint evidence with him and the possibility of fingerprints being lifted, transplanted and forged. At that stage, neither Ms McKie nor Mr McKie made any allegations against SCRO and appeared to have high regard for the expertise of its fingerprint officers.156
10.83. Levy & McRae first wrote to Mr Swann suggesting the possibility of planting in May, and Mr Swann responded157 and explained: "I would have to see all exhibits (fingerprint) in the case, documentation relating thereto, disposal of all marks and be provided with appropriate copies thereof."
10.84. Levy & McRae needed to provide Mr Swann with the material that he had requested. Accordingly they wrote to Mrs Greaves confirming that they had appointed a fingerprint expert who had requested access to all productions, including fingerprints.158 Mrs Greaves replied on 4 June159 advising that some of the relevant productions had been sent to St Albans (i.e. to Mr Kent) for examination and that a report had been received and was being considered by Crown Counsel. Mrs Greaves wrote: "Once Crown Counsel are satisfied that they do not require any further examination to be carried out then I will arrange for the return of these items."
10.85. On 9 June Mr Watson of Levy & McRae wrote to Mrs Greaves.160 The letter has a handwritten note made by Mrs Greaves161 of a discussion with Ms Climie in August: "Spoke to G Climie 18/8 she will re-read report + advise if any further matters require clarification before return of piece of wood + other productions." Ms Climie had no recollection of this call.162
10.86. On 21 August Mrs Greaves wrote to Levy & McRae.163 The letter recorded that she was awaiting further instructions from Crown Office, following which she would instruct further examination of the productions or request their return. The letter stated: "Last week I was in contact with the Depute at Crown Office regarding this case. She assures me I should have Crown Counsel's instructions within the next 2 weeks. Thereafter, I will either request further examination of the productions which are at PSDB [i.e. Mr Kent's department] or I will arrange for their return to Glasgow."
10.87. On 10 September Mrs Greaves wrote to Ms Climie.164 The letter asked for confirmation as to whether Crown Counsel was satisfied with Mr Kent's report or if further inquiries were required.165 It did not list all the outstanding instructions. Ms Climie could not remember seeing this letter.166
10.88. A handwritten note by Mrs Greaves167 records that she spoke with Ms Climie on 29 September about instructions regarding Mr Kent's report. Mrs Greaves was expecting instructions from Crown Counsel.168 Ms Climie could not remember this call.
10.89. As noted earlier, Ms Climie moved from being an indicter at Crown Office to the Appeals Section in early October.
10.90. Mrs Greaves sent a further letter dated 19 October169 asking Ms Climie to "advise if Crown Counsel are satisfied with the terms of Terry Kent's report". The letter does not explicitly refer to the instructions that were outstanding from Ms Climie's letter of 30 January. Ms Climie could not remember seeing this letter.170
10.91. On 9 November171 Mrs Greaves wrote to Levy & McRae to advise that she had "now received instructions to request return of the productions from PSDB". She said that she would not have written this without having received instructions, and such instructions would have come, ultimately, from Crown Counsel.172 She said this meant that she must have received an instruction by 9 November, however she could not remember if this was by phone or letter.
10.92. There is no material in the Crown Office files for either HMA v Asbury or HMA v McKie covering the period around November 1998.
10.93. The first entry in the Crown Office file for HMA v McKie is a letter dated 19 January 1999173 from Ms Climie to Mrs Greaves advising her that the case was to be indicted for the High Court sitting commencing 1 March 1999 and forwarding a draft indictment for revision. In that letter Ms Climie instructed that Mr Kent's report be lodged as Production 186 and that letter makes no reference to the need for any further inquiry.
10.94. There were further discussions between Ms Climie and Mrs Greaves prior to finalisation of the indictment. On 25 January 1999174 Mrs Greaves wrote to Ms Climie referring to previous discussions and confirming that Mrs Greaves had requested SCRO to carry out a comparison of Y7 relative to the fingerprint form taken from Ms McKie on arrest and by letter dated 26 January175 Mrs Greaves acknowledged that that fingerprint form was to be Production 187.
10.95. In her evidence at the Inquiry hearing Ms Climie said of her letter of 19 January 1999:
"I suppose this is really the shopping list letter arising from my indictment work on the McKie case. I was trying to tie off loose ends. Obviously I failed to tie off the end of the Kent report, as you have drawn my attention to, and if there was not an explicit instruction by Crown Counsel about that, then I have failed."176 (Emphasis added)
10.96. This should be read in the light of her statement to the Inquiry in which she said:
"I am aware that the PF in Glasgow was instructed in January 1998 to have Y7 examined by an English fingerprint expert against Ms McKie's prints (but this was subject to the proviso that the English practice for identifying points of similarity was then more stringent than the Scottish practice, a point upon which I was then, and remain to this day, unclear). It appears that this part of the instruction was not carried out by the PF and that I indicted the case without this evidence. Standing the fact that this was an instruction from Crown Counsel, I can only assume that Crown Counsel had considered the Kent report and were happy for the case to be indicted without further evidence and that this was recorded somewhere in the McKie file."177
10.97. Two points should be made for completeness:
Commentary
Failure to instruct a comparison of Y7 by an external fingerprint examiner
10.98. It is particularly unfortunate that there is a gap in the Crown Office papers that might have assisted the recollections of Mrs Greaves and Ms Climie. I am not in these circumstances prepared to make a finding which involves preferring the recollection of one of these witnesses to that of the other. I do not consider, in any event, that it is necessary for me to do so.
10.99. Having reviewed the available papers in relation to both HMA v Asbury and HMA v McKie it is evident that Ms Climie paid meticulous attention to detail. The same is true of Mrs Greaves who was involved only in the McKie case. The failure to instruct an external review of the comparison is only explicable on the basis given by Ms Climie in her witness statement: there must have been an instruction from Crown Counsel to proceed to indict the case without further evidence. I am entirely satisfied that had there been no instruction to that effect from Crown Counsel Ms Climie and Mrs Greaves would have picked the matter up in the pre-trial preparation from January 1999 and, consequently, I accept Ms Climie's explanation. Though nothing is known of the background to it, that must have been the import of the instruction that had been conveyed to Mrs Greaves by 9 November 1998.
10.100. Responsibility for the failure to instruct an external review of Y7 must lie with Crown Counsel (the identity of the individual counsel in question being unknown) and I conclude that no criticism can be made of either Ms Climie or Mrs Greaves.
Lack of knowledge that some SCRO examiners had not found 16 points in sequence and agreement
10.101. By whomsoever the decision was taken, one point is clear. It was taken in ignorance of the fact that as many as five of the SCRO examiners who had compared Y7 had found fewer than sixteen points in sequence and agreement.179
10.102. There was no one individual at the time who was aware of the whole picture concerning the views of the individual examiners but Mr MacPherson was aware that Mr Geddes did not agree with him that there were as many as 16 points in sequence and agreement. Mrs Greaves interviewed Mr MacPherson in late 1997 to precognosce him and Mr MacPherson mentioned that he had worked with Mr Geddes on the case, including going with him to Miss Ross's house when an opportunity was taken to view Y7 on the door-frame.180 However, Mr MacPherson did not disclose to Mrs Greaves that Mr Geddes had been unable to identify Y7 to the 16-point standard nor did he give her any indication that she would need to precognosce Mr Geddes. Mrs Greaves did not think that she had precognosced Mr Geddes.181 This is not surprising. Mr Geddes had not signed the report relating to Y7, or the production containing the enlargement of Y7. In the absence of some positive indication from Mr MacPherson that there was anything unusual about Mr Geddes's involvement, there was no reason for Mrs Greaves to precognosce Mr Geddes.
10.103. Mr Foley was one of those who had examined Y7 in the 'blind test'. He was listed as a witness in the indictment for HMA v McKie182 (witness number 35). The witness statement included for him in the Precognition183 was a copy of a statement that he had given to Mr Malcolm in April 1997 in connection with the incident in 1993 when Ms McKie's prints were found on a production. There is no reference in that statement to any involvement on his part with Y7 and no indication that anyone involved in the conduct of the case (including the defence)184 was aware of his involvement with that mark.
10.104. Mrs Greaves understood that the fingerprint examiners were working to a standard of 16 points in sequence and agreement. That was, after all, the basis on which the SCRO report dated 10 April 1997185 (initially prepared for HMA v Asbury) had been signed. Ms Climie, likewise, understood that the fingerprint evidence had been checked repeatedly within SCRO at increasing levels of seniority and all such checks had confirmed that the print originated from Ms McKie.186 She believed that every officer identifying the print had looked at the print independently of everybody else and had identified 16 points. She assumed that the examiners would have identified the same 16 points as well.187 Ms Climie was unaware that opinions as to the number of matching points in Y7 diverged amongst various examiners. Lord Boyd too was unaware of the range of views held at SCRO.188
10.105. Mrs Greaves, Ms Climie and Lord Boyd were asked by the Inquiry what difference disclosure of a fuller picture might have made.
10.106. Mrs Greaves would at the relevant time have sought instructions from Crown Office as to what to do if she had received this information.189 She explained that disclosure by the Crown to the defence in 1997-1999 did not operate in the way it does now but still she agreed that it would have been important for the defence to be told that there were examiners within SCRO who could not get 16 points.
10.107. Ms Climie's personal assessment was that the prosecution was periled on the fingerprint evidence and had she known that some examiners had identified to less than 16 points, she would probably have recommended to Crown Counsel an independent expert review.190
10.108. Lord Boyd explained that it was impossible, even with hindsight, now to say what view would have been taken then had this information been known.191 A view could have been taken that, largely, the others were supportive of the identification, albeit that they did not reach the 16 points. The information might not have influenced the original decision to prosecute, although he would have wanted to make sure that there was disclosure to the defence. He did, though, add that "it might have influenced a later decision", by which he meant that it would have been taken into account by the trial depute (Mr Murphy) when the defence challenge to the identification emerged.
Significance of the failure to instruct an external review
10.109. With hindsight, it might be suggested that the failure to instruct a review of the comparison of Y7 by an examiner external to SCRO was a missed opportunity to discover the misidentification before the trial began. However, it is impossible to say what difference such investigations, if carried out, would have made. Having regard to the opinions of Mr Martin Leadbetter, Mr John Berry, two independent fingerprint experts, and Mr Swann it is not possible to know whether another, English, fingerprint examiner would have confirmed or contradicted the view taken by the SCRO examiners.
10.110. It is also salutary to recall that the original decision to instruct a comparison by an English examiner was contingent on a more stringent approach being taken in English practice when counting characteristics relative to the 16-point threshold. Mr Sheppard of the National Training Centre in Durham was asked about this at the hearing. The practice at SCRO was to count a lake and an island as two characteristics each (i.e. a total of four). In English practice:
"it became policy that only one would be shown, unless you are desperate to find 16 characteristics in coincident sequence; then you were perfectly entitled to use both ends of a independent ridge or a lake."192
If there was a surplus of matching characteristics a lake or an island could be counted as only one characteristic leaving the members of the jury to form the view that they could find extra characteristics; but, if necessary, an English examiner could count each as two characteristics towards meeting the minimum 16-point standard.
10.111. On that view, English practice was not necessarily more stringent.
The decision to indict: ought the matter have been referred to Lord Boyd?
10.112. Lord Boyd said that the papers provided to him by the Inquiry did not disclose whether the papers were returned to him for a decision to indict. Lord Boyd had no recollection of giving any instructions in relation to the prosecution of Shirley McKie after January 1998.193 He could not remember taking a further decision to indict Ms McKie.194
10.113. From the papers provided to Lord Boyd by the Inquiry it appeared to him that the decision to place Ms McKie on petition was treated as including a decision to indict. It may have been decided that given that he had seen the entire Precognition when instructing that Ms McKie be placed on petition there was no need for further instruction as to indictment.195 He had no criticism to make if his original decision to place on petition was understood to be the final decision to indict the case.196 He expected that the decision to indict would have gone to the duty advocate depute.197
10.114. No criticism arises here of the procedure that was followed. Lord Boyd had taken a decision in January 1998 on the basis of an extensive Precognition. As Lord Boyd said, it was understandable that his January 1998 decision was treated as a final decision encompassing the decision to indict.
The indictment
10.115. The indictment198 was sent by Ms Climie to the procurator fiscal in Glasgow for service on Ms McKie on 27 January 1999.199
1. CO_3451
2. Now (2011) Sheriff Pattison
3. CO_3923-CO_3957 and CO_3453-CO_3480
4. Mr McMenemy 11 June pages 142-144, 152-153
5. CO_4441-CO_4501
6. CO_4516
7. CO_4454
8. CO_3445
9. Mr Pattison 17 November page 11
10. Lord Boyd of Duncansby 10 November page 3
11. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 98, FI_0038 para 9 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves
12. Now Sheriff Murphy
13. Lord Boyd of Duncansby 10 November page 4 and FI_0057 para 18 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd of Duncansby
14. FI_0057 para 18 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd of Duncansby
15. See Chapter 31
16. Lord Boyd of Duncansby 10 November page 25
17. FI_0057 paras 25-27 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd of Duncansby
18. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 69
19. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 71
20. FI_0075 para 22 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms Climie
21. Sheriff Murphy 25 June page 9
22. See SG_0528 pdf page 32
23. FI_0057 paras 25-27 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd of Duncansby
24. Sheriff Murphy 25 June page 9
25. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 69
26. FI_0075 para 13 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms Climie
27. Ms Climie 2 July page 32
28. Sheriff Crowe 2 July page 173
29. Sheriff Crowe 3 July page 13
30. Mr MacPherson 3 November pages 85-86
31. Mr Stewart 5 November page 138
32. FI_0038 para 2 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves
33. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 69
34. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 122
35. FI_0038 para 6 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves
36. Ms Climie 2 July page 104
37. Mr Stewart 5 November page 193
38. By this time the 1997 general election had been held, and Lord Hardie was appointed as Lord Advocate in place of Lord Mackay of Drumadoon.
39. CO_3957
40. At that time A.P.Campbell Q.C., now Lord Bracadale. As noted earlier, the Home Advocate Depute was the most senior advocate depute.
41. C0_3956
42. Now Sheriff Gallacher
43. CO_3955
44. CO_3950
45. Now Lord Brodie
46. CO_3951
47. CO_3506
48. CO_3943
49. CO_3402
50. See Chapter 8
51. CO_3505
52. CO_3942
53. CO_3941
54. CO_0345
55. FI_0078 para 19 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Wilson
56. Chief Superintendent
57. Chief Inspector
58. FI_0038 para 16 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves
59. See CO_0280 and CO_0278
60. CO_3588 pdf page 28
61. CO_2592
62. Mrs Greaves 1 July pages 55-61
63. CO_3587 pdf pages 14-33
64. CO_3587 pdf page 59ff
65. CO_2630
66. CO_2631
67. CO_2624
68. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 66
69. Mrs Greaves 1 July pages 66-67
70. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 118
71. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 127
72. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 127
73. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 130
74. CO_3587 pdf page 27
75. CO_0201
76. FI_0038 para 5 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves
77. CO_2561
78. CO_3937
79. CO_2561 pdf page 1
80. CO_2561 pdf page 4
81. CO_2561
82. CO_2561 pdf page 4
83. CO_3573
84. FI_0038 para 20 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves
85 Mrs Greaves 1 July page 74
86. FI_0038 para 11 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves
87. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 74
88. Ms Climie 2 July page 10
89. CO_3936
90. CO_2561 pdf page 4
91. Ms Climie 1 July pages 172-173
92. Ms Climie 1 July page 176
93. Ms Climie 2 July page 5
94. CO_3935
95. CO_3928
96. FI_0038 para 8 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves
97. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 116
98. This should have been a note to the Solicitor General with a recommendation and not an instruction (Lord Boyd of Duncansby 10 November page 16).
99. CO_3934
100. CO_3933
101. Ms Climie 2 July pages 17-18
102. CO_3932
103. CO_3931
104. Lord Boyd of Duncansby 10 November page 17
105. FI_0057 para 6 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd of Duncansby
106. FI_0057 para 10 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd of Duncansby
107. CO_3930
108. FI_0057 para 19 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd of Duncansby
109. FI_0057 para 24 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd of Duncansby
110. FI_0057 para 21 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd of Duncansby
111. Lord Boyd of Duncansby 10 November pages 25-26
112. Lord Boyd of Duncansby 10 November page 26
113. CO_3929
114. CO_3928
115. Quoted at paragraph 44 above
116. Ms Climie 2 July page 44
117. Ms Climie 2 July page 67
118. Ms Climie 2 July page 50
119. CO_3921 pdf pages 4-5
120. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 47
121. FI_0052 paras 1-2 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Kent
122. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 73
123. FI_0034 paras 61-63 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Hogg
124. HO_0053
125. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 81
126. FI_0038 paras 9-10 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Hogg
127. FI_0038 paras 9-10 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Hogg
128. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 82
129. CO_3924
130. FI_0038 para 10 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves, CO_3468
131. CO_3467 and CO_3476
132. FI_0038 para 10 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves, CO_3466
133. FI_0038 para 10 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves
134. CO_3876
135. Production 186
136. FI_0052 para 27 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Kent
137. Sheriff Murphy 25 June page 55
138. Sheriff Murphy 25 June page 57
139. Sheriff Murphy 25 June page 82
140. CO_3463
141. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 110
142. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 90
143. Mrs Greaves 1 July pages 116-117
144. FI_0038 para 11 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves
145. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 92
146. FI_0038 para 11 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves
147. FI_0038 para 11 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Greaves
148. Ms Climie 2 July page 58 and FI_0075 para 9 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms Climie
149. FI_0075 para 14 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms Climie
150. FI_0075 paras 4-7 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms Climie
151. FI_0075 para 13 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms Climie
152. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 97
153. FI_0181 para 16 Inquiry Witness Statement (Part 1) of of Mr McKie and FI_0149 para 7 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Swann
154. FI_0181 para 17 Inquiry Witness Statement (Part 1) of Mr McKie
155. FI_0181 para 18 Inquiry Witness Statement (Part 1) of Mr McKie
156. FI_0149 para 8 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Swann
157. DB_0680
158. CO_3462
159. CO_3461
160. CO_3460
161. Mrs Greaves 1 July pages 92-93
162. FI_0075 para 13 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms Climie
163. CO_3458
164. CO_3456
165. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 93
166. FI_0075 para 9 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms Climie
167. CO_3788
168. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 94
169. CO_3453
170. FI_0075 para 9 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms Climie
171. CO_3451
172. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 144
173. CO_4454 and CO_3445
174. CO_3439
175. CO_4487
176. Ms Climie 2 July pages 88-89
177. FI_0075 para 11 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms Climie
178. FI_0079 paras 30-32 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd of Duncansby
179. See Chapter 7 para 192
180. CO_2624 pages 2-3
181. Mrs Greaves 1 July pages 107-108
182. CO_4484
183. CO_2643
184. See also Chapter 11
185. SG_0409
186. FI_0075 para 22 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms Climie
187. Ms Climie 2 July page 104
188. Lord Boyd of Duncansby 10 November pages 32-33
189. Mrs Greaves 1 July page 136
190. Ms Climie 2 July pages 94-101
191. Lord Boyd of Duncansby 10 November pages 33-34
192. Mr Sheppard 7 July pages 172-174 at page 174
193. FI_0079 para 29 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd of Duncansby
194. FI_0079 para 28 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd of Duncansby
195. FI_0079 para 23 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd of Duncansby
196. Lord Boyd of Duncansby 10 November page 24
197. Lord Boyd of Duncansby 10 November page 26
198. CO_4484
199. CO_4489