Introduction
13.1. This chapter sets out the sequence of events following the acquittal on Friday 14 May 1999 of Ms McKie. The reviews in which the Crown and SCRO were involved, the instruction of additional experts to consider the fingerprint evidence, and decisions concerning six of the SCRO officers are outlined.
HMA v Asbury - appeal
13.2. Mr Asbury had lodged an appeal on 5 August 1997. The original Grounds of Appeal1 did not dispute the fingerprint identifications. In April 1998 Mr Asbury instructed new solicitors, George More & Co, and on 10 September 1998 they intimated that they had appointed a fingerprint expert to review the fingerprint evidence.2 On 4 November 1998 the appeal was continued to enable further investigations to be carried out3 but it was not until 2 July 1999 that George More & Co informed the procurator fiscal that they were applying for legal aid sanction to instruct an (American) expert.4 By 14 September 1999 sanction had been granted and George More & Co sought the image of QI2 and Miss Ross's prints.5 On 30 September 1999 copies of the productions relative to QI2 were sent to them.6
13.3. There was correspondence in February 2000 stating that Mr Wertheim had been instructed on behalf of Mr Asbury7 and in June 2002 the defence solicitors intimated amended Grounds of Appeal challenging the identification of Miss Ross's print on QI2.8
13.4. Mr Asbury was liberated on bail pending the determination of his appeal on 22 August 2000,9 the Crown did not oppose his appeal and on 14 August 2002 the Court of Criminal Appeal quashed his conviction.
13.5. The basis on which Mr Asbury's conviction was quashed is not within the Inquiry's terms of reference but some of the inquiries mentioned in this chapter did relate, at least in part, to that appeal.
1999: Initial reactions to HMA v McKie
SCRO and Crown Office
13.6. Mr Crowe, then Deputy Crown Agent, first became aware of the trial the day after it ended and he and Mr Murphy spoke about it. They were concerned about the effect it could have on fingerprint evidence.10
13.7. Detective Chief Superintendent Henry Bell, the Director of SCRO from November 1998, did not know about the trial while it was ongoing but afterwards became aware of the growing media attention focussed on the fingerprint evidence.11 There was speculation in the media about the mark and Mr McKie was making public statements about it being wrong and the quality of the fingerprint experts from America. Mr Bell thought it appropriate to have the mark re-examined and to meet with the Crown to clarify if there were any areas he should investigate.12
13.8. He asked Mr Mackenzie and Mr Dunbar to re-examine the mark and they confirmed that Y7 was Ms McKie's fingerprint.13 Mr Mackenzie explained that they were unable to examine the defence material as it had been removed after the trial, but they discussed information from the upper part of mark Y7 that the American experts had pointed to and about which the SCRO witnesses had not given a clear explanation.14
13.9. Mr Bell convened a meeting15 which was held on 20 May and attended by Mr Crowe and Mr Murphy from Crown Office and by Mr Griffiths, Mr Mackenzie, Mr MacPherson, Mr Stewart, Ms McBride and himself from SCRO. The purpose of the meeting was to clarify what had gone wrong and learn lessons to avoid any repetition.16
13.10. Witnesses accepted that the minutes17 were generally a fair reflection of the meeting although there were differences of recollection on points of detail.18 The minutes reflect a wide-ranging discussion including the problems posed by the late arrival of the defence fingerprint evidence, the significance of the SCRO examiners' inability to explain their treatment of the upper part of the mark and the relatively poor quality of the SCRO charted enlargements compared with Mr Wertheim's production. That said, the minutes record Mr Murphy as being of the opinion that "it was unlikely that this case would cause serious damage to fingerprint evidence and that the case was a one-off, containing circumstances which were unlikely to be repeated." Complicating factors were present, including the lack of security at the house (i.e. the defects in log-keeping) and the inability of scene of crime officers to support the inference that the mark had been placed on the door-frame after the application of the aluminium powder. Reading the minutes it is evident that the failure of the prosecution was not attributed to the SCRO fingerprint evidence, or at least not solely attributed to that evidence:
"Miss McBride asked 'Did fingerprints lose the case?' Mr Murphy's reply was, 'No, there were other difficulties with the case' and added that the Defence made a good case in suggesting doubt."
13.11. The assessment that the outcome of the prosecution did not depend solely on the quality of the fingerprint evidence is consistent with the structure of Lord Johnston's charge to the jury.19
13.12. Statements provided to the Inquiry confirm that that reading of the minutes reflects the understanding of those involved at the time. Mr Bell's assessment was that there were areas that the bureau would have to improve on but that the Crown was satisfied with the evidence given by the examiners and its conclusions.20 Mr MacPherson's recollection was that Mr Murphy said that the SCRO witnesses' integrity and presentation skills were fine and that fingerprints did not lose the case.21 Mr Mackenzie had the impression that it was witnesses other than SCRO that had given rise to problems.22 Mr Crowe thought the SCRO examiners seemed competent and gave clear explanations. He left the meeting reassured by their explanations.23 The SCRO examiners had accepted that their productions had not been of the best quality.24 He was left with the impression that there might have been a bit of an ambush in court as a consequence of the lack of opportunity to prepare a response to the defence evidence and his view was that fingerprint evidence could be challenged in future but the SCRO examiners could respond to it.25
13.13. On 2 June Mr Bell wrote to all the chief constables in Scotland and copied that letter to HM Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland and the Scottish Executive Justice Department.26 Reflecting the meeting on 20 May, Mr Bell gave reassurance that, while SCRO would re-evaluate its methods of evidence presentation, the Crown was satisfied that "the case was unique in certain areas and [was] unlikely to cause any serious damage to fingerprint evidence".
13.14. The following day, Mr Murphy submitted his note on the case to Crown Office and the Inquiry was provided with a copy of part of that note,27 which concludes:
"I consider that there are three main lessons to be learned from the McKie case.
(1) In any future case the SCRO experts must be able to justify all aspects of their position to the jury in language which the lay person can understand. To this end it is essential that there be a full and detailed pretrial consultation between the A-D and SCRO witnesses - all of them - in any case where fingerprint evidence is crucial to the Crown case, a fortiori where a challenge is expected.
(2) To this end, in any case where fingerprint evidence is essential, and especially where a challenge is perceived, better quality reproductive materials must be used so as to permit the SCRO experts to demonstrate clearly to the jury what they are talking about.
(3) In cases where the expert fingerprint evidence is being challenged, the Crown must not commence until the experts have had a full and proper opportunity to consider any defence materials in detail; and if necessary an adjournment should be sought to allow this to happen before the Crown leads the evidence of its experts. This point was made with some force by the SCRO at the post-trial meeting with them. They considered in retrospect that they required more time in which to seek to analyse the methodology of the 'rival' experts. Normally this ought to be done pretrial, but in practice defence productions commonly arrive at the last minute.
What this means overall is that A-Ds and fingerprint analysis witnesses must have regard to the general principles set out in Hamilton."28
13.15. The minutes of the meeting on 20 May, the letter to chief constables and Mr Murphy's note all proceed on the basis that any problem with the fingerprint evidence in HMA v McKie lay in weaknesses in presentation, rather than in the formulation of an erroneous conclusion. That was the assessment of SCRO and Crown Office at that time.
Mr McKie
13.16. Mr McKie wrote to the then Lord Advocate, Lord Hardie, on 9 June, reflecting on the prosecution and trial and suggesting that Crown Office had failed to ascertain whether "the checks and controls on the output and evidence of the SCRO fingerprint 'experts' were operating and being applied effectively and efficiently". He asked whether the SCRO witnesses at the trial were still acting as Crown experts, whether their previous work had been reviewed by outside experts and what steps the Crown was taking to avoid any potential miscarriages of justice in relation to fingerprint evidence.29
13.17. In reply, by letter dated 12 July 1999, a member of the Lord Advocate's Secretariat said that various issues raised by the case had been the subject of investigation by the Lord Advocate, including the conflict in expert evidence. The Lord Advocate did not propose to prevent the citation as prosecution witnesses in appropriate cases of the officers from SCRO who gave evidence for the Crown in the case, nor did he propose to instruct review of the findings of those officers in relation to other cases. 30
Examinations of the mark and print
SCRO
13.18. The return of the Crown productions from the trial in early August31 gave SCRO an opportunity to revisit the case and Mr Bell asked Mr Mackenzie to do this. He studied an image of Y7 and the 1997 impressions of Ms McKie's prints and reached the same conclusion, and began to prepare an extensive portfolio of material.32
Materials available to those outside SCRO
13.19. From about this time there was growing public debate about Y7. It is important to note that this was based on a variety of source materials. Conflicts of opinion about the provenance of the particular images being examined have bedevilled the debate about Y7 and underlay the decision of the Inquiry to base its examination of the opinion evidence on the standard set of comparative exercise materials for sake of consistency. Comments on the views expressed by other examiners prior to this Inquiry have to be viewed in that light.
13.20. Since the trials in HMA v Asbury and HMA v McKie, save as necessary for the official inquiries referred to in this chapter and for the purposes of this Inquiry, the original SCRO material has not been available to the public. It is understood that material on the internet includes copies of the SCRO production books and illustrative chartings. At the time of the Inquiry Mr Mackenzie remained puzzled as to how Crown productions could appear on a website.33 Be that as it may, comment referable to internet copies attracts the obvious criticism that it is not based on the best evidence, which is original images of the mark and actual fingerprint forms.
13.21. Various images taken by Mr Wertheim, both photographs of Y7 and thumb prints of Ms McKie, have entered the public domain in one form or another. Some examiners such as Mr Leadbetter may have received original photographic prints directly from Mr Wertheim34 but copies are more widely available. Mr Mackenzie mentioned a CD circulated by Kasey Wertheim through Mr German to fingerprint bureaux35 and also the publication on the internet of nine impressions taken by Mr Wertheim.36 For his part, Mr Wertheim informed the Inquiry that the image of Y7 put on the Ed German website "onin" in 1999 or 2000 was scanned by Mr German directly from the negative of Mr Wertheim's photo that he took of Y7 on the door-frame and the inked impression was scanned directly from an inked impression of Ms McKie's print that Mr Wertheim took in March 1999.37 Again, comment made by reference to copies attracts the obvious criticism that it is not based on the best evidence and even insofar as some examiners may have viewed originals of Mr Wertheim's materials there has been the complication that Mr Wertheim's photographs of the mark Y7 show it with the striation which the SCRO examiners have long argued adversely distorts the image.
Devon and Cornwall Constabulary
13.22. Mr Bell sent an abridged version of his letter of 2 June 1999 to the chief constables to the heads of fingerprint bureaux as he had received a number of enquiries, both national and international.38 The head of the fingerprint bureau at Devon and Cornwall Constabulary by letter dated 20 August 1999 advised Mr Bell that, having viewed "photographic copies" of the mark Y7 and print, in his opinion the two were not made by the same person.39
13.23. In his reply40 Mr Bell reaffirmed his understanding of the line adopted by Crown Office at the meeting on 20 May and otherwise stated that SCRO officers were not at liberty to discuss their evidence nor to circulate fingerprints of persons who had been found not guilty.
Commentary on unwillingness of SCRO to release the fingerprint material
13.24. The inability of SCRO examiners to discuss their evidence is probably referable to considerations of confidentiality and, while cases are live,41 may be linked to contempt of court. The proposition that the fingerprints of a person who has been acquitted should not be circulated is consistent with section 18(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 that requires such fingerprints to be destroyed. Arguably there might have been an exception applicable to the prints taken from Ms McKie when she was arrested because they are of the same kind as elimination prints that police forces generally keep for police officers and therefore retention could be justifiable under section 18(4)(b) of the Act. Nonetheless, that supports only retention of the prints for police purposes and not publication. Other legislation is also relevant. Retention and also circulation of prints would raise issues under the Data Protection Act 1998 and, as has been more recently determined by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of S v UK (2009) 48 EHRR 50, raises issues concerning the Article 8 rights (i.e. protection of private life) of the donor of the prints. Police forces and other public agencies do not have an unrestricted right to publish personal data.
13.25. Having regard to these matters SCRO was correct to be reluctant to publish the fingerprint material to facilitate public debate among fingerprint practitioners.
Further work at SCRO
13.26. Mr Bell described the media attention as relentless and it grew and included politicians. He was engaged almost full time addressing issues that they raised.42 Though not a fingerprint expert himself, he continued to be happy with the integrity of the SCRO evidence about Y7. He received a personal presentation from Mr Mackenzie, which was "very compelling".43 He arranged for Mr Mackenzie to give a presentation to chief constables.44
13.27. Mr Mackenzie explained that in reviewing the evidence he was assisted by three "gifts"45 that had come to him after the trial: the training he received on ridgeology (enabling him to factor third level detail into his examination of Y7 and QI2); the CD of images circulated by Mr Kasey Wertheim (which showed the fault-line in Y7 more clearly); and the material Mr Wertheim put on the website through Mr German (the relevance of which is discussed in chapters 25 and 29).
January - February 2000
First BBC 'Frontline Scotland' documentary
13.28. The catalyst for external investigation would appear to have been the first of two documentaries (18 January 2000 and 16 May 2000) broadcast by the BBC. 46 In this programme, 'Frontline Scotland, Finger of Suspicion', Mr Wertheim, fingerprint examiners Ron Cook, Frank Williams, Ray Broadstock and Frank Reid and an unidentified person said to be a former senior fingerprint expert from SCRO said that Y7 was not made by Ms McKie. The programme stated that Mr Grieve had reached the same conclusion.47
13.29. The next day, 19 January 2000, Mr Crowe wrote to Mr Bell by fax commenting that what was new in the programme was the number of UK experts who all said Y7 was not Ms McKie's and the fact that a former SCRO examiner was apparently interviewed and agreed. He asked for confirmation that Y7 had been verified by senior officers in SCRO and an examiner from another force, that more than sixteen points of comparison had been found, and that there had been no other cases where fingerprint evidence had been seriously challenged.48
13.30. In his reply49 Mr Bell reported that the evidence had been reviewed by Mr Mackenzie and Mr Dunbar and that they re-affirmed the identification in accordance with the 16-point standard. He also made the more general point already summarised that, while it was not known what source materials external examiners may have seen, the SCRO examiners had worked with "the actual evidence" and the internet images were considered to be inferior.
13.31. The Chief Constable of Strathclyde, Mr Orr, requested that the McKie case be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the chief constables and the Chief Constable of Grampian, Mr Brown, asked Mr Robertson,50 the chairman of the SCRO Executive Committee and the ACPOS Council at the time,51 if he intended to order an inquiry.
Lothian & Borders fingerprint officers
13.32. A number of Lothian & Borders fingerprint examiners subscribed to a letter dated 26 January 2000 to the Minister of Justice and the Lord Advocate, copied to MSPs. The officers had reviewed, via the internet, material provided by Mr Wertheim and reached the conclusion "along with experts throughout the world" that Y7 was not Ms McKie's mark. They were critical of SCRO for not releasing the evidence in the case, were concerned that SCRO's stance brought "the whole fingerprint system into disrepute" and considered that the apparent "mis-identification" was at best a display of gross incompetence and at worst bore "all the hallmarks of a conspiracy". An independent fingerprint bureau should review SCRO's involvement in the case.52
13.33. Mr Mackenzie commented that those examiners "foolishly based their comparisons solely on materials posted on the internet".53
Decision to have an external review
13.34. In a letter to Mr Bell dated 4 February 2000, Mr Crowe mentioned that letters to the Lord Advocate following the Frontline Scotland broadcast had been passed for reply to the Justice Minister (then Jim Wallace54 ), who had ministerial responsibility for SCRO, and noted that the Justice Department might want the evidence in the case considered independently to verify the SCRO identification and indicate how the discrepancy between experts arose.55 This suggestion was superseded by the decision to involve Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (HMCICS) made on 7 February.56
13.35. On 7 February the ACPOS Council met in the morning and the SCRO Executive Committee in the afternoon. The chief constables of the eight Scottish police forces were members of both.57
13.36. Sir William (then Mr) Rae, at the time Chief Constable of Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary, gave a statement to the Inquiry. He recalled that the BBC documentary had given a significant public profile to the alleged misidentification and that at the ACPOS Council meeting Mr Orr expressed concern that the issue would continue unabated unless ACPOS took the initiative and procured an independent assessment of the fingerprint evidence. 58 The ACPOS Council decided that this should happen and the chairman, Mr Robertson, agreed to raise the matter that afternoon at the meeting of the SCRO Executive Committee.
13.37. Mr Mackenzie made a detailed presentation in support of the identification at the meeting of the SCRO Executive Committee59 but the committee agreed that Mr William Taylor, HMCICS, should be invited to conduct an independent assessment which should involve two or three eminent experts. The Scottish Executive representative said Ministers would support an independent assessment and an approach to HMCICS. Mr Bell welcomed this approach. Mr Crowe said that by then the case had become a matter of political concern, it was a big issue at the new Scottish Parliament,60 allegations were being made that there might be something systemic wrong with SCRO, Mr McKie "was extremely good at articulating his complaint", the media was running with the story and it reached a stage where it was right for the authorities to make some more detailed enquiries than "the quick exercise" he and Mr Murphy had done at the start.61
13.38. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland (HMICS) was due to carry out an inspection of SCRO in December 2000 and this was brought forward in respect of those aspects specifically raised by the McKie case.62
March - June 2000
Second BBC 'Frontline Scotland' documentary
13.39. On 16 May 2000 in a documentary, entitled 'False Impression,' fingerprint evidence in the Asbury case was challenged and Mr Wertheim and Mr Allan Bayle, then a lecturer in fingerprinting and other subjects at the Scientific Support College for the Metropolitan Police Training Establishment at Hendon, stated that in their opinion QI2 was not the mark of Miss Ross.63
13.40. Mr Crowe said that this programme led to an investigation of QI2.64
HMICS's emerging findings
13.41. Mr Taylor's Inspectorate examined the McKie case,65 with the assistance of three fingerprint experts, Mr Zeelenberg Head of the National Fingerprint Service in the Netherlands, Mr Rudrud Head of the National Fingerprint Service in Norway and Mr Mervyn Valentine of Greater Manchester Police.66
13.42. Mr Zeelenberg and Mr Rudrud reviewed the identification of Y7 and concluded that SCRO was incorrect in identifying Y7 as Ms McKie's.67 They gave a presentation to Mr Taylor and others at Edinburgh on 16 June. Their written report, dated 28 June 2000, explains their reasons in detail and is stated to be a reproduction and elaboration of this presentation.68
13.43. HMICS presented the emerging findings of its inspection of SCRO on 21 June to a meeting attended by members of the SCRO Executive Committee and representatives from SCRO, ACPOS and Crown Office.69 It was given in note form to Sir William Rae70 by then the president of ACPOS.71 The identification of Y7 was erroneous and HMICS found that the SCRO fingerprint bureau was not fully efficient and effective.72
The ACPOS Presidential Review Group and announcements in Parliament
13.44. Sir William Rae considered that the Inspectorate's emerging findings suggested that the Scottish Police Service could no longer rely on the expertise within the SCRO fingerprint bureau. The implications, he said, were serious; the term "crisis" was not unreasonable. Something had to be done to re-establish confidence of the public, the police and others working in the criminal justice system. "By that I mean there was only one acceptable standard of accuracy in relation to fingerprint identification which was 100% and anything less than 100% was unacceptable."73
13.45. Immediately following the meeting with HMICS, the ACPOS representatives reconvened to discuss how to respond. Sir William Rae thought they were all surprised by the outcome of the independent examination of the fingerprint. They had no explanation as to why such a misidentification had occurred and ACPOS had to try and discover what had happened. They agreed to set up the ACPOS Presidential Review Group (APRG) under his chairmanship to co-ordinate the Scottish Police Service's response to HMICS's findings.74
13.46. On the next day, Thursday 22 June, HMICS made the emerging findings known to Ms McKie's family and to the media without publishing an interim report.75
13.47. Later that day, the Justice Minister and the Lord Advocate, by then Colin Boyd Q.C., both made statements to the Scottish Parliament. Mr Wallace informed members of HMICS's emerging findings and ACPOS's decision to set up the APRG.76 Mr Boyd reported that he had instructed that:
Implementation of decisions
13.48. By letter dated 23 June 2000, Mr Crowe asked that the APRG consider how officers from other bureaux could provide confirmation of SCRO fingerprint reports until matters were resolved,78 and Sir William Rae responded that Mr Bell was exploring using the services of Metropolitan Police or the Royal Ulster Constabulary.79 Thereafter arrangements were put in place which lasted for over one year.
13.49. Mr Crowe was asked to work with SCRO to restore a normal service for fingerprint evidence in criminal cases.80
13.50. The APRG appointed Mr McInnes, Deputy Chief Constable of Fife Constabulary, to carry out a scrutiny of the management and resourcing of SCRO to assist the implementation of HMICS's Inspection Report.81 He led the Change Management Review Team (the CMRT) whose remit was: "To undertake a 90 day scrutiny of the SCRO Fingerprint Bureau which will inform the ACPOS Presidential Review Group established to undertake a wide ranging review of SCRO."82
13.51. Mr Bell in his evidence to the Inquiry said that in his mind the main thrust of HMICS's finding that the bureau was "not fully efficient and effective" was the case load the bureau was carrying. There was a 7000-case backlog when he arrived at SCRO in November 1998, staff morale was not good and their grading was lower than in some other bureaux in Scotland; the working environment was not good; and the new Automatic Fingerprint Recognition (AFR) system made additional demands on experts' time. He was assisted in addressing these issues by the Change Management Review Team and others.83
13.52. Mr Crowe intimated to Sir William Rae that arrangements were being made to have the evidence in the Asbury case independently examined.84 Mr Asbury was then in prison.
13.53. The APRG appointed Mr James Mackay, Deputy Chief Constable of Tayside Police, on 23 June: "To conduct an investigation into all of the circumstances which resulted in the identifications by the Fingerprint Bureau of SCRO in the murder of Marion Ross in Kilmarnock in January 1997, in particular, the difference in opinions of SCRO fingerprints experts and the experts recently consulted by Mr William Taylor, HMCIC for Scotland."85
Mr McKie's response
13.54. Mr McKie wrote to Mr Wallace by letter dated 26 June 2000, acknowledging the steps that had been taken but emphasising that in his view matters other than failings in the operation of SCRO required to be addressed and these "struck at the very heart of the prosecution system in Scotland". He listed five specific matters that required to be addressed, three of which in part come within this Inquiry's terms of reference:
(i) "That officers of the Crown Office failed to take action on matters raised before, during and after her trial which clearly pointed to her innocence and the possible guilt of SCRO and its officers";
(ii) "That the SCRO 'experts' namely Charles Stewart, Hugh McPherson, Fiona McBride and Anthony McKenna should be investigated in respect of possible perjury and criminal conspiracy committed by them at the trials of David Asbury and Shirley McKie";
(iii) "That the organisations and persons responsible for supervising SCRO failed to carry out their responsibilities and as a result failed to identify serious shortcomings in the operation of that organisation."86
July - September 2000
Investigation of allegations of criminality
13.55. On 6 July 2000 Mr William Gilchrist, then a Regional Procurator Fiscal at Paisley,87 was instructed by the Lord Advocate to investigate Mr McKie's complaints of alleged criminal conduct.88
13.56. Four SCRO officers in particular were under consideration, Mr MacPherson, Mr Stewart, Ms McBride and Mr McKenna,89 the officers who had signed the relevant reports and, other than Mr McKenna, had given evidence in court.
13.57. The role of Mr Mackay and his team changed. Mr Gilchrist was now a procurator fiscal investigating suspected criminal activity with Mr Mackay to assist him and under his direction.90
13.58. By this time Crown Office had decided to have the fingerprint evidence in HMA v Asbury independently reviewed and initially it was decided that, since HMA v Asbury was under appeal, Mr Gilchrist should restrict his investigation to allegations of criminal conduct only in relation to the McKie prosecution and Mr Mackay was similarly to confine his inquiries meantime.91
13.59. After Mr Gilchrist met Mr McKie and Mr Cassells, then Ms McKie's solicitor, on 14 July,92 he informed Mr Crowe that Mr McKie's allegations of conspiracy and perjury encompassed the Asbury case and that Mr McKie's position was that the SCRO evidence in relation to both Y7 and QI2 Ross was not only wrong but untenable. Accordingly Mr Gilchrist considered that he ought to investigate both cases. In his opinion a decision was not needed about the Asbury case until after the results of the independent examination of the fingerprint evidence from the tin but if the result was that QI2 was not Miss Ross's then his investigation should undoubtedly be extended.93
Examination of QI2 and other marks: Mr Rokkjaer and Mr Rasmussen
13.60. It would appear that Crown Office initially instructed Mr Malcolm Graham to provide a report without appreciating that he had been the examiner instructed by the defence in HMA v Asbury.94 He provided a report dated 23 June 2000.95 Mr Graham explained to the Inquiry that he did not review the material in the case at this stage, but may have provided a copy of a report he prepared in 1997 to Crown Office.96
13.61. In any event, by 6 July 2000 when Mr Gilchrist was first instructed the Crown had decided to instruct Danish experts to examine the fingerprint evidence in the Asbury case;97 and Mr Rokkjaer and Mr Rasmussen were instructed.
13.62. Mr Crowe accompanied the Danish experts, Mr Rokkjaer and Mr Rasmussen, when they visited the procurator fiscal's office in Kilmarnock on 31 July 2000 to examine the productions. His recollection was that there was a great deal of pressure to have the marks that were important to the Asbury appeal checked and, therefore, the main focus was on those marks. He did not think they examined Y7 because it was the subject of another investigation.98
13.63. Mr Rasmussen's precognition taken by Mr Crowe that day records that he was acting Head of the Police Fingerprint Bureau in Denmark and that he was satisfied that QI2 (Ross) was not made by Miss Ross.99 Mr Rokkjaer is recorded as corroborating Mr Rasmussen's findings.100 Mr Crowe remembered noting their "incredulity" when they viewed QI2 (Ross) and that they "kept saying how they could not believe how anyone could make an identification on the prints".101 He described this as his 'Damascene moment'. He had never had a case where one mark was disputed but to have two disputed caused him real concern. It was a turning point.102
Suspension of the SCRO officers
13.64. On 2 August, the APRG met to consider interim reports from Mr McInnes and Mr Mackay.103
13.65. The Mackay enquiry had approached the National Training Centre for Scientific Support to Crime Investigation at Durham (the NTC) to secure its own independent expert.104 Mr Geoffrey Sheppard, then its Head of Fingerprint Training, had been instructed to compare Y7 with Ms McKie's fingerprints. Mr Sheppard carried out a comparison, as did two other fingerprint examiners at the NTC, Mr Mike Thompson and Mr Geoffrey Grigg.105
13.66. In the afternoon of 2 August, Mr Ablett (not a fingerprint examiner but director of the NTC at the time) and Mr Sheppard met members of Mr Mackay's team and informed them of the NTC's findings. Mr Mackay joined them later, and the meeting is recorded as finishing at 17:00.106 The NTC reported that Y7 was not made by Ms McKie and that "without adequate explanation", there appeared to have been both collective manipulation of evidence and collective collusion to identify Y7 as Ms McKie's.
13.67. Mr Mackay phoned Sir William Rae at 17:45 to tell him, referring also to Mr Rudrud and Mr Zeelenberg and Mr Wertheim.107
13.68. Sir William Rae spoke to other members of the APRG, and the Deputy Chief Constable of Strathclyde,108 and next morning contacted Mr Bell, asking him to suspend the officers which Mr Bell did after receiving written confirmation from Sir William Rae.109
13.69. Accordingly, on 3 August 2000, Ms McBride, Mr McKenna, Mr MacPherson and Mr Stewart were subject to precautionary suspension.
13.70. After he had consulted with other members of the APRG, Sir William Rae prepared a press release explaining that the four officers had been suspended from duty on full pay.110
13.71. The suspension of the officers is discussed in Chapter 17.
The meeting of experts
13.72. A meeting of experts took place at the Scottish Police Training College at Tulliallan on 15 August 2000, attended by Mr Mackenzie and Mr Dunbar, Mr Zeelenberg and Mr Rudrud. Dr Robert Bramley from the Forensic Science Service acted as facilitator and Mr Mackay, Mr Gilchrist and others including a stenographer were also present.111
13.73. The meeting is discussed in more detail in Chapter 16.
13.74. Mr Mackenzie and Mr Dunbar made a presentation, followed by a presentation by Mr Rudrud and Mr Zeelenberg, after which there was a facilitated discussion.112 At the end of the meeting Mr Mackenzie and Mr Dunbar adhered to the view that Y7 was made by Ms McKie, and Mr Zeelenberg and Mr Rudrud remained of the opposite view.
13.75. Towards the end of the meeting Mr Mackenzie saw, briefly, for the first time Mr Wertheim's defence production and an unmarked enlargement of a Kent photograph of Y7, as well as the piece of door-frame.113 A request was subsequently made for copies of the Wertheim and Kent materials to be sent to SCRO and these were received within a few days.114
13.76. In a paper dated 23 August, Mr Rudrud and Mr Zeelenberg submitted their comments on the SCRO presentation at Tulliallan, reaffirming their conclusion that Y7 was not the fingerprint of Ms McKie.115 This was a detailed paper that included the illustration of the "leapfrogging" pattern of movement assumed by Mr Mackenzie's analysis of the mark which has been reproduced as figure 13 in Chapter 25. In summarising this in his report (see below) Mr Gilchrist said that the SCRO presentation "strongly suggested to Rudrud and Zeelenberg that the comparison was done in a reverse order. In other words, they felt that Mackenzie and Dunbar had looked at the print and tried to find similarities in the mark. This gives rise to the danger of stretching tolerances in order to establish similarities."
13.77. Mr Mackenzie prepared an additional report dated 29 August 2000, in which he commented on Mr Wertheim's defence production, Mr Kent's photographs, and a copy of the Rudrud and Zeelenberg report. He adhered to his conclusion on Y7 and was critical of the quality of the other source materials that had been used, stating his preference for the original Strathclyde Police image of Y7 and the police elimination prints.116
Mr Mackenzie and Mr Dunbar moved to non-operational duties
13.78. In September 2000 Mr Mackenzie and Mr Dunbar were transferred to non-operational duties.117 The background to this decision is explored in Chapter 16; the decision reflected a concern that these officers had declined the opportunity afforded to them after the Tulliallan meeting to change their opinion in the light of the emerging conclusion of the Mackay investigation that Y7 had clearly been misidentified.
Written report from the Danish experts and extension of Gilchrist and Mackay investigations
13.79. In his letter to Sir William Rae on 3 August, Mr Mackay had said they still awaited Crown Office investigation into the fingerprint found on the tin within the Asbury house i.e. QI2 Ross.118
13.80. The Danish experts reported in writing on 7 August 2000.119 The report referred to Production 99 in relation to QI2 Ross120 and Production 98 in relation to other marks which SCRO had identified as Mr Asbury's.121 Their conclusions were:
(i) the fingerprint QI2 (Ross) did not originate from Miss Ross;
(ii) XF was identical to the impression of Mr Asbury's right forefinger;
(iii) QD2 did not originate from Mr Asbury;122
(iv) the quality of the photographs of QE2, QL2 and QI2 (Asbury) in the production was too poor for comparison, and special light, which was not available, would have been required to examine the impressions on the tin itself. Therefore it could not be determined whether these impressions originated from Mr Asbury.123
13.81. In September the remit of Mr Gilchrist's investigation was extended to cover allegations of perjury at the trial of Mr Asbury.124 Mr Crowe's letter to Mr Gilchrist dated 13 September confirmed the Lord Advocate's instruction and enclosed a copy of the Danish experts' report.125
APRG and HMICS interim reports
13.82. The report of the HMICS inspection of the SCRO fingerprint bureau was published on 14 September 2000126 as was an interim report by the APRG indicating the measures taken to date.127
NTC reports
13.83. A letter from NTC to the Mackay enquiry dated 28 September 2000128 enclosed a report, signed on 27 September, which narrated the steps taken at NTC in examining Y7 and comparing it with Ms McKie's prints. This included taking the precaution of having the mark re-photographed by a photographer at Durham to ensure that the comparison was done to Durham standards "end to end".129 The NTC examiners were aware that there was by then damage to the mark but Mr Sheppard expressed the view (which the Inquiry accepts) that the damage was not material.130 The NTC examiners were unanimous that the mark was not made by any of Ms McKie's digits. The material prepared by SCRO for court was critically reviewed and a report from Mr Wertheim was said to demonstrate fully the discrepancies identified by the NTC examiners. Given the inferior quality of the SCRO court productions the NTC had "grave doubts" that the examinations were carried out totally independently and, as previously conveyed orally, "without adequate explanation there appears to be collective manipulation of evidence and collective collusion" to erroneously identify Ms McKie. "As to how such an erroneous identification came about it is assumed that, this being an elimination exercise, it was not treated or approached in the professional manner which the service and ultimately the courts are entitled to expect."
13.84. By letter dated 21 September the NTC had been asked to examine QI2 with a view to indicating whether NTC agreed with other examiners that it was not that of Miss Ross and to offer an explanation for SCRO having got it wrong. They were also to compare it with Mr Asbury's prints. A brief report from Mr Sheppard dated 19 October 2000 said that QI2 had been compared with the fingers and thumbs of Miss Ross and Mr Asbury with a negative result. "As to how such an erroneous identification was made originally I am totally at a loss to offer any explanation other than what I have referred to previously as the ELIMINATION MENTALITY" (emphasis original).131
13.85. By this time the NTC had also been asked to compare Y7 and QI2 with various persons' fingerprint forms.132 Each comparison resulted in a negative result. The exercise is explained in more detail in supplementary statements of Mr Sheppard and Mr Thompson of the NTC to the Inquiry.133
Apology to Ms McKie
13.86. Around 12 September 2000, Sir William Rae met with Ms McKie and her father and extended to her an apology on behalf of the SCRO Executive Committee for all the distress she had suffered as a consequence of the misidentification of Y7.134
October - November 2000
Mr Mackay's report and the CMRT report
13.87. On 20 October 2000 Mr Mackay submitted his report to Mr Gilchrist. Sir William Rae said he had sight of the report at the time but it was "strictly confidential". The report has not been published but an excerpt became publicly available in 2006,135 and a synopsis was made available by the Lord Advocate to the Justice 1 Committee inquiry.136
13.88. The Change Management Review Team (CMRT) that ACPOS had set up, under the APRG, also reported in October 2000, and included responses to the recommendations and suggestions made by HMICS.137
Mr Gilchrist and the NTC
13.89. In November 2000 Mr Gilchrist obtained a statement from Mr Sheppard,138 although Mr Sheppard did not recollect this by the time of the Inquiry. Mr Sheppard, commenting on this statement during the hearings, affirmed the view he expressed in it that the identification of Y7 was "either gross incompetence or pure fabrication".139
13.90. On 29 November 2000, Mr Gilchrist asked Mr Mackay to commission a further and more detailed report from the NTC.140 He explained to the Inquiry why he had involved the experts from Durham. He had to go beyond considering whether or not the marks had been correctly identified. He had to look at what the SCRO officers had done and to investigate whether or not it could be proved beyond reasonable doubt that they had either deliberately misidentified one or both of the marks or had wilfully failed to admit to a mistake. This required expert evidence addressed to the material as seen by the SCRO officers and that was what he sought from Durham. The Durham experts were not being asked to offer another assessment of Y7 and QI2 as this had been done already by other experts.141
2001: the SCRO officers, Mr Gilchrist's report
13.91. In May 2001 the Director of SCRO advised Mr Mackenzie, Mr Dunbar, Mr MacPherson, Mr Stewart, Ms McBride and Mr McKenna that after the conclusion of the Crown's assessment of a possible criminal case an evaluation of any disciplinary issues would be required. In the interim, Mr Mackenzie and Mr Dunbar remained on non-operational duties and Mr MacPherson, Mr Stewart, Ms McBride and Mr McKenna remained suspended.142
NTC report
13.92. On 12 June 2001 Mr Gilchrist met with examiners from Durham when they explained their conclusions.143
13.93. Following the meeting a final report was produced by the NTC, dated June 2001, reviewing its work and providing a detailed analysis of both Y7 and QI2 Ross and the relative prints. Y7 was not identical with the left thumb print of Ms McKie, the mark was a partial impression in which no pattern type was visible, it could be a thumb though no absolute determination could be made. It appeared to be made by a single contact, not a double touch as the SCRO examiners had suggested, which was significant as features ignored in the original evidence were now included in the overall analysis and comparison. QI2 revealed a limited amount of first, second and third level detail. Very little second level detail could be seen due to a lack of clarity in the quality of the ridge detail. There were some areas of the mark where the ridge flow was incomplete and the interpretation of the detail in the Scottish evidence was "speculative to say the least". The NTC had no doubt that QI2 and the inked impression of the right forefinger of Marion Ross were not identical.144
Meetings with other examiners
13.94. Mr Gilchrist wrote to Mr Crowe on 13 June 2001145 to indicate that he was minded to interview the four experts who had supported the SCRO identifications: Mr Mackenzie, Mr Dunbar, Mr Swann and Mr Graham. He anticipated that they would be called as defence witnesses in any prosecution and he proposed to put the Durham material to them to judge their reaction to what the prosecution case might be against the SCRO officers and also to see if this material caused any of them to change their position. He had to assess the strength of any defence case and the Crown had to look at any potentially exculpatory evidence.146
13.95. He was able to interview Mr Swann and Mr Graham. By the time of the Inquiry he had little recollection of those meetings beyond what was in his report.147 At least at that stage he had been unable to interview Mr Mackenzie and Mr Dunbar because, so he understood, of legal advice they had received at the time.148 It did not appear possible to speak to Mr MacPherson, Mr Stewart, Ms McBride and Mr McKenna as they had declined to answer any questions at interview under caution.
Mr Gilchrist's report
13.96. Mr Gilchrist submitted his report to Crown Office together with a letter dated 6 July 2001 to Mr Crowe. He attached the reports from Messrs Rudrud and Zeelenberg and from Messrs Rokkjaer and Rasmussen, two reports from Mr Wertheim (dated 2 April 1999 and 30 March 2000) the NTC report and an extract from "the Tayside Police report" in which, he wrote, the Mackay enquiry team summarised their findings.149
13.97. Mr Gilchrist's report150 runs to 34 pages and contains a detailed narration and analysis of the evidence. He proceeded on the basis that in order to mount a successful prosecution the Crown would have to prove two things: (1) that there was a misidentification of each mark and (2) that the SCRO examiners had either deliberately misidentified the fingerprints or, having made an initial mistake, they wilfully failed to admit to that mistake at a stage when it must have been apparent to them that they had made a misidentification. On the first issue Mr Gilchrist was certain that they were not entitled to make positive identifications and, in particular, that they were "stretching the tolerances" to establish 16 similarities; but though he was "reasonably confident" that these were misidentifications he did not have the same degree of certainty in that conclusion. As to the second issue, relating to criminal culpability, it had proved extremely difficult to get the various experts to offer an opinion as to whether the misidentifications resulted from incompetence or were wilful. Mr Wertheim had initially said gross incompetence but had firmed up in support of dishonest intent in view of the state of the illustrative enlargements but the NTC examiners said that the SCRO examiners were either incompetent or dishonest and were reluctant to offer an opinion as to which it was. Mr Gilchrist noted the conflict in the expert evidence in relation to both marks and, having had the benefit of attending the facilitated discussion at Tulliallan, he observed that it was extraordinarily difficult for a layman to follow the detail and he was forced to the conclusion that the jury would have reasonable doubt and therefore his view was that a conviction was "highly improbable".151
13.98. Having completed his investigation into the allegations of criminal conduct he wanted to revert to SCRO regarding QI2. QI2 had not had the same level of scrutiny as Y7 and he was uncomfortable about not having been able to seek SCRO's view on the evidence that it was not made by Miss Ross. If the Crown was going to concede that it was not Miss Ross's mark he would prefer that it was after SCRO had a further opportunity to examine QI2.
Contact between Mr Gilchrist and Mr Mackenzie
13.99. Mr Mackenzie had not looked at QI2 before.152 Arrangements were made for him to be provided with enlargements153 and he provided an opinion on that mark producing a letter,154 a report on QI2155 and booklet of photographs156 all dated 27 July 2001. He found twenty nine ridge characteristics and twenty three incipient ridges in sequence and agreement. He followed that up with transparencies in a booklet dated 19 February 2002157 showing third level detail in agreement.158
13.100. Mr Mackenzie explained his views on Y7 to Mr Gilchrist in essentially the same terms as the explanation given to the Inquiry. Mr Gilchrist wrote: "I was left with the impression that this was a man who genuinely believes that the fingerprint is that of Shirley McKie. Although I tend to be unduly swayed by the last expert to whom I have spoken I have also to say that he created a doubt in my mind as to whether the other experts are right when they say that it definitely cannot be Shirley McKie's print."159
13.101. Mr Gilchrist explained this to the Inquiry saying: "every expert I spoke to was genuine and was trying to be honest. So not having any doubts about their credibility, I invariably found their technical explanation for their view persuasive. Unduly: well perhaps I should not have said 'unduly', perhaps I should have just have said I tend to be swayed by the last expert."160
13.102. After he saw Mr Mackenzie, Mr Gilchrist's view shifted slightly. With two opposing camps both of whom were absolutely definite that it was or was not a misidentification his final position was somewhere in the middle: it may or may not be a misidentification but no one was entitled to say definitely one way or the other.161
Crown Office assessment
13.103. Mr Crowe submitted Mr Gilchrist's report to the Lord Advocate with a detailed assessment in two notes dated 9 and 20 July.162 In his statement to the Inquiry Mr Crowe further explained his reasoning by citing from the standard textbook on criminal law, Gordon's Criminal Law (now in its 3rd edition):
"Normally the expression of an opinion cannot constitute perjury, if only because of the difficulty of proving that the witness did not hold the opinion he gave. But where the opinion can clearly be shown to have been given dishonestly, for example by showing that the witness was bribed to give it, or that it was clearly an untenable opinion, perjury may be committed."163 (emphasis added)
13.104. The test in any prosecution would be whether the opinion expressed by the four officers was "untenable". Mr Crowe noted that while some experts were of the view that there had been misidentifications, others (Mr Swann and Mr Graham) still agreed with SCRO and he concluded:
"There seems no basis for proceeding since a jury would be unlikely to cope with being led through microscopic examination of the fingerprints and their similarity/differences."
He recommended that no proceedings be taken.164
Lord Advocate's decision regarding prosecution
13.105. The Lord Advocate's handwritten note in response165 addressed to the Deputy Crown Agent, dated 21 August 2001, was directed to Mr Gilchrist who by then had succeeded Mr Crowe.166 In this the Lord Advocate conveyed his decision that there were to be no criminal proceedings against the SCRO officers.167 He agreed with Mr Gilchrist's assessment that there was "no prospect of persuading a jury that the evidence given by the SCRO officers was given dishonestly".168
13.106. On 7 September 2001 it was announced that there would be no proceedings against the four officers.169 A subsequent note from Mr Gilchrist to the Lord Advocate reported that on 7 December 2001 he had a meeting with Ms McKie, Mr McKie and Mr Russell MSP and explained that the Crown would not be making a comment on the evidence.170
13.107. The four remained suspended from duty and the question was whether they should return to work. Another issue was whether they could be used in trials in the future. These matters are discussed in Chapter 17.
Requirement for second opinions in SCRO cases ends
13.108. In addition to the Lord Advocate's direction in June 2000 that independent fingerprint experts should verify all SCRO fingerprint identifications, SCRO management instructed a verification of serious cases which involved each of the four suspended officers in the year before and after the McKie case. Both verification exercises showed the SCRO identifications to be 100% accurate.171
13.109. Mr Crowe said that at some point in 2001 he persuaded the Lord Advocate that it was no longer necessary to verify SCRO fingerprint evidence. Over 1700 cases were examined and no other misidentifications had been found.172 Indeed, in one case the external expert had disputed an identification which was subsequently confirmed by DNA evidence and the accused's admission that he had been at the locus.173 The requirement ended in July 2001, and Mr Bell was notified of this in terms of a letter from Mr Crowe.174
Civil proceedings
13.110. In the latter part of 2001 Ms McKie raised civil proceedings against the Strathclyde Joint Police Board as well as the Scottish Ministers and the four examiners Mr MacPherson, Mr Stewart, Mr McKenna and Ms McBride. These continued through to February 2006 when they were settled and their extended nature had an impact on the position of the SCRO officers - see Chapter 17.
First Minister's statement
13.111. On 9 February 2006, in response to a call for an inquiry in the Scottish Parliament, the First Minister made this statement:
"... a number of important investigations into elements of this case and, indeed, into the fingerprint provisions in Scotland have proved that the fingerprint evidence used in this country is reliable; that we can ensure that it can be used in the Scottish justice system; and that the people involved deal with it honestly and accurately. In this case, it is quite clear-and this was accepted in the settlement that was announced on Tuesday-that an honest mistake was made by individuals. I believe that all concerned have accepted that."175
Leak of Mackay report
13.112. Part at least of the Mackay report was leaked and was the subject of articles in the Scotland on Sunday newspaper on 12, 19 and 26 February 2006176 and on 3 May 2006 the BBC published the Executive Summary of the report.177
The Justice 1 Committee report
13.113. The Justice 1 Committee of the Scottish Parliament published the report of its Inquiry into the Scottish Criminal Record Office and the Scottish Fingerprint Service on 15 February 2007.
13.114. It was not part of the remit of the Committee's inquiry to reach a view as to whether Y7 was or was not correctly identified as being Shirley McKie's mark. The Committee found it "staggering" that respected and highly experienced experts could have such widely divergent professional opinions on the identification of the mark.178 It did not comment on QI2, as the matter was regarded as being sub judice.179 It did not comment on QD2, as the identification was, at the time of the report, no longer disputed by the Danish experts.180
13.115. Among its comments, the Committee considered that the case highlighted inconsistencies in the identification and verification processes within the SCRO fingerprint bureau. Insofar as procedures were written down, they had not been properly followed, or had been ignored. In some instances ad hoc procedures had been adopted.181 The Committee considered that the standards of court presentation displayed by SCRO fingerprint officers had been lacking, and that this resulted from inadequate training for and limited experience of officers facing cross-examination.182
13.116. It is not the role of this Inquiry to review or comment upon the findings contained in the report of the Justice 1 Committee or in any of the other reports that have been referred to in this chapter. They are included as forming part of the series of events following upon the acquittal of Ms McKie.
1. CO_3402
2. CO_3761
3. CO_3756
4. CO_3753
5. CO_3748
6. CO_3744
7. CO_3743
8. CO_3536 and CO_3537
9. CO_0010
10. FI_0048 para 3 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe
11. Mr Bell 3 July page 31
12. Mr Bell 3 July page 33
13. Mr Bell 3 July pages 31-33
14. FI_0046 para 133 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie
15. Mr Bell 3 July page 33 and FI_0043 para 6 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Bell
16. FI_0048 para 3 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe, FI_0043 para 6 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Bell and CO_0034
17. CO_0034
18. FI_0043 para 6 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Bell, FI_0048 para 5 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe and FI_0070 para 32 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Murphy (but see para 33)
19. See Chapter 12
20. Mr Bell 3 July pages 33-34
21. FI_0055 para 176 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
22. FI_0046 para 132 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie
23. FI_0048 para 4 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe
24. Mr Crowe 2 July page 150
25. Mr Crowe 2 July page 151
26. CO_1022, Mr Bell 3 July pages 37-44 and FI_0043 paras 7-8 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Bell
27. CO_4416
28. Hamilton v HMA 1934 JC 1
29. DB_0576
30. DB_0582
31. CO_3515 - dated 5 August
32. Mr Mackenzie 30 September page 53ff and FI_0046 paras 174-175 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie
33. Mr Mackenzie 30 September pages 53-54 and FI_0046 para 176 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie
34. Mr Leadbetter 23 October page 80
35. Mr Mackenzie 30 September page 37
36. Mr Mackenzie 30 September page 55
37. Mr Wertheim 24 September page 64
38. Mr Bell 3 July pages 44-45, 50
39. DB_0618 and Mr Bell 3 July pages 45-47
40. DB_0622
41. The Asbury case, in which there was a pending appeal at this date, remained live.
42. FI_0043 para 9 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Bell
43. Mr Bell 3 July page 51
44. FI_0046 para 177 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie. The Chief Constables were part of the SCRO Executive Committee.
45. Mr Mackenzie 30 September pages 25, 37, 55
46. Lord Boyd of Duncansby 10 November page 41
47. The transcript is available at URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/605129.stm
48. CO_1947
49. SG_0545 and Mr Bell 3 July pages 57-61
50. Chief Constable of the Northern Constabulary
51. Of the SCRO Executive Committee and the ACPOS Council - see e.g. FI_0050 para 46 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae
52. CO_1899. One of the people named in the letter (Miss Hannah) subsequently dissociated herself from it in a statement to Tayside Police - CO_2058.
53. FI_0046 para 181 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie
54. He was also Deputy First Minister; now Lord Wallace of Tankerness.
55. CO_1956
56. FI_0048 para 10 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe and CO_1969
57. FI_0050 paras 14 and 22 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae
58. FI_0050 paras 45-48 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae
59. CO_0396
60. The devolved Scottish Parliament was established in May 1999.
61. CO_0396, CO_1645, Mr Bell 3 July page 61, Mr Crowe 3 July pages 14-18 and FI_0048 para 10 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe
62. FI_0050 para 49 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae
63. The transcript of the second documentary is available at URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/749442.stm
64. Mr Crowe 3 July page 18
65. SG_0375 paras ii) and 1.2.4
66. SG_0375 para 1.2.5-1.2.7 and DB_0178. Mr Valentine focused on procedures - AZ_0031.
67. FI_0115 paras 32 and 34 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Zeelenberg
68. DB_0178
69. SG_0375 para 1.2.8
70. CO_1012
71. FI_0050 para 3 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae - he was appointed President of ACPOS in 2000 for a period of 12 months.
72. Sir William explained that the latter phrase came from the legislation which described the purpose of such inspections as being to ensure that police forces were efficient and effective. FI_0050 paras 51 and 53 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae.
73. FI_0050 para 54 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae
74. FI_0050 para 55 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae
75. A matter of concern to the Justice 1 Committee - Scottish Parliament Justice 1 Committee 3rd Report, 2007 (Session 2) Inquiry into the Scottish Criminal Record Office and the Scottish Fingerprint Service, SP Paper 743 Edinburgh RR Donnelly, 2007 paras 394-395.
76. Scottish Parliament Official Report 22 June 2000 Col 681; CO_1646
77. Scottish Parliament Official Report 22 June 2000 Col 687; CO_1638
78. CO_1026
79. CO_1633 and FI_0048 para 12 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe.
80. FI_0048 para 12 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe
81. CO_1633 and FI_0050 para 58 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae
82. SG_0522 para 11.3.1 (its October 2000 report)
83. Mr Bell 3 July pages 64ff
84. CO_1026
85. CO_1633, FI_0050 para 59 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae
86. CO_1543
87. Now Sheriff Gilchrist
88. CO_0021 and FI_0072 para 3 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Gilchrist
89. FI_0072 para 8 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Gilchrist
90. FI_0072 para 8 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Gilchrist and FI_0050 para 62 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae
91. CO_1451, CO_1509 and FI_0048 para 15 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe
92. FI_0072 para 9 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Gilchrist
93. FI_0072 paras 10 and 13 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Gilchrist and CO_0014
94. FI_0048 para 14 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe
95. CO_2755
96. Mr Graham 9 July page 40. CO_2755 bears a footer "23/6/00." This was the same as a report dated 8 May 1997, DB_0201, which was not Mr Graham's final report in 1997, DB_0202. He had printed off an earlier copy in error - Mr Graham 9 July page 54.
97. CO_0021
98. FI_0048 para 17 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe
99. CO_0022
100. CO_0023
101. FI_0048 para 17 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe and Mr Crowe 2 July page 146 - the precognition did not deal with mark QD2 as Mr Crowe did not regard it as evidentially significant.
102. Mr Crowe 2 July page 156
103. FI_0050 para 64 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae
104. CO_1509 and CO_1451
105. FI_0082 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Sheppard and FI_0081 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Grigg
106. CO_2549 and CO_1318
107. FI_0050 para 65 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae
108. FI_0050 para 67 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae
109. FI_0043 para 20 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Bell and PS_0195
110. FI_0050 para 70 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae and CO_1339
111. The meeting was minuted (CO_0050), which Mr Mackenzie commented on in FI_0046 para 240ff Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie.
112. CO_0050
113. FI_0046 para 226 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie
114. FI_0046 para 231 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie
115. AZ_0007 and FI_0115 para 47 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Zeelenberg
116. CO_0063 and FI_0046 para 204ff Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie
117. FI_0053 para 10 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Dunbar and SP_0004 pdf page 42
118. CO_1010
119. CO_0030 (which includes other marks not relevant to the Inquiry)
120. CO_0207h and SG_0131(photocopies) which contains a charted enlargement of QI2 Ross
121. SG_0010h (which includes a charted enlargement of XF)
122. In a letter dated 1 February 2006 (DB_0200) Frank Jensen of the Danish National Police subsequently agreed the identification of QD2 as the print of David Asbury - see chapter 27.
123. As a result they appeared to contradict SCRO's findings as regards QE2, QL2 and QI2 Asbury - see chapter 27.
124. FI_0072 para 15 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Gilchrist
125. FI_0072 para 14 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Gilchrist and CO_0010
126. SG_0375
127. CO_0378
128. CO_1065
129. FI_0082 paras 38-39 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Sheppard; the photographs are CO_0204h
130. FI_0082 para 38 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Sheppard
131. CO_0392
132. Referred to in CO_1065
133. FI_0206 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr Sheppard and FI_0207 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Thompson. See chapter 3
134. FI_0050 para 72 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sir William Rae
135. See below
136. URL: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/justice1/papers-06/J1_S2_06_28_5J1CtteReportsynopsisAug06.pdf. This is referred to in the Justice 1 Report at pdf pages 22-23 URL: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/justice1/papers-06/FinalPDFversion-volume1.pdf
137. SG_0522
138. CO_0032, FI_0072 para 23 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Gilchrist and FI_0082 para 90 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Sheppard
139. Mr Sheppard 8 July page 67-74, 73
140. CO_0009
141. Mr Gilchrist 24 June pages 144-145 and FI_0072 paras 16-25 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Gilchrist
142. SP_0004 - para 3.20 of Annex 1(a) to Black Report of internal disciplinary procedure investigation dated 28 February 2002
143. FI_0072 para 26 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Gilchrist and FI_0082 para 92 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Sheppard
144. CO_2003
145. CO_0008
146. FI_0072 paras 29-33 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Gilchrist
147. FI_0072 paras 41-42 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Gilchrist
148. The legal advice was being reconsidered. Mr Gilchrist 24 June pages 138-139 and CO_0007 - letter from Mr Gilchrist to Mr Crowe dated 6 July 2001
149. CO_0007 and CO_0003. The attachment to Mr Gilchrist's report was an extract from section 7 of the full report "Criminal Allegations against SCRO Personnel".
150. CO_0003
151. CO_0003 pages 30, 34, 35 and CO_0007
152. FI_0072 paras 43-48 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Gilchrist
153. CO_0007
154. TC_0002
155. CO_0026
156. CO_2005h
157. CO_2004h
158. FI_0046 paras 160-167 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie
159. CO_0006 - letter dated 19 July 2001 to Mr Crowe
160. Mr Gilchrist 24 June pages 148-149
161. Mr Gilchrist 24 June pages 65-66
162. CO_0027
163. Gordon Sir Gerald H. The Criminal Law of Scotland 3rd edition (Edited by Michael G A Christie): W Green, 2001 volume 2, para 47.12 copyright The Scottish Universities Law Institute, and FI_0048 para 20 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe
164. CO_0027
165. CO_0028
166. FI_0048 para 25 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe
167. FI_0057 para 45 Inquiry Witness Statement of Lord Boyd
168. CO_0028
169. Referred to in the Black report SP_0004
170. CO_4066 pdf page 3
171. SP_0004 paras 3.16-3.18
172. FI_0048 para 24 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe
173. FI_0048 para 12 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe and see FI_0055 paras 32-33 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
174. PS_0146
175. Scottish Parliament Official Report, 9 February 2006, column 23240, URL: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/officialReports/meetingsParliament/or-06/sor0209-02.htm#Col23255
176. URL: http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/news/Exposed-the-criminal-coverup-at.2750333.jp ; URL: http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/politics/Coverup-conspiracy-and-the-Lockerbie.2752201.jp ; and URL: http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/shirleymckiefingerprintcase/How-justice-failed-an-innocent.2754176.jp
177. URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/4969830.stm
178. Scottish Parliament Justice 1 Committee 3rd Report, 2007 (Session 2) Inquiry into the Scottish Criminal Record Office and the Scottish Fingerprint Service, SP Paper 743 Edinburgh RR Donnelly, 2007, para 342
179. Scottish Parliament Justice 1 Committee 3rd Report, 2007 (Session 2) Inquiry into the Scottish Criminal Record Office and the Scottish Fingerprint Service, para 818
180. Scottish Parliament Justice 1 Committee 3rd Report, 2007 (Session 2) Inquiry into the Scottish Criminal Record Office and the Scottish Fingerprint Service, para 820
181. Scottish Parliament Justice 1 Committee 3rd Report, 2007 (Session 2) Inquiry into the Scottish Criminal Record Office and the Scottish Fingerprint Service, paras 352, 497
182. Scottish Parliament Justice 1 Committee 3rd Report, 2007 (Session 2) Inquiry into the Scottish Criminal Record Office and the Scottish Fingerprint Service, paras 489, 490