Introduction
36.1. ACE-V is a process that is regarded as a safeguard. If the protocol is followed, it is said, the resulting evidence is more likely to be reliable. If it is to promote the reliability of fingerprint evidence, the ACE-V process must be robust. This chapter discusses current practice in Scotland and elsewhere in respect of ACE-V and includes recommendations for improvements in practice as regards ACE-V.
Overview of ACE-V
36.2. ACE-V is an acronym for a sequence of working whereby:
(i) an examiner analyses a mark;
(ii) having done so compares the mark to a known print;
(iii) having compared the images evaluates what he or she has seen and reaches a decision; and where
(iv) the results are then subject to verification by one additional examiner or more.
36.3. Mr Chamberlain and Professor Champod state: "In general, most examiners subscribe to the ACE-V methodology or a comparable protocol (Ashbaugh 19991)¿.[It] implies four distinct stages to the comparison between a mark and a print. In the UK practice (and elsewhere), it is common to find little distinction or clear-cut separation between its stages."2
36.4. ACE-V is a description of a structured process that is applied to arrive at a decision. Professor Champod and Mr Pugh said that the ACE-V methodology is not new and it would be wrong to think of a pre ACE-V and post ACE-V fingerprint world as good practice existed before ACE-V. Good practice is to concentrate on the unknown, then move to the comparison, and to assess findings only when one has finished the comparison exercise. It is also good practice to obtain a second opinion, if required.3 It can probably be described as codifying the thought process that previously existed amongst many fingerprint examiners.4
36.5. ACE-V is not a theory or an underpinning fundamental basis for fingerprint examination.5 It does not, for example, provide guidance to an examiner in deciding whether particular features properly match or differ. It is a protocol that describes the sequence in which an examiner should approach the stages of a comparison exercise.6 The belief is that if an individual examiner approaches the stages in the proper sequence the risk of individual error is minimised, with the residual risk of individual error (including inappropriate subjective judgments) being guarded against by the need for verification by another examiner or examiners.
36.6. While it is possible to give a concise summary of ACE-V under reference to the literature,7 there is little in the way of consensus as to the precise content of each of the stages of the process. One of the deficiencies identified in the FBI's procedures after the Mayfield case was the absence of definition of the ACE-V process.8
Analysis and comparison
36.7. The examiner begins by analysing the less clear image which, in most instances, is the unknown mark.9
36.8. There is a degree of controversy as to the extent to which an examiner should identify, at the analysis stage, all of the detail, and in particular level 2 detail, available in the mark before moving on to the comparison stage. There is also some controversy as to the extent to which the analysis stage ought to be documented.
36.9. Professor Champod gave a description of the analysis stage at the hearing.10 The examiner is ascertaining what reliable information can be derived from the mark. Questions to be asked include whether the image is of a friction ridge skin impression, what the substrate is, whether there is superimposition, a multiple touch, slippage, distortion and so forth.11 The examiner considers the quality of the mark and what features are visible in it. In relation to the visible features (or events) the examiner considers what type the feature may be (a ridge ending or a bifurcation). It is at the analysis stage that the examiner will "set" his tolerances12 and consider the reliability of the features. His description of the analysis stage was principally in the context of teaching students and when it came to documentation of the analysis stage he adopted the pragmatic approach that there was little need to document all the minutiae in a mark that was clear and left little room for interpretation. Fuller documentation was required where the mark was of limited quality. The analysis stage concluded with a decision whether the mark was of comparable quality.
36.10. It is only after the analysis stage that the print becomes available to the examiner.13 Preceding comparison, there is the preliminary stage of considering the quality of the print. Should the print be of poor quality it may be subject to a full analysis similar to that for the mark.14 If it is of comparable quality, the examiner proceeds to carry out a comparison. The flow of the examination goes from the general to the particular beginning with the level 1 detail, comparing the level 2 detail and, if that is in agreement, the level 3 detail. The examiner may select a set of features to use as a target to begin with and then proceed across the whole surface working from mark to print.
36.11. With the exception of (1) the reference to the setting of a level of tolerances and (2) documentation of the analysis, the approach of the Metropolitan Police to the analysis and comparison components of ACE-V coincides with the evidence of Professor Champod.15 The Metropolitan Police do not currently document the analysis and their description of this phase has no reference to any conscious setting of a level of tolerance.
Reasons for a separate analysis stage
36.12. A rationale for a distinct analysis stage is to minimise the risk of reverse reasoning,16 the concern being that the examiner inappropriately takes account of features in the known print to observe and/or interpret uncertain or ambiguous features in the mark in such a manner as to conclude a match.
36.13. Mr Wertheim said that if a mental image is formed based on the clearer impression, the mind can trick one into seeing things incorrectly in the unclear impression. This is not intentional but it happens that the examiner sees something that he wants to see.17 Mr Zeelenberg emphasised the importance of a separate analysis stage in the context of a discussion of circular and reverse reasoning, warning that a premature judgment of donorship will steer the examiner to the presumed outcome. He stressed the importance of not reaching conclusions prematurely and then analysing the mark and the print in a way consistent with the premature conclusion.18
36.14. From the beginning of their training, SPSA examiners are taught that there is a risk, to be avoided, in going from print to mark.19
Approach to analysis and comparison in current SPSA practice
36.15. I have considered whether the analysis and comparison stages in current practice at SPSA have altered significantly from the practices that I have concluded were factors that contributed to the erroneous identifications of Y7 and QI2 Ross. In this I was assisted by the evidence of Mr McGinnies, SPSA Fingerprint Training Officer, and Mrs Tierney, SPSA Fingerprint Unit Manager, Edinburgh.
A sifting comparison
36.16. Mr McGinnies said that there is not always a clear distinction between analysis and comparison. An examiner may carry out an 'early' or initial comparison on the basis of level 1 detail only (i.e. pattern type such as loop or whorl) and stop there if the patterns do not match. If the pattern is the same, the examiner may return to the analysis before carrying out a more detailed comparison with the print.20 The justification advanced was that this was an efficient use of time, particularly if there was a large number of marks to be examined.21
36.17. The risk with such a 'sift' phase is that the examiner is influenced by information from one of the prints when completing the analysis of the mark. If such an approach is to be employed, the examiner who has carried out the 'sift' should not participate further and a different examiner should carry out the full analysis and comparison. That is the solution that Mr Zeelenberg said was about to be introduced in the Netherlands to deal with the analogous situation where an examiner processes a mark through the AFIS computer system based on an "immature analysis" to find a suitable cluster to search in the database.22
Full comparisons
36.18. Analysis in current practice in Scotland is a process in which the following are considered: the general pattern of the mark (whorl, loop, arch, etc); size and orientation; deposition factors and the nature of the surface on which the mark has been deposited; 'movement'; clarity and the development method. At the analysis stage, level 2 detail is considered to the extent that a target group of a relatively limited number of level 2 details becomes the focus of attention. The work done with more advanced trainees involves their identifying and documenting a target group. Qualified practitioners identify a target group of level 2 detail, normally without documenting it, and then work back and forth between mark and print looking for further features in agreement as between the two.23 Mrs Tierney spoke of ascertaining during analysis what kind of characteristics were in the mark and whether they were of sufficient quality and quantity to enable the examiner to come to a conclusion on the mark in the event of comparison. She would be looking for sequences of characteristics or clusters of characteristics to use as information with which to begin for comparison purposes. She would also be looking to see if there was any other kind of level of detail evident in the mark, and for factors affecting the order and relationship of the characteristics such as movement or pressure.24
36.19. There is still no practice of a detailed preliminary analysis of the mark in which all the available level 2 detail, or, should it arise, any level 3 detail, is identified at this stage by the examiner. There is no practice whereby such details are recorded or documented in order that it can later be checked to what extent tolerances may have been applied.
36.20. There is a contrast between the work done with trainees in the early stages of their training, when they will be required to document and annotate all the features that they can see in the mark, and the way that qualified practitioners come to work.25 Trainees who are sufficiently advanced to be comparing marks and prints make drawings documenting the target area they have identified, but do not document all the available features in the way that the less experienced trainee will.26 Qualified practitioners do not document even their target area as a matter of routine. Rather, they will hold the target group in their head as they go to look at the known print.27
36.21. Mr McGinnies's description of training and practice regarding analysis was consistent with the guidance in Section 6 of the National Police Improvement Agency ("NPIA") Training Manual, which he described as the "Bible for trainees".28 The draft standard operating procedure spoken to by Mrs Tierney described analysis as establishing the quality of detail in the mark and its suitability for further examination. "All available information such as surface effect, pressure and distortion" should be taken into account.29
36.22. With a target group identified, the examiner would then use a glass to compare the unknown mark to the known print. Although early in their careers trainees would be given two glasses and instructed to work from unknown to known, over time individual examiners would devise their own ways of carrying out comparisons with glasses.30 The examiner would change focus from the mark to the print.31 Mr McGinnies gave evidence under reference to a presentation prepared by him for Crown Counsel.32 The slides in that presentation demonstrated working from mark to print, moving backwards and forwards between the two as more features in agreement on the two images were identified. Mr McGinnies accepted that this was a realistic depiction of how examiners worked, although he would wish to amend the presentation to show that the examiner would identify a target group in the mark before starting to move back and forth between mark and print, rather than simply a process of working from a single detail on the mark to a single detail on the print and then repeating the process.33 An examiner might use pointers in order to keep the place on one image while looking over towards the other for a corresponding feature.34
36.23. Mrs Tierney described working with both images, the mark and the print, together under a single glass. She would fold the photograph of the mark so as to be able to place it right alongside the relevant digit on the ten-print form.35 She would work with one eye closed, and look with the other at the mark and then at the print. She would determine on a cluster of characteristics in the mark then look at a corresponding area in the fingerprint form to see if a particular cluster or sequence was replicated. She would then return to the mark and count from the first cluster to another characteristic or couple of characteristics, then turn again to the known print. She would continue working her way through the mark and print until satisfied, or not, as to identification.36
36.24. These descriptions of practice bear considerable similarities to the practices described by Mr MacPherson, Mr Stewart, Ms McBride and Mr McKenna.37
Reverse reasoning
36.25. Given the rationale for a separate analysis stage discussed in paragraph 12 above, it might be expected that an examiner would be prohibited at the comparison stage in carrying back detail from the print to alter or otherwise influence his prior analysis of the mark. Despite that logic, witnesses at the Inquiry, with the exception of Mrs Tierney, all spoke to reverse reasoning being permitted to some extent.
36.26. Mrs Tierney used only detail that she could see clearly in the mark. She would not 'see' something on the print that helped explain something that she had not previously understood on the mark. She always carried information from the mark to the print. If she could not determine in the mark whether something was dirt or a characteristic or she thought "something might be happening there", that was not something she relied upon.38
36.27. The Metropolitan Police recognised that it could be regarded as more objective to take into account only features first identified in the mark39 but in practice they allow for limited reasoning from print to mark. The limit is that the examiner must at least have seen some 'event' in the corresponding area of the mark and the print can be used to clarify the nature of that 'event'. Mrs Redgewell emphasised that one should never bring anything new to the unknown from the known. The examiner has to have some theory of what the event is and the known then leads to clarification.40
36.28. Mr Grigg said that although an analysis of the unknown mark should enable the examiner to determine where the clear features are in their totality, it was inevitable that, as the examiner worked, features would become clearer in the mark.41 It could be described as an iterative process,42 though Mr Ashbaugh had described it more colourfully as 'flip-flopping'.43 Mr Grigg acknowledged that taking facts from the known print into consideration when coming back to the unknown mark could give rise to problems if the examiner was unaware that it was happening, and, significantly, part of his explanation for the iterative nature of the process was that it is impossible to remember all of the clear features observed at the analysis stage.44 That naturally links to those witnesses who advocated note-taking.
36.29. Mr Zeelenberg was one of those witnesses. During the analysis stage, the characteristics are marked up with annotations dealing with perceived value and confidence levels. All further properties of the mark such as distortions, stains, movements etc are noted. "Any points that are identified have to come from the analysis stage, and not the comparison stage. Points that are real during analysis are real during comparison, and any deviance from the analysis phase in comparison is restricted and should be justified. If it cannot be justified, it must be rejected as being a correct analysis."45
36.30. Mr Wertheim suggested a thorough analysis stage, in order to find all points and all other features before proceeding to carry out the comparison. In his view it was permissible to take into account a characteristic first observed in a known print which was not observed in the mark in the analysis stage and he said that this was not an uncommon occurrence. He did, though, add that (1) characteristics first found during the comparison phase are not as reliable and hence (2) more weight should go to the characteristics that had been visible in the analysis phase and (3) it was his practice to take notes.46
36.31. Mr Chamberlain allowed for reverse reasoning, provided it was documented. Most examiners can miss characteristics in a mark and so it is practical to allow for reverse reasoning. He anticipated a thorough analysis stage, saying that if the majority of characteristics were found only after looking at the print, clearly this would indicate that something was possibly wrong. He would be very cautious in terms of formulating a finding on such a comparison.47
36.32. Professor Champod's approach was similar to Mr Chamberlain's approach. He said that it is too restrictive to suggest that only the features identified during analysis should be used in the comparison. This is on the basis that the analysis has been documented and stored separately from the documentation associated with the comparison. The fact that a feature in the unknown print has been identified or clarified during the comparison stage must then be documented.48
Repeated viewing
36.33. There is a more subtle form of exposure to the risk of reverse reasoning and that is where examiners become familiar with specific prints before they examine a particular mark.
36.34. The ACE-V process proceeds on the hypothesis that the examiner has not seen the relevant known prints before. That may be practically difficult in an investigation with many marks, such as the investigation into the murder of Miss Ross. The examiners may become so familiar with certain prints that they take into account sub-consciously their pre-existing knowledge of these at the stage of analysis of the mark. Further, having identified a number of marks as made by an individual the examiners may be influenced by the appearance of those marks when considering other marks, without being aware of it.
Commentary on analysis and comparison
36.35. The risks associated with the possibility of contextual bias,49 lack of appreciation of the tolerances being applied50 and the possibility of inappropriate reverse reasoning indicate the importance of a distinct analysis stage. In particular, those factors suggest the importance of an analysis of the mark as a whole before comparison with the print.
36.36. One of the purposes of the analysis stage should be to assess whether the mark is complex. The need for a separate procedure for such marks is considered in chapter 39.
36.37. Reverse reasoning was identified as one of the causes of misidentification in the Mayfield case.51 I am satisfied that it was a factor that was also involved in the misidentification by SCRO of Y7 and QI2 Ross.52 However, despite the rationale for a separate analysis stage and the known risks of reverse reasoning, there was a broad consensus among the witnesses to the Inquiry who discussed this matter that it could be appropriate to permit knowledge gleaned from the print to be carried back to the analysis of the mark, provided safeguards are in place. The appropriate safeguards include proper evaluation, to be discussed next. The need for note-taking has also to be considered in this context. At SPSA it is not standard practice to take notes at the analysis or comparison stage.53 Notes or drawings as to the sequences of features that have caught the examiner's eye are not taken nor are all of the features on the crime scene mark noted before moving on.54 Note-taking is more fully discussed and the subject of recommendations in chapter 37.
Evaluation
36.38. A decision should be made after evaluation. The examiner will evaluate all of the available information and come to a conclusion about the identity of the mark.55 Inevitably, though, the depth of the evaluation will depend on the depth of the preceding analysis and comparison.
36.39. Professor Champod described the evaluation stage as the fundamental inferential step. Reflecting his view that an examiner should set a level of tolerance at the analysis stage and consider the reliability of characteristics, his evaluation exercise entailed a reflection on the level of tolerance and an assessment of the relative weight between the features found in agreement and any observed differences assigned by informed judgment, mainly derived from training and experience.56
36.40. Mr Zeelenberg expressed particular concern at the risk of reaching conclusions prematurely. The approach in the Netherlands is to postpone the point at which an examiner reaches a conclusion to a separate evaluation stage in particular in light of awareness that examiners find it hard to change their minds once they have reached a conclusion. Particularly where the 'multiple procedure' is being applied to complex marks each examiner is required to complete a detailed form as he progresses through analysis and comparison and that gives the means to reflect on the pros and cons at the evaluation stage.57
36.41. Mrs Tierney said that an examiner would be evaluating as the comparison proceeded but a benefit of ACE-V is that with evaluation as a distinct phase an examiner takes a 'mental step back'. The examiner considers what has been found to be in agreement, anything in disagreement and anything that has not been accounted for in order to be satisfied with the identification.58
36.42. The difference between the process envisaged by Mrs Tierney and that undertaken in the Netherlands is signposted by her use of the phrase a 'mental step back'. As just mentioned, at SPSA it is not standard practice to take notes during the ACE-V process. Addressing the need for documentation, she said initially that it was not necessary because analysis and comparison is a mental process. But on further questioning she accepted that in a minority of cases there could be merit in the discipline of documenting the process to give the examiner an opportunity properly to reflect if there are quite a lot of "could be's" with the identification.59
Commentary
36.43. Evaluation is important. One of the factors that contributed to the error of SCRO's conclusions in regard to Y7 and QI2 was the absence of a formal process to evaluate the nature of the assumptions being made and the tolerances that underlay the assumptions.60 As a minimum there should be a conscious mental step back before a conclusion is reached but the question is whether that is sufficient.
36.44. To take reverse reasoning as an example, the weight of opinion supports the conclusion that it is permissible to engage in a degree of reverse reasoning provided that the examiner is aware that it is being done and properly evaluates the acceptability of the resulting information. It is difficult to refute Mr Grigg's view that there is an inevitable risk of reverse reasoning because of the inability accurately to remember all of the detail observed on the initial analysis and, in the absence of documentation of the analysis and comparison, it is at least open to question whether the examiner will have sufficient awareness to give rise to the need for due reflection. The OIG report makes this very point: with "an incomplete record of the analysis, over time the examiner may lose track of which came first, features he saw in the latent [i.e. the mark] or features suggested by the exemplar [i.e. the print]." The OIG concluded that circular reasoning may "infect the examiner's mental process, particularly in the absence of standards or safeguards to require the examiner to keep distinct which features were seen in the latent during the analysis and which were only suggested during the comparison."61
Verification
36.45. It is verification that is particularly said to give fingerprint evidence its reliability. A review of the conclusion by another examiner or examiners, using the ACE process, provides a cross-check to ensure that the decision is not based on a marginal subjective judgment of one individual but enjoys acceptance as the consensus conclusion of a number of examiners.
36.46. Under current SPSA procedures the initial examiner's conclusion is verified:
(i) by one examiner in the case of an elimination identification reported to the police;62
(ii) by two examiners in the case of an elimination going to court; and
(iii) by a minimum of two examiners in the case of suspect/accused identifications.63
36.47. The NPIA teaches that two officers should be involved in verification64 and that is the practice at the Forensic Science Service (FSS)65 and PSNI.66 At the Metropolitan Police at least two examiners verify, the second of whom will come from a pool of nominated senior examiners, and a third examiner will undertake verification in cases where there is a low level of disclosed detail.67
36.48. In the Netherlands a different approach is taken depending on the complexity of the mark. Verification of an ordinary mark is carried out by one examiner. For a complex mark two will verify68 and the case is referred to as a 'multiple procedure',69 which is discussed in chapter 39.
The constituent elements of 'verification'
36.49. While the number of verifiers may be important, the critical factor is the quality and independence of the process. There are two issues and practice varies on them. The first concerns the seniority of those involved in verification and the second concerns the knowledge that the verifying examiners may have about preceding comparisons and discussions between those involved.
Seniority
36.50. At SPSA there is no requirement for any particular seniority. Any qualified fingerprint officer (i.e. registered in the National Register of Fingerprint Experts and authorised to give evidence under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995)70 can act as a verifier. No additional accreditation is required.71 It follows that a junior examiner could verify a senior examiner's findings.
36.51. At PSNI the final check will be carried out by someone with at least the rank of senior officer. The position may arise whereby the first examiner is a senior officer and more junior officers carry out verification. The risk of 'peer pressure' is guarded against in various ways. All examiners are aware of the need to get their work right. All examiners are encouraged to question and no one is cajoled into making an identification.72 At the Metropolitan Police one of a pool of nominated senior examiners, all of whom have expert status, carries out the final verification.73
36.52. The approach at FSS focuses on training. Examiners involved in verification must undergo a separate authorisation procedure. This includes coaching and mentoring with particular reference to the need for independence.74
Knowledge of preceding comparisons and discussion between examiners
36.53. Practices similarly differ as to the level of knowledge that examiners involved in verification may have, ranging from:
36.54. Ashbaugh presents 'verification' as a "form of peer review" and positively advocates the merits of consultation and discussion between experts during the process. It is, he says, "an excellent vehicle for training" and his text leaves it to the individual examiner to decide whether his objectivity has been compromised by consultation, in which case he should not act as a verifier.75 That coincides with the evidence given by Mr Geddes not only in relation to practice at SCRO in 1997 but also at SPSA in 2009, leaving aside the period when there was a requirement for 'blind verification' which is discussed below. Mr Geddes spoke to the fact that discussions did take place between examiners involved in the verification process and he commended this as an opportunity for training, the 'independence' of such a system coming from the personal responsibility and professional integrity of the examiners.76
36.55. The concern is that discussions between examiners can lead to peer pressure and sub-conscious bias, particularly if a more junior examiner is tasked with verifying the conclusion of a senior examiner. The HMICS September 2000 report made adverse comment on the practice of passing findings from one officer to another during the verification process, in particular from a senior to a junior officer, as not being conducive to a "truly independent" verification process77 and recommended that: "practices be reviewed with a view to introducing a system that increases the independence within the identification/verification process."78
Blind verification: Scottish 'experiment'
36.56. The Change Management Review Team for the ACPOS Presidential Review Group recommended in October 2000 that the processes of identification and verification be separated, with the creation of a dedicated verification team who, though they would know the result of the identification phase, would not know the identity of those involved.79
36.57. The Glasgow bureau introduced a system intended to anonymise the process. Identification and verification were split with three fingerprint examiners deployed in a verification unit and another three with a quality support unit and no one of those officers was involved in front line comparison work. This system was resource intensive and there was a delay in introducing it in the smaller Scottish bureaux. The system was not entirely anonymous because there was always the risk that the handwriting of the examiner who had made the initial identification could be recognised from a diary page.80
36.58. The system was reviewed in December 2006 by Roger Shearn, a forensic consultant. He was critical of blind verification and recommended an open and transparent system of verification, citing Ashbaugh's textbook and the absence of a requirement for blind verification elsewhere in the UK with the possible exception of Manchester.81 On transfer to SPSA it was agreed that the anonymous verification process in place at Glasgow would cease. The focus instead was on addressing this issue through other means, in particular encouraging the fingerprint manager at local level to develop, actively, a culture where staff feel able to challenge opinions.82
36.59. As at the time of the Inquiry hearings a verifier at SPSA knew the identity of the previous examiner and the conclusion he had reached. Accordingly, if a mark had been identified as having been made by a specific finger the verifier would carry out a comparison of the mark with that finger.83
36.60. Mr McGinnies noted that there were risks arising from the fact that the verifier knows the previous examiner's findings. The verifier might be affected, even slightly.84 His position was that the risks are guarded against by dip sampling, the quality assurance procedures in place in the organisation and the requirement for several examiners to reach the same conclusion. Dip sampling had not shown examiners following other examiners' conclusions incorrectly.85
Practice elsewhere
36.61. Mr Grigg said that verification must be independent. In an ideal situation, each examiner would approach the task without any knowledge of what had gone before with no preconceptions that anybody else had reached any result whatsoever. Critical issues are practicality and resources. In the confines of a fingerprint bureau and the restrictions of the work that needs to be completed, such an approach is not practical. In practice, verifiers will have some knowledge of what has gone before, even if it is simply that someone else has already reached an opinion.86
36.62. Mr Wertheim also mentioned resources. Blind verification could take longer to carry out. In the traditional form of verification, all an examiner has to do is look at the one finger. In one scenario of blind verification, the examiner would get all of the latents and all of the inked prints and have to repeat the whole process. There is a time factor involved. The greater concern is the reliability factor and getting rid of confirmation bias. One could limit verification to the one finger and achieve a degree of blindness.87 Professor Champod was also mindful of resources. He said that blind verification on all conclusions is not cost-effective and is not needed.88 Neither the Metropolitan Police nor PSNI practise 'blind verification'.89
36.63. A number of examiners said that verifiers must not be provided with any indication of the reasons for the preceding examiner's conclusions. The verifier should not be provided with access to a marked up comparator and asked to check the markings, and at PSNI that would probably result in disciplinary procedures.90 Mr Grigg said that as a minimum the verifier should not have any knowledge of the manner in which the comparison had been carried out, for example marked photographs showing features on which the first examiner had relied, as such a verification would not be independent.91 At the Metropolitan Police the second and third examiners have no information about the features identified in the preceding examination.92
36.64. At Mr Wertheim's laboratory the verifier knows who carried out the previous comparison, he is given the mark and the print and he knows the result. He is also given the working notes and may or may not choose to study those before carrying out his work. The verifier should have the "raw" images unmarked.93 Mr Wertheim said that blind verification was coming into use in the United States. It had been a source of much discussion within the previous year. The only laboratory of which he was aware that practised blind verification on a regular basis was the FBI. They had 50 or 60 fingerprint experts. The FBI had certain criteria by which an identification was mandated to go to a blind verification. He thought it would probably become a standard within the next five to ten years.94
36.65. The OIG suggested introducing 'blind decoy' prints into the verification process, to ensure that the verifier was doing a careful job, and not merely 'rubber stamping'.95 The June 2011 review discloses that the FBI adopted a different approach to avoid excessive disruption to the pace of casework. Blind verification is undertaken at the FBI only in limited circumstances: in cases where only one print is individualised, excluded or regarded as inconclusive;96 in any case where examiners disagree; and possibly also for complex marks, cases where an examiner changes his opinion and in other situations at the discretion of a supervisor.97
36.66. Mr Zeelenberg's general view was that verification should be as 'blind' as possible. The approach originally suggested by the OIG is not dissimilar to the approach suggested by him. In the Netherlands a new system has been introduced whereby a verifier will not know whether he is a verifier or not. The verifier will not know whether the mark has already been compared, nor will he know of any results.98 The result is that the verifier will have no preconceptions as to the potential outcome.
36.67. Mr Chamberlain's view was that blind verification is unnecessary. With the correct training, in the correct environment, assurance by an independent check is sufficient. He did not see the need to move to blind verification.99
36.68. Professor Champod emphasised the importance of notes in this context. He said that if the verifier knows the conclusions of the preceding examiner the verification can still be considered independent, as the verifier will document the features he has used independently from the first examiner. It is possible to review the documents and discuss the features that have been used by both. Documentation plays an important role. The fact that the verifier knew about the conclusion of the first examiner did not worry him.100
Discussion between examiners and panel reviews
Position in Scotland
36.69. In 1997 SCRO maintained a distinction between the situations where (1) a verifying examiner was doubtful but not positively in disagreement and (2) where the verifier was positively in disagreement.101
36.70. In its September 2000 report HMICS noted that fingerprint comparison is a matter of opinion and there would be occasions where there were disagreements over an identification. The recommendation was that a national policy be established to deal with all erroneous and disputed fingerprint identifications102 and HMICS envisaged review by an external body.103
36.71. That recommendation addresses the second scenario (i.e. instances of disagreement) and at the time of the hearings a formal questioned identification procedure104 was under development to deal with it.105 The draft made available to the Inquiry did not contain all the detail but Mrs Tierney outlined the proposal. Any conclusion of identity which had been queried by a verifier would be reported to the unit manager and the case material would be removed from the bureau and submitted to a panel of nominated experts for review. The conclusions of the nominated panel would be accepted as final.106 The constitution of the panel was not contained in the procedure107 and also the draft did not specify what would happen to the identification if the panel said it was an identification whilst an examiner continued to state that it was not.
36.72. Mrs Tierney reported that no case had arisen calling for the formal questioned identification procedure to be applied; positive disagreements among examiners are "a rare occurrence".108 In practice it is the first scenario that remains more common: there are occasions when examiners involved in the ACE-V process do entertain doubts or are uncertain and it remains the case that there can be informal discussions between examiners.
36.73. The draft questioned identification procedure also addresses this scenario and was briefly discussed by Mrs Tierney.109 If one examiner identifies and the second is doubtful, i.e. questions whether the observed features are of sufficient quality for an identification to be made, the two examiners discuss matters. If agreement is reached the fact that they have had a discussion has to be recorded in the diary page but the case continues in accordance with the normal examination process. If the two examiners cannot agree by informal discussion it is referred to a line manager and a facilitated discussion takes place. If they agree at that stage the matter will be noted in the diary page. The possibility of going to a panel would arise only in the event of a failure to agree at a facilitated discussion.
36.74. Mrs Tierney supplied further information to the Inquiry having checked the records of the Edinburgh bureau.110 In that bureau 433 cases resulted in identifications between March and November 2009. In 28 of those cases a difference of opinion between the first examiner and one of the verifiers was recorded. In none of these cases did the verifiers challenge the identification. What the examiners questioned was the quality or clarity of the mark, and they were reluctant therefore to confirm the identification. In each case, the examiners agreed to report that mark as insufficient to come to a conclusion. Other marks were in each case identified to the person in question. The fact that a discussion had taken place was recorded but was not disclosed to the prosecution.
36.75. The evidence of Mr McGinnies111 and Mr Geddes112 confirmed that informal discussions do take place between examiners at the verification stage and, at least anecdotally, their evidence would support the view that that can lead to a verifier agreeing an identification despite some initial doubt, though it may not necessarily have that result. Both referred to the possibility that an identifying examiner could demonstrate the identification on a comparator machine for the benefit of a verifier, for example, if the verifier had doubts about the sufficiency of the points for an identification. That is consistent with the draft questioned identification procedure which states that at the stage of either informal discussions or a facilitated discussion the examiners are able to obtain enlargements or use the comparator if they feel it is relevant.113 They confirmed that such discussions would now be recorded in the diary page. Mr McGinnies was not aware of any situations where the verifier's doubts had caused the first examiner to change his opinion without the matter moving to a formal process. He indicated that in such an instance the identification would, if formally recorded, be recorded as a misidentification.114
36.76. Apart from the fact that discussions would now be noted in the diary page, the evidence of Mr Geddes was that practice had not essentially changed since 1997. The evidence of Mr Geddes was that until shortly before the Inquiry hearing if the verifier remained doubtful after a facilitated discussion that would be the end of the matter. As at the date of the hearing practice had changed with the unit manager having the option to take it further. It was not known whether that could result, as it had in the case of Y7, in the possibility that a doubtful examiner could drop out and the identification be verified by others115 or if the more formal panel option would apply at that stage.
36.77. Mr Geddes argued strongly that it was acceptable for informal discussions to take place at the verification stage, the professionalism and integrity of the verifier still providing the necessary 'independence'.116
Practice elsewhere
36.78. Contemporary practice varied in other bureaux. Again a distinction has to be drawn between (a) cases where one examiner has a doubt and (b) cases involving disagreement.
36.79. FSS practice was explained by Mr Chamberlain:
36.80. PSNI examiners are encouraged to talk but not to persuade. Ultimately it is the examiner who makes his own decision.119 At PSNI if there is an individual who is unhappy about an identification it is automatically referred to an arbitration panel. That panel decides whether that identification goes out. The members of the panel have no connection to the case. Each member sees the mark without being aware of the decision of the other panel members and without any knowledge of the case. If the panel is unanimous as to identification it can be reported out. The fact that there has been a dispute would not be reported to the prosecution authorities or recorded in the report. It would be recorded in the notes and a defence expert could review the notes.120
36.81. The Metropolitan Police approach is different in relation to examiners who have any doubt. If guidance is sought from another examiner the advising examiner is excluded from any involvement in verification. A verifier cannot consult with a preceding verifier/identifier, or make use of any of their findings.121 At the Metropolitan Police if an identification is disputed it is referred to an assessment panel of three senior experts. Each member reviews the mark independently. The panel sat once during the 18 months before Mrs Redgewell gave oral evidence.122
36.82. In the Netherlands the procedure known as the 'multiple procedure' is followed.123
Commentary on independent verification
36.83. Independent verification is essential, the issue being what degree of 'independence' is necessary.
36.84. For reasons of practicality and resource, the approach to verification needs to be proportionate. As mentioned earlier blind verification was tried in the Glasgow bureau and abandoned on external advice. Not even the FBI has it as a universal requirement. In many instances it will be acceptable that, as in current practice, a verifier at SPSA knows the identity of the previous examiner and the conclusion reached and accordingly carries out a comparison of the mark with a particular fingerprint. However, as the Inquiry heard, there is a case for an enhanced process in some circumstances.124
36.85. Nonetheless, it is undesirable that there should be consultation between a verifier and the initial examiner (or between verifiers) to discuss the comparison before the verifier has arrived at a conclusion. A verifier should not view a marked comparator, let alone observe a demonstration by an identifying examiner, nor should a verifier discuss any doubts or questions with any identifying examiner. A rule excluding consultation between examiners before the ACE-V process is completed is not intended in any way to impugn the integrity or professionalism of examiners. Rather, it reflects the rationale of the ACE-V protocol itself. If that protocol is to guard against inappropriate subjective judgments, it is essential that those who participate are not exerting influence (consciously or sub-consciously) on each other.
36.86. Any discussion among the examiners involved in the ACE-V process should take place after each has reached a conclusion. This is considered in the next section of this chapter.
36.87. There is merit in the FSS approach requiring those involved in verification to be given training stressing the need for independence.
36.88. Judge Edwards has commented on the "unfathomable willingness among some professionals in the forensic science community to stick with the idea that a forensic science practitioner is bound to get better with practice and experience"125 and that habit was manifest in SCRO and underpinned the inappropriate hierarchical philosophy that contributed to the misidentification of Y7.126 Examiners should operate in an environment where an open and challenging culture exists irrespective of the seniority of the other examiners involved. To that end, standard operating procedures should positively encourage open and frank discussion. In order to avoid compromising the independence of the verification process the stage at which discussions take place between examiners requires to be managed appropriately (as discussed in the next section of this chapter) but the more critical point is that the views of all examiners are deserving of equal consideration on their merits irrespective of seniority. In particular, standard operating procedures should emphasise that the level of tolerance that can be applied in explaining differences between mark and print requires careful consideration of the quality of the mark and is not determined by the seniority of the examiners.
36.89. Provided that examiners are trained in the need for independence and encouraged to be independent there would be no need to prohibit an examiner from verifying an identification made by a more senior examiner.
Differences of opinion
36.90. The approach to be taken to verification is one aspect of the need, discussed in chapter 38, to re-assess the approach of fingerprint examiners to differences of opinion.
36.91. Practitioners should conduct their individual ACE comparisons conscious of the fact that they are working in a field where there is no certainty and where there is scope for differences of opinion. When it comes to verification examiners should be encouraged to be open and to adopt a challenging attitude. The fact that one examiner reaches the opposite conclusion from another, or entertains any doubt, does not necessarily cast any aspersion on the competence of either examiner.
36.92. Current SPSA procedures, in common with those of other bureaux, imply a distinction between (a) an examiner entertaining doubt and (b) an examiner disagreeing with the conclusion. While those cases do differ by degree, they do have the same common origin: an examiner is recognising some uncertainty. Recognition of some specific source of uncertainty requires due consideration whether it is so significant as to lead to disagreement or gives rise only to a potentially transitory doubt. The significance of an uncertainty that one examiner may recognise, even if it stops short of disagreement with the finding, is that it affords all of those involved in the comparison to reflect on the reliability of their own reasoning and hence the conclusion. The by-passing of Mr Geddes during the verification of Y7 is a case in point.127 The need to develop a procedure to manage comparatively rare instances of disagreement should not detract attention from the equally important requirement to have an effective system for the management of doubt.
36.93. There is merit in the practice of the Metropolitan Police. Where the first examiner has doubt and seeks advice from another examiner the advising examiner should be excluded from any involvement in verification. Furthermore, a verifier should not consult with a preceding verifier/identifier, or make use of any of their findings. Each examiner involved in the ACE-V process should come to his own conclusion before there is any discussion among them. However, the existence of doubt continues to have potential relevance even if an examiner, having discussed the matter with someone outside the process, has allayed the concern. As will be discussed in chapter 39 I have accepted the argument that there is a need for a special procedure for 'complex' marks. There is a lack of a definition for what should constitute a 'complex' mark but a case where an examiner has laboured under any doubt, especially if that has necessitated advice being sought elsewhere, would qualify. The recommendation is that the procedures for handling 'complex' marks should include a technical review of the substantive reasoning of each examiner. If examiners have resolved a doubt by mutually exclusive reasoning (take, for example, the conflicting interpretations by Mr MacPherson and Mr Mackenzie of SCRO points 1, 10 and 16, and 11 and 12 in QI2 Ross)128 the consensus between them as to the result or finding is potentially diminished by the inconsistency in their reasoning. Requiring them to participate in a technical review which exposes that inconsistency affords an opportunity for them to reflect on the robustness of the finding.
36.94. The same philosophy should carry forward into procedures for facilitated discussions and the handling of disagreement among examiners. The September 2000 HMICS report envisaged review of disputed identifications by an external body.129 There continues to be a need for a procedure for a review panel to deal with cases of unresolved disagreement between examiners but now that fingerprint work is under the control of SPSA, an organisation with national coverage, there is no need for the review panel to have any 'external' membership. In the event that it is necessary for a review panel to be convened, the members of the panel should in the first instance arrive at their own personal conclusions before any panel discussion. The panel discussion should cover the reasoning of the panel members and also that of the earlier examiners in order to reflect on any source of uncertainty. If, having given due consideration to the reasoning of the earlier examiners, the panel members are unanimous, then the result can be reported.
36.95. This is, of course, without prejudice to the separate issue of the provision of information to COPFS. Current practice should be maintained with any discussions relating to the comparison at any stage in the ACE-V process (even seeking of advice from another examiner who is not involved in verification) being recorded in the diary page. Standard operating procedures should, however, require that when results are being reported COPFS be told of any informal discussions, any facilitated discussion or panel review.
ACE-V's limitations
36.96. The recommendations in this chapter are intended to enhance the benefits which accrue from adherence to the ACE-V protocol but it is important to note the limitations of this protocol. Reference may be made to the report of the National Academy of Sciences:
"ACE-V provides a broadly stated framework for conducting friction ridge analyses. However, this framework is not specific enough to qualify as a validated method for this type of analysis. ACE-V does not guard against bias; is too broad to ensure repeatability and transparency; and does not guarantee that two analysts following it will obtain the same results. For these reasons, merely following the steps of ACE-V does not imply that one is proceeding in a scientific manner or producing reliable results. A recent paper by Haber and Haber presents a thorough analysis of the ACE-V method and its scientific validity. Their conclusion is unambiguous: 'We have reviewed available scientific evidence of the validity of the ACE-V method and found none.' Further, they state:
'[W]e report a range of existing evidence that suggests that examiners differ at each stage of the method in the conclusions they reach. To the extent that they differ, some conclusions are invalid. We have analysed the ACE-V method itself, as it is described in the literature. We found that these descriptions differ, no single protocol has been officially accepted by the profession and the standards upon which the method's conclusions rest have not been specified quantitatively. As a consequence, at this time the validity of the ACE-V method cannot be tested.'"130
36.97. While ACE-V has an important role in ensuring that fingerprint evidence is reliable, adherence to it does not of itself secure reliability. Excessive reliance on ACE-V as a means of guarding against mistakes and bias is to be avoided. The evidence to the Inquiry suggests a lack of consensus as to a range of practical matters relating to the content of ACE-V and, in any event, examiners require to make subjective assessments throughout the stages of ACE-V. Accordingly, even where this protocol is followed, subjectivity remains intrinsic to friction ridge analysis.131
Standard Operating Procedures
36.98. The need for a national guidance manual on fingerprint standards and procedures formed part of the recommendations of the HMICS report.132 The 2006 OIG report recommended that standard operating procedures give detail regarding each of the components of the ACE-V process.133 The conclusion of that report is as true of the Asbury/McKie cases as it was of Mayfield:
"Given the fact that four different examiners made the same error, we believe that the more systemic causes described [in the report] were in play. The fact that the examiners' conduct contravened no existing standards suggests that more detailed and explicit standards are needed."134
36.99. That is all the more compelling when it is recognised that some of the same systemic causes led to the errors in relation to Y7 and QI2 Ross. The OIG report identifies the need for detailed guidance on (1) circular reasoning, (2) explanations for differences and (3) the weight to be applied to ambiguous ridge detail in the mark that an examiner may clarify after viewing the print. These were all factors central to Y7 and QI2 Ross and remain critical subjective elements in fingerprint methodology not covered by SPSA standard operating procedures.135 These matters are addressed in training but they are pivotal to the reliability of all work by fingerprint examiners and merit being kept constantly to the fore by explicit guidance in standard operating procedures.
36.100. Standard Operating Procedures should detail the stages of ACE-V with practical guidance on matters such as reverse reasoning.
36.101. Fingerprint bureaux should always keep their processes under review and should seek to learn from each other. The Inquiry benefited from extensive evidence from practitioners as to good procedural practice. It is impracticable to reproduce all of that evidence in this Report but it is hoped that the evidence will assist practitioners in this regard.
36.102. When assessing fingerprint evidence the legal community should be aware that the procedure followed by the examiner can influence the outcome of the substantive examination. Accordingly when assessing the reliability of fingerprint evidence they should have regard to the process employed, and focus on matters such as the danger of reverse reasoning, the importance of having a separate stage of evaluation and a robustness of the independence of the verification.
36.103. Although the risk of error can be mitigated in a number of ways fingerprint examiners should be mindful that no process can be error free; and that should also be borne in mind by the legal community when assessing the reliability of fingerprint evidence.
Recommendations
Standard Operating Procedures
36.104. The SPSA should revise Standard Operating Procedures to take into account the recommendations in chapter 35.
36.105. The SPSA's Standard Operating Procedures should set out in detail the ACE-V process to be followed.
Exceptions to strict application of ACE-V
36.106. Steps should be taken to reduce the risk of over-familiarity with prints where an examiner has prior knowledge of the print before conducting an analysis of the mark:
(i) Examiners should be made aware of the risks arising from over-familiarity with prints, by way of written guidance and training.
(ii) As wide a range of examiners as possible should be involved in the work when this risk is present. As an example, when an identification is made in such circumstances at least one verifier should be an examiner who has not previously seen the prints in question.
36.107. If a 'sift' phase is employed, the examiner who has carried out the 'sift' should not participate further and a different examiner should carry out the full analysis and comparison.
ACE-V
Analysis
36.108. At the analysis stage an examiner should assess the quality of the mark. If the examiner considers it to be complex this should be recorded and the separate process for complex marks recommended in chapter 39 should be followed.
36.109. As thorough analysis is an important safeguard against reverse reasoning, before comparison commences the whole mark should be analysed. The approach whereby only a target area is analysed for all levels of detail should be discontinued.
36.110. Fingerprint examiners should assess tolerances during the analysis stage so that when they come to evaluate whether the mark and print match they are conscious of the risk of applying excessive tolerances.
Comparison
36.111. Characteristics first found at the comparison stage should be included in any note of the examination. Less weight should be attached to such characteristics.
Evaluation
36.112. Although evaluation may be taking place throughout the analysis/comparison part of the ACE-V process, emphasis should be placed on the need for a separate E - evaluation - stage.
36.113. SPSA guidance to fingerprint examiners should emphasise the need at the evaluation stage to reflect on: tolerances, the quality of similarities, the nature of differences, any explanations for differences, the extent to which reverse reasoning may have been employed and the sufficiency of matching characteristics.
Verification
36.114. All verifiers should be experienced examiners who have been given special training for this task, stressing the need for independence.
36.115. A verifier should not be told of the preceding examiner's reasoning before completing A-C-E. It follows that the verifier should not be shown, for example, a photograph or comparator screen marked up to show points of similarity.
36.116. A verifier should not be someone who has been consulted for advice on the mark by the original examiner in the course of his or her examination.
36.117. No discussions should take place between verifiers and preceding examiners until they have completed their work and reached their conclusions.
Differences of opinion
36.118. Practitioners should conduct their individual ACE comparisons conscious of the fact that they are working in a field where there is no certainty and where there is scope for differences of opinion. When it comes to verification, examiners should be encouraged to be open and to adopt a challenging attitude to the opinions of other examiners, irrespective of seniority. Standard Operating Procedures should emphasise that the fact that one examiner reaches the opposite conclusion from another, or entertains any doubt, does not necessarily cast any aspersion on the competence of either examiner.
36.119. The SPSA should review its Standard Operating Procedures relative to handling differences of opinion and provision should be made not only for cases of disagreement between examiners but also for instances where an examiner has some doubt about the finding which is being verified.
36.120. Where an examiner has doubts, the comparison should be processed in accordance with the complex marks procedure recommended in chapter 39.
36.121. The SPSA should amend its procedures to include a review panel to consider any disagreement between examiners:
(i) Where there is a disagreement between examiners the further investigation should be conducted by a panel the members of which should have had no prior involvement with the mark in question but need not come from outside SPSA.
(ii) The members of the panel should each examine the mark independently without any background information about the case or knowledge of the conclusions of the other panel members.
(iii) Once the panel members have reached their own conclusions, they should, as a panel, look at the reasoning of the earlier examiners.
(iv) A result of the review should be that examiners understand why they came to different views.
(v) If the panel members are unanimous, then the result can be reported.
1. Ashbaugh D. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1999.
2. Champod C. and Chamberlain P. Fingerprints, in: Fraser J. and Williams R. (eds) Handbook of Forensic Science, Willan Publishing, 2009 page 68
3. Professor Champod 25 November pages 103-104
4. Mr MacPherson 27 October pages 136-137 and Mr Geddes 26 June page 37ff
5. Mr Pugh 24 November pages 30-31
6. Professor Champod 25 November pages 43-44
7. Ashbaugh D Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis, 1999, pages 173-174; and Champod & Chamberlain, Fingerprints, in Fraser et al Handbook of Forensic Science, pages 68-71
8. US Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General (2011) A Review of the FBI's Progress in Responding to the Recommendations in the Office of the Inspector General Report on the Fingerprint Misidentification in the Brandon Mayfield Case, URL: http://www.latent-prints.com/images/FBI%20Mayfield%20Progress%20062011.pdf page 28
9. If the mark is very clear and clean and the inked prints are smudged it is important to interpret the features in the print first e.g. Mr Wertheim 22 September page 50 and ED_0003 para 18.
10. Professor Champod 25 November page 44ff
11. Professor Champod 25 November page 44
12. See chapter 35
13. Professor Champod 25 November page 57ff
14. Professor Champod 25 November page 44
15. MP_0008 pdf page 21ff
16. Also called circular reasoning or guided interpretation
17. Mr Wertheim 22 September pages 50-51
18. Mr Zeelenberg 7 October pages 62-64, 101-102; see also Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, Committee on Science, Technology and Law Policy and Global Affairs, Committee on Applied and Theoretical Statistics Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, National Research Council. Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2009, page 124
19. Mr McGinnies 4 November page 10
20. Mr McGinnies 4 November pages 12-13
21. Mr McGinnies 4 November pages 4-5
22. Mr Zeelenberg 8 October pages 27-30
23. Mr McGinnies 3 November pages 156-161
24. Mrs Tierney 12 November pages 56-58
25. Mr McGinnies 3 November pages 167-168 and Mrs Tierney 12 November pages 56-60
26. PS_0375 and Mr McGinnies 3 November page 160
27. Mr McGinnies 3 November pages 167-168 and 4 November page 6
28. MM_0065 and Mr McGinnies 4 November pages 8-13
29. PS_0238 and Mrs Tierney 12 November pages 75-79
30. Mr McGinnies 4 November pages 14-17
31. Mr McGinnies 4 November pages 17-18
32. CO_4118
33. Mr McGinnies 4 November pages 29-30 and190
34. Mr McGinnies 4 November page 33
35. Mrs Tierney 12 November pages 61-62
36. Mrs Tierney 12 November page 60
37. See chapter 28 paras 8-13, 16-19
38. Mrs Tierney 12 November pages 63-65
39. MP_0008 pdf page 24
40. Mr Pugh, Mrs Redgewell 24 November pages 37-40
41. Mr Grigg 29 September page 8
42. FI_0081 para 19 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Grigg
43. Mr Grigg 29 September page 8
44. Mr Grigg 29 September pages 7-9
45. FI_0115 paras 139-140 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Zeelenberg
46. Mr Wertheim 22 September pages 50-54
47. Mr Chamberlain 18 November pages 20-22
48. Professor Champod 25 November pages 60-61
49. See chapter 35 para 111ff
50. See chapter 35 para 56ff
51. US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (2006) Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case (Unclassified and Redacted) (US Department of Justice) URL: http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0601/final.pdf page 149ff
52. See chapter 28
53. Mr McGinnies 4 November page 6
54. Mrs Tierney 12 November pages 58-59
55. FI_0152 para 28 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Tierney
56. Professor Champod 25 November page 63
57. FI_0201 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr Zeelenberg. For the 'multiple procedure' see chapter 39.
58. Mrs Tierney 12 November pages 70-71
59. Mrs Tierney 12 November page 94ff
60. See chapter 28
61. OIG (2006) pdf pages 149-161 at 161
62. See chapter 37 para 13
63. Mrs Tierney 12 November pages 141-142 and FI_0152 paras 43-44 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Tierney
64. Mr Grigg 29 September pages 3-4
65. FI_0136 paras 33 and 38 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Chamberlain
66. Mr Logan 16 November pages 41-42
67. MP_0008 pdf pages 22-23
68. Mr Zeelenberg 8 October pages 4-6
69. FI_0115 para 138 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Zeelenberg
70. See chapter 40
71. FI_0193 para 152 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McGinnies
72. Mr Logan 16 November pages 41-45
73. MP_0008 pdf page 23
74. FI_0136 para 32 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Chamberlain
75. Ashbaugh D. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis, 1999, page 148
76. Mr Geddes 26 June pages 37-49
77. SG_0375 paras 5.9.1 and 8.15.2
78. SG_0375 para 8.15.2 recommendation 23
79. SG_0522 paras 13.4.12-13.4.13
80. Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (2003) Third Year Review of SCRO 2000 Primary inspection, published on 22 May 2003, URL: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/public-safety/Police/local/15403/publications/7442-1; Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland (2005) SCRO 2004 Primary Inspection, published on 17 March 2005, URL: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2005/03/20826/54258 para 5.23-5.24; HM Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland (2006) Review Inspection of Scottish Criminal Records Office Primary Inspection of 2004 published on 15 December 2006. URL: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/159565/0043406.pdf para 4.11.1
81. SG_0920 pdf page 4ff
82. FI_0152 paras 84-85 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Tierney
83. Mr McGinnies 4 November pages 38-40 and FI_0193 para 81 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McGinnies
84. Mr McGinnies 4 November page 41
85. Mr McGinnies 4 November pages 45-46
86. Mr Grigg 29 September pages 14-15
87. Mr Wertheim 22 September pages 66-67
88. Professor Champod 25 November page 79
89. Mr Pugh 24 November page 41 and Mr Logan 16 November pages 41-42
90. Mr Logan 16 November pages 41-43
91. Mr Grigg 29 September page 6
92. MP_0008 pdf pages 22-23
93. Mr Wertheim 22 September page 64
94. Mr Wertheim 22 September pages 65-66
95. OIG (2006) pdf page 216
96. OIG acknowledges that it is counterintuitive to submit a single exclusion or inconclusive finding to blind verification in cases where multiple marks have been identified to a particular person, but that is the system.
97. OIG (2011) pages 43-45
98. Mr Zeelenberg 8 October pages 27-31
99. Mr Chamberlain 18 November page 31
100. Professor Champod 25 November page 80
101. See chapter 23 para 44
102. Recommendation 13
103. SG_0375 para 5.20.4
104. MM_0073
105. See Mrs Tierney 12 November page 30ff
106. FI_0152 para 30 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Tierney
107. Mrs Tierney 12 November pages 33-36
108. Mrs Tierney 12 November pages 35-36
109. FI_0152 paras 35-37 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Tierney
110. MM_0154
111. Mr McGinnies 4 November pages 51-58
112. Mr Geddes 26 June pages 42-58
113. MM_0073
114. Mr McGinnies 4 November pages 57-58
115. Mr Geddes 26 June pages 42-58
116. Mr Geddes 26 June pages 42-48
117. Mr Chamberlain 18 November pages 32-34
118. FI_0136 para 41 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Chamberlain
119. Mr Logan 16 November pages 46-47
120. Mr Logan 16 November pages 46-50
121. Mrs Redgewell, Mr Pugh 24 November pages 42-43
122. Mrs Redgewell, Mr Pugh 24 November pages 43-44 and MP_0008 pdf page 23
123. The procedure is described in chapter 39.
124. See chapter 39
125. Judge Edwards, "Solving the Problems That Plague the Forensic Science Community", keynote address at the conference on Forensic Science for the 21st Century: The National Academy of Sciences Report and Beyond, Arizona State University, 3 April 2009 URL: http://lst.law.asu.edu/FS09/pdfs/H.T.%20Edwards,%20Solving%20the%20Problems%20That%20Plague%20Forensic%20Science.pdf page 8
126. See chapter 28 para 38ff
127. See chapter 28 para 41
128. See chapter 26
129. SG_0375 para 5.20.4
130. NAS, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, 2009, pages 142-143
131. NAS, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, 2009, page 139
132. SG_0375 paras 5.11.3, 5.20.4 and 8.15.2; the O'Dowd report (2006) agreed that this recommendation had been discharged - see chapter 33 para 32
133. OIG (2006) pdf pages 207-208
134. OIG (2006) pdf pages 209-210
135. Mrs Tierney 12 November page 81ff