Introduction
5.1. I now turn from the investigation in general to SCRO's identification and verification of the marks of relevance to the Inquiry. It is convenient to discuss Y7 separately from the other marks (XF, the 'Q' marks identified to Mr Asbury and QI2). This chapter will focus on the other marks that were identified before Y7 but, before addressing their work on these marks, it is necessary to begin with two preliminary topics of common relevance to all of the marks. The first relates to the difference between 'identifications' and 'eliminations' which is relevant to the standard that SCRO applied in the comparison process. The second concerns the relationship between the police and SCRO, including the nature of the information made available to SCRO relating to the evidential significance of the marks because there is some academic research suggesting that fingerprint examiners might be influenced by what is referred to as 'contextual bias'.1
The standard applied in the comparison process
5.2. SCRO maintained a distinction between an 'identification' and an 'elimination'.2 Both terms were applied to a conclusion by a fingerprint examiner that there was a unique identity between a mark and the print of a specific individual. The distinction between the two lay in part in (a) the significance of the individual to the police investigation and (b) the standard applied by the fingerprint examiners in comparing the mark. SCRO approached the task of comparing the prints of police suspects as a potential 'identification' requiring proof of identity in accordance with the 16-point standard.3 By contrast, SCRO spoke of 'eliminating' non-suspicious marks from the police investigation by matching them to individuals believed by the police to have had an innocent reason for being at the scene (such as those of a police officer involved in the investigation). A conclusion of 'elimination' could be arrived at by applying the legal standard of 16 points but it was not necessary to apply that standard in every case and a finding of 'elimination' could be made on a lower number of matching characteristics. A finding of 'elimination' was, accordingly, ambiguous and could signify a conclusion of individualisation to either (a) the legal standard of 16 points or (b) a lesser number of matching characteristics.
5.3. At the time of the murder investigation the finding that Y7 was the mark of Ms McKie, a police officer involved in the investigation, fell into the category of an 'elimination'. As will be seen, the SCRO officers who first identified it approached it as an 'identification' to the 16-point standard4 but those who were involved in cross-checking that finding approached it as an 'elimination' that could be established on a lesser number of points in agreement4 but the inconsistency in the standards applied by the two groups was not picked up at the time.6
5.4. This issue has relevance to QI2 Ross but from a different perspective. The fact that Miss Ross was the victim of the crime meant that her prints ordinarily fell into the category of an 'elimination'. The marks on the tin (including QI2) were an exception because the tin was found in Mr Asbury's house and therefore the presence of Miss Ross's prints on the tin was potentially an incriminating piece of evidence requiring proof to the full court standard of 16 points. In the case of QI2 the first question is what standard SCRO applied when comparing it and the second question is the extent to which information made available by the police about the significance of the tin to the investigation may have influenced the comparison of that mark by SCRO.
5.5. Mr Stewart's evidence was that in a 'special case' (i.e. a case involving a more serious crime such as murder or rape, as opposed to 'volume crime') it was down to the fingerprint officer in charge of the case to decide the standard to be applied to 'eliminations'.7
5.6. The person in charge was Mr MacPherson. He said that he could have eliminated to less than 16 points but he applied the 16-point standard to all of the marks. This was a "whodunit" murder, where he was not the final arbiter of who was to be eliminated and who was to be treated as a suspect and where the status of an individual might change over time. To be efficient and effective, he identified to 16 points. As for other examiners, he said that it might have started off that people were eliminating on less than 16 points but once XF was identified it became 16 for all.8 He would have probably told them individually.9 Also, since the number of checkers for an elimination and an identification differed (two for the former and four for the latter in 1997), an examiner asked to be checker three or four would have known it was an identification they were to do.10
5.7. Ms McBride said she was informed that it was a "whodunit" and that it was necessary to check the marks to 16 points.11 She did not think there was anything abnormal about being asked to sign up to four signatures for an elimination when that was required.
5.8. Mr Stewart agreed "from memory" that it was 16 for all marks in the case. He had no specific recollection as to how that came about but Mr MacPherson would have taken the decision and told those doing verifications that was the way he was working the case.12
5.9. Mr McKenna said that it was not normal to ask four examiners to agree an elimination. In the past this was done for suspect eliminations or in the case of an 'internal enquiry'.13
5.10. Mr Padden confirmed that if a fourth checker was involved that examiner would be working to the 16-point standard.14
5.11. When it was put to Mr Geddes that Mr MacPherson had said to the Justice 1 Committee that all the marks that were identified in the case were identified to 16 points, he said he would be surprised by that.15 That said, he was effectively passed over when he could only 'eliminate' Ms McKie as the source of Y7 because he could not find 16 points in sequence and agreement.16
5.12. However, as noted later in this chapter, there was a conflict of evidence between Mr MacPherson and Mr Edward Bruce, another SCRO examiner, regarding the standard applied by the latter when he worked with QI2 Ross.
Information available to SCRO
5.13. SCRO indicated that information they received helped them prioritise their work.17 Papers in the case envelope for the Marion Ross investigation gave rise to a question about the information they received.
Information sharing generally - the police perspective
5.14. Mr McAllister, the liaison between the investigation team and SCRO,18 said that in a domestic break-in case (i.e. a case that SCRO would classify as 'volume crime') the police would not be in communication with the SCRO fingerprint section. In a case of this nature where there were in excess of 400 marks "we were very conscious that we were asking a lot of SCRO" and there was frequent contact, in debriefs and by telephone. The sheer volume of marks meant that there was a need to try to narrow the focus.19 He did not set any particular policy criteria by which a given mark might be prioritised, but he would have indicated to SCRO which marks he would like eliminated as a priority. He believed, for example, that he would have asked for priority to be given to the identification of individuals who had been at the scene in order to eliminate them from police enquiries,20 and sometimes specific priorities were given such as having marks on the money checked against Mr Asbury's associates.21
5.15. More generally, in an investigation of this sort "we work as a team, the reality is that these sorts of crimes are solved by teamwork and in a wide sense everybody working on that is viewed as part of the team. Unless there is good reason not to give some specific information (such as sensitive intelligence) then the practice would be to share as much information as possible, to motivate individuals who were all giving or being asked to give more than they would normally and hopefully so that we get the maximum results from all the enquiries that were ongoing."22 Under Mr Heath's direction the police were very much into teamwork and sharing fairly significant amounts of information. Mr McAllister said that at the time of the investigation this was even more the case.23
5.16. Mr Heath said "It is a simple fact that in terms of focus and examination and the direction of the investigation sometimes you have a list of eliminations¿for example [in the case of this investigation] it was a natural thing to try and trace the people who fitted the bathroom, and send the elimination prints from the fitters to SCRO to be examined against those prints¿So sometimes in a line of enquiry I do not think that there is anything untoward in terms of trying to focus examinations ¿as long as you are not focusing too far. There are various demands on SCRO and on the Identification Bureau where they have to focus their work in that way because they are juggling other investigations and other enquiries. It was not just the Marion Ross investigation at that time."24
Information sharing generally - the SCRO perspective
5.17. The fingerprint bureau received a daily "incidents of note" form from the police incidents room. These reports of serious crimes would be circulated in the SCRO office and assisted in the planning of resources.25 On a particular case, Mr Geddes said that the liaison officer from the investigating team might phone in to SCRO. If it was a big case the productions officer would be coming in and out of the office with elimination print forms, and information might come on a form 13 to prioritise a particular batch of marks.26
5.18. Mr Stewart also said that information was relayed in various ways. For example the senior investigating officer (SIO) might say he wanted SCRO to focus on particular marks or a certain elimination or a certain suspect. SCRO talked to the SIO on a regular basis for information on priorities, so that they could structure their work rather than just starting at the beginning and going through it. Different SIOs gave different amounts of information. It might vary depending on the relationship built up over the years between the particular examiner and the SIO with more information being disseminated if the two were familiar with each other but a new SIO was always more guarded.27 Mr Stewart had worked on a number of inquiries with Mr Heath and knew Mr McAllister.28 The contact could be daily, or several times a day, depending on the particular case. "Certainly you would have to have contact to make sure you were doing the right things. You would be contacting them to disseminate information back¿about people that had been identified, you would have asked questions over a period of time."29
5.19. Care was taken in passing on information within SCRO. The examiner in charge would only tell his team what they needed to know. "That way the potential for information to be leaked was minimised."30 Of all the documents in the case envelopes in the Marion Ross case, the only ones he would have seen at the time were those that he had written himself.31
5.20. Mr MacPherson did not recall there being daily briefings in this investigation, but he did phone Mr McAllister, the liaison person, with identifications etc or if he could not get him then he contacted the incident room.32
SCRO's notes in this case
5.21. There were a number of papers inside the case envelopes including handwritten notes, and press cuttings which Mr MacPherson had collected about the murder investigation.33
5.22. The bureau dealt with so many cases it could be difficult to remember the details of each specific case, but it was not Mr Stewart's practice to keep press clippings, nor Ms McBride's.34 Mr McKenna did not keep press clippings with case papers either, but said some experts did. Mr Geddes said that whether press cuttings were kept depended on the individual working on the case; it was not unknown for a suspect notification to be obtained from the press,35 and Mr Bruce said that clippings would be kept for example in murder cases.36
5.23. A scribbled note in the case envelope included information such as the names of Mr Heath, Mr McAllister and Mr Kirkland and "case being dealt with by team 4 HM, AG, JO" (Mr MacPherson, Mr Geddes, Mr Orr),37 followed by a note by Mr MacPherson with detailed information about the case from a "de-brief" on 13 January 1997. The note of the debrief included an entry indicating "exhaustive elims to come - will be phoned to prioritise comps" and appeared to indicate that Mr Thurley "would liaise re elims where to compare"38 though Mr Thurley had no recollection of such an involvement.39
Information about the gift
5.24. The mark on the gift tag (XF) was one of a number that arrived in SCRO on 13 January and it was identified as Mr Asbury's on 21 January.40
5.25. A piece of paper41 within the SCRO case envelope vii42 had many scribbled notes including one that read "Apparently current Xmas present??"43 Mr MacPherson said he noted such information because it helped him build up a picture to prioritise his work.44 A second note referring to the date of purchase of the gift tag is referred to below.
Information about the tin and banknotes
5.26. The tin containing banknotes was recovered from Mr Asbury's home on 22 January45 and at some stage SCRO were made aware that these were of particular interest to the police. Mr Heath did not doubt that SCRO would have been told that the police regarded the tin and money as significant and been asked to direct their resources towards examination of marks on these items.46 If there was someone in custody who was going to be reappearing in court and the police had seized an item which might have items in it that could possibly connect back to the murder scene then he saw it as the duty of the police to make sure that that line of enquiry was pursued in a focussed way within the period of time prior to his reappearance in court.47
5.27. There were three particular notes concerning the tin and its contents. Two were notes from one SCRO examiner passing on information that had come in to another. The third was on a form 13B that accompanied the relevant series of marks when it arrived in SCRO from the Identification Bureau.
SCRO note mentioning the tin
5.28. In the SCRO case envelope vii was an undated handwritten note written by Mr Stewart which read: "Gift tag bought 18/11/96. They are hopeful about the tin the money was in. There is an area the same size as the tin on her bedside table, clearly seen with dust round it. Tin recovered at accused's."48
5.29. Mr Stewart explained that in this investigation, as Mr MacPherson was the point of contact with the police, he would only have been involved if Mr MacPherson was out and he was the senior person present. They worked different shifts. He did not recall writing the note but he would have recorded the information and passed the note to Mr MacPherson when he was next in the office. SCRO did not understand how the tin fitted into the investigation until he took this message but from it he knew that the marks on the tin were of interest to the investigating team. He did not remember any discussions along the lines 'QI2 is really important in the case against Mr Asbury'. SIOs would not normally discuss it like that. He doubted if anybody would have said the marks on the tin would be of critical importance or dire importance. Sometimes what was critical was obvious, for example if there was a mark in blood, but, "a lot of the time you are not aware how critical the marks are. You can identify x number of marks and the one we think is important - by the time it gets to trial the Crown is actually much more interested in something else¿"49
5.30. Mr MacPherson accepted that he must have read the note at the time but he had no recollection of it.50
5.31. Mr McAllister did not recall passing this information to SCRO but it was the sort of information that would be mentioned at debriefs or contact meetings. It would have been shared with SCRO as they were part of the team and to highlight the potential importance of the marks. The amount of information given to SCRO was a matter for the discretion of the SIO and there were variations between officers in that regard. "The benefit of communicating this type of information was, on a fundamental level of motivation and team working, making every department, including backroom staff, involved with the case as part of the investigating team."51 Clearly it was contextual information that the Identification Bureau would not actually need in order to examine the tin and recover any marks to forward to SCRO for elimination. He could see that the information in the note appeared to emphasise the potential importance of any marks that were recoverable from the tin itself. But it seemed to him just an example of the kind of information-sharing that was encouraged.52
5.32. Mr Heath thought that the reference to "hope" might be viewed as inappropriate. This was for two reasons. First there was no particular need to disclose this level of detail to SCRO. The risk of leaks to the press increased whenever knowledge was disclosed and that could put the investigation at risk. Information should be protected. Secondly the role of the bureau was to provide an impartial service. It should not be subject to any form of influence, and a remark such as "hopeful" could be so regarded. That said, he encouraged those working on investigations to be keen and involved in their work and it could simply be over enthusiasm. The divulging of such a message would not be particularly serious.53
The shape in the dust
5.33. The 'shape in dust' was mentioned in the HOLMES file for 26 January: "subject report to PF - re parade + money + shape in dust developments if applicable".54
5.34. Mr McAllister had no recollection of a tin shaped dust mark at the murder scene55 but on being shown the note56 recalled that someone had thought there had been a dust mark in Miss Ross's house that might have fitted the shape of the tin, "but it was no more than a thought".57 There was a discussion but he had no recollection of how the "dust mark theory" progressed. The HOLMES entry was he said for inclusion in Mr Heath's supplementary report to the fiscal.58
5.35. Mr Heath had no recollection of anything to do with shapes in dust. He viewed it as a matter of significance and told the Inquiry that he found it unusual that he was not informed of it at the time.59
5.36. When Mr Leslie Brown, a retired police officer,60 was undertaking his investigation into the case, he received information about a dust free shape on a shelf in Miss Ross's house identical to the shape of the tin found in Mr Asbury's room. He regarded this as crucial evidence and tried to identify the source of the information. He said he discovered that Mr Stewart "who attended the scene at the material time" had "the answer" and there was apparently a note in the case papers describing the "tin impression".61
5.37. Mr Stewart was not at the locus at any time.62
5.38. Mr Kerr, the police officer who coordinated work at the scene, thought that the dust impression was noticed two or three days into the investigation when the team were trying to establish if anything was missing from the house. The dust shape was fully investigated and they tried to work out what item might have come from there. If there was a question of the shape being of a particular tin he would ordinarily have expected someone to check that the tin fitted the dust. His recollection was that the shape in the dust was on the bedside cabinet.63
5.39. Mr Moffat, the scene of crime officer who took the initial photographs and video at the crime scene,64 could not recall having seen a shape in dust or thinking that something had been removed. He thought that if it had been at all obvious it would have been pointed out to him to video and photograph.65 While giving oral evidence to the Inquiry he was shown a still of the video66 and was able to see gaps in the dust. He was not sure if this was dust or a stain but if it was dust he agreed that it appeared that an item or items had been removed.67
SCRO note mentioning the money
5.40. In SCRO case envelope vii was another note written by Mr Stewart to Mr MacPherson68 which read: "DI McAllister was in on Saturday. He did not know about other mark eliminated. He is getting elims for the two plumbers who installed the shower etc. Told him marks (if any) from money not with us yet. Sunday Stevie Heath brought in Accs TP No 3.30.1 and elims."
5.41. Mr MacPherson said it was normal to send notes like this,69 and Mr Stewart said that "Stevie Heath" was how Mr Heath was known.70
5.42. The Saturday and Sunday would have been 25 and 26 January and Mr Heath confirmed that Mr McAllister had been to SCRO on the Saturday, and that he had been to SCRO on the Sunday with Mr Asbury's arrest prints and some elimination prints. He could see that in hindsight someone could think it unusual for the SIO to do a routine task like this, but his team had been stretched with the demands of the investigation and sometimes as a senior manager you helped out. Mr McAllister had asked him to take the prints to SCRO in Glasgow, it was important that they were there before the Monday, and he did it. He had not been to SCRO much before, and did not really know the individuals there. However this murder investigation was unusual, it was particularly focussed on fingerprints, and so the police were linking closely with SCRO, whereas in other cases such links might be with ballistics or the chemistry side of the investigation. The main link was with Mr McAllister so he did not have a lot of close work with the SCRO people. He could understand people thinking that the use of "Stevie" in the note might suggest a familiar relationship, but its use indicated "how little they knew me" because Stephen was what he was called. "To me that is a harmless note."71
IB note to SCRO about the marks on the money and tin
5.43. The form 13B for the series of marks QB2 - QL2, which was stamped as arriving in SCRO on 29 January,72 had an asterisked note written on it: "Ident required for deceased." None of the other forms 13B73 for the case had such an entry.
5.44. Mr Stewart and Mr MacPherson said that this form was filed when the marks were booked in and used later for dates etc when the end of case letter was being compiled.74 Mr Stewart said that it would have gone to the person running the case from SCRO's point of view, in this case Mr MacPherson, and that person would be aware of its contents but most people on the case would not have seen the paperwork.
5.45. Mr MacPherson was not sure whether he would have seen the form. On being shown it for the purposes of the Inquiry, he took the entry to mean that SCRO was to compare these marks against the deceased.75 Routinely people were mentioned on form 13B for comparison. It was absurd to suggest that this meant that an identification would automatically follow; it could not be taken to be an instruction as the marks could be fragmentary and insufficient. 76
5.46. Mr Stewart thought that the entry indicated that the Identification Bureau had information that the SIO considered these marks of interest, and it meant that the mark should be compared against the deceased first of all. "If you could identify it as the deceased's the SIO would be very interested in it." But, even if someone gave it as an instruction SCRO could not identify what was not identifiable. All the marks might be insufficient or they might be negative when compared against the deceased. Nor was it a valid interpretation that it was an instruction to do a comparison to 16 points as SCRO's standards would not be known outside SCRO such as in the Identification Bureau.77
5.47. Ms McBride thought that it meant that the deceased was to be the first to be compared78 as did Mr Geddes. Mr Geddes conceded that the wording could have "sinister connotations" attached to it79 and Mr McKenna thought it was "unprofessional" and open to misinterpretation, but that SCRO experts were a hard group to pressurise.80
5.48. Mr Heath was shown the form at the Inquiry hearing. While emphasising that it was not his note and there might be a number of interpretations of it, he did not regard it as professional because it was "far too specific." He was asked if he issued any instruction that an identification was required for the deceased in relation to QI2 and replied "Absolutely not."81
5.49. Mr MacNeil, who with Mr Gibbens had found the marks on the tin and banknotes,82 confirmed that he had written this entry. He explained that it was the type of expression that would be used where a SOCO had some knowledge of the potential significance of the production to the criminal investigation and wanted to ensure that it was not overlooked. At the time he had been made aware83 that the tin had come from a suspect's house and that there was a possibility that the tin had been taken from the deceased's house. These forms were designed simply for suspects and accused. They were "not designed to be matched up for deceased's prints and things like that so you have got to put in just whatever you feel for a comparison to be made." In those days "and probably even still now, we refer to comparisons as 'idents' more than, as they are, comparisons. We just work on the word 'ident' all the time. So I was wanting SCRO to be aware to check against Marion Ross and that is all it was." In hindsight he conceded that he could have written "please compare with deceased" but "in those days that is how we phrased things", and there was no hidden agenda behind the entry.84
Identification and verification
5.50. The following part of this chapter considers SCRO's work with XF, QD2 and QI2, up to the point when the results for these marks were phoned out of the office. The case envelope for the case was completed after this and productions were prepared for court. These are considered in later chapters. It is appropriate to note here that the main case envelope, the one which had fields completed and which referred to XF, QD2, QI2 as well as Y7 and other marks, showed "ident by Hugh MacPherson" "comparator - see photographs" and "checked by Charles Stewart, Alister Geddes, Anthony McKenna, Fiona McBride".85 As the evidence that follows shows, the examiners who signed a case envelope could be different from those whose names were noted in connection with the original identification and verification of a mark.
The identification and verification of XF
The record written on the photograph
5.51. The front of the photograph of XF used by SCRO86 was annotated by hand showing initials HM, AG, AMcK (Mr MacPherson, Mr Geddes, Mr McKenna) and a further initial. Above the initials the word 'SCREEN' was written. A note in black ink that the mark was eliminated as that of David Asbury was crossed out and it was noted, in red ink, that David Asbury was identified. That was because Mr Asbury was at first someone to be eliminated as a workman who had a legitimate reason to be in the house, later he became a suspect, then an accused.87
5.52. On the back of the photograph Mr MacPherson88 had written: "21\01\97 D\C KIRKLAND informed of ident. Info being passed on to D\I McAllister. Imp overleaf checked against arrest89 form. OK. REVERSAL REQUESTED FROM IB."
5.53. Mr MacPherson said that it was his practice to write on the photograph when the print was identified.90 He would have compared XF initially against the Asbury elimination print form, had it checked by other experts and then phoned out the result.91 The stickers on the photograph indicated that XF was searched on AFR.92
5.54. The word 'screen' indicated that the comparator had been used.93 Mr Geddes said it might mean that he had looked at the image only on the comparator but "the important thing to remember is that I would only initial or sign it if I was fully satisfied with identification".94
5.55. Mr McKenna was not one of Mr MacPherson's team but was called in, he could not recall by whom. He said that an elimination comparison was always done in black and identification was always done in red.95 His was the third set of initials. "That would mean it was now going to be an identification so therefore I would be looking for 16."96 'Screen' meant that at some point he would have looked at it on the screen but he might have used glasses also. He did not have a recollection of looking at this particular mark.97 He was asked if it was possible that all that one was doing at this stage was checking what appeared on the comparator from an earlier examination by a colleague but he said no, you would do your own examination.98
5.56. The reference to the impression "overleaf" being "checked" indicated that the identification had been re-checked against Mr Asbury's prints taken on his arrest the following day, 22 January.99 Mr MacPherson said that at this stage he would probably have checked the original elimination form against the new charge form to satisfy himself that it was accurate and related to the same person, and he would probably also have checked that the current form was competent i.e. that he could still get 16 points. If he could not due to the quality of the impression on the form he would ask for a further set of prints to be taken to avoid having to ask for new prints when preparing the productions for court. He usually did such double checks as a matter of course.100
5.57. Mr McKenna indicated that reversal would have been ordered to have the mark in correct colour sequence.101 Mr Padden explained that image reversal was used both for presentational purposes (for court) and for re-checking,102 and Mr MacPherson agreed, sometimes it was needed for a comparison, sometimes only for court purposes. He was not sure why image reversal was requested in this instance.103
The marks worksheet
5.58. On the marks worksheet104 an entry recording in black ink that the mark was eliminated as David Asbury's was overwritten in red to show that it was identified as his. Mr MacPherson said it had not been a two stage process. Albeit that it was initially eliminated, it would have been eliminated to the 16-point standard.105
The fourth checker
5.59. Mr Padden had no recollection of dealing with mark XF.106 However, on being shown the annotated photograph, he was "pretty sure" the last initials were his.107 This would signify that he had been the fourth checker of the mark. The practice in 1997 was for officer A to pass to officer B the image and the ten-print form, to have officer B check an identification.108 The first person would have marked on the photograph the arrow and the number 2 to signify the right forefinger.109 It was also the practice to ask officers to look at marks on comparators.110 The proper practice was for the screen to have been wiped clean, but sometimes that did not happen, an example being when he took part in the "blind test" about Y7.111 It was possible that he would have looked at XF only on the comparator.112 The comparator was used as a means to record the staff that had seen or carried out an examination and come to the conclusion it was an identification.113
5.60. Mr Padden's recollection was that, at the time, if one was the fourth checker one would be looking for 16 points, the court standard.114 It was normal in an elimination for the work to be by two officers, so if four were involved it would be a suspect.
The identification and verification of QD2
5.61. The Inquiry had a photographic original of QD2 but not the photograph with SCRO annotations. A copy of the annotated photograph could be seen attached to a report for the Scottish Executive prepared by Michael Pass in connection with Ms McKie's civil proceedings.115 This image of QD2 had manuscript annotations in red, including the digit, the date (29/01/97) and four sets of initials.116 Although Mr MacPherson was not sure about the third set of initials,117 the consensus was that the initials were those of Mr MacPherson, Mr Geddes, Mr Orr and Ms McBride.118
5.62. A manuscript note by Mr MacPherson119 apparently from the reverse of this image120 recorded that the identifications of QD2, QE2 and QL2 were reported to Mr McAllister on 29 January "in person at debrief". This was a meeting at which Mr Heath said, among other things, that any remaining marks had to be eliminated if possible.121
5.63. The entry in red on the marks worksheet122 was completed by Mr MacPherson.123
5.64. In contrast to what was to be seen on the image of XF124 and in the entry in the marks worksheet for it,125 where black entries were changed to red, there was no indication on the paperwork that QD2 was an elimination process which became an identification process. This is perhaps not surprising as SCRO were aware that Mr Asbury had been arrested and charged with the murder, and form 13Bs received in SCRO from 27 January on listed him as a suspect with one form from this date stating, with asterisks, "accused".126
The identification and verification of QI2
The record written on the photograph and the marks worksheet
5.65. The photograph of QI2 used by SCRO127 was annotated by hand on the front to show the donors of the mark, David Asbury and the deceased, and the digits with arrows to denote their direction.128 On the reverse was a note written by Mr MacPherson.129 It recorded: "Deceased's on screen 31/01/97 HMcP/CS/AG/EB Accused's on screen 31/01/97 HMcP/AG/EB/CS." These were in red ink (now faded). It went on, in black ink, "D\IMCDonald informed 31/01/97 12.25 of above idents. Info to be passed on to D\I McAllister."
5.66. The initials were those of Mr MacPherson, Mr Geddes, Mr Stewart and Mr Bruce and Mr MacPherson said he would have taken them from the comparator. The rest of the note recorded a telephone call he made.131
5.67. Mr MacPherson thought that the initials on the photograph would be in the order in which the examiners saw the mark, Mr Stewart thought they might or might not be, and Mr Geddes thought they would be, assuming that Mr MacPherson wrote them in the same sequence.132
5.68. The entry on the marks worksheet133 was "QI2 (part of) ident'd No.2 of deceased" and "QI2 (part of) ident'd No.3 David Asbury" (both in red ink). As with QD2 there was no change from black to red. Mr MacPherson did not think there was any valid reason not to use the phrase "identified as deceased" although other marks attributed to Miss Ross were shown as "eliminated as the deceased". It was an important identification of a mark as the tin was found in Mr Asbury's house, not an identification like those from her own house.134
The process
Mr MacPherson
5.69. Mr MacPherson was the first to examine QI2.135 He would have used fingerprint glasses for his initial comparison and then gone to the comparator.136 He thought he would have used the first set of prints for Miss Ross.137 As he did not tend to keep working notes there was no permanent record of the specific characteristics that he used in forming his opinion.138
5.70. It looked to Mr MacPherson as if the next person to view QI2 was Mr Stewart in relation to the deceased's mark and Mr Geddes in relation to Mr Asbury's, and he thought they must have done so at different times on the same day. He did not recall what he told Mr Geddes or Mr Stewart about either mark.139 He would have marked it on the comparator, but he would not have seen what the other examiners did with the mark.140
5.71. Mr MacPherson found a further digit which he considered also belonged to Mr Asbury, but it was not to the standard then required, being less than ten points, and he would not have mentioned it when he phoned the results out.141
Mr Stewart
5.72. Mr Stewart did not recall being told anything about the mark beforehand by Mr MacPherson; it was not Mr MacPherson's style to give detailed briefings.142 QI2 was one among thousands of marks he had compared over the years and he did not recall exactly how he went about comparing it.143 He would have done it in his usual way, using glasses and looking at the mark and print simultaneously. Once he had identified 16 characteristics in sequence and agreement he would have stopped. There would have been no point in continuing. "On screen" on the photograph meant that it had been put on the comparator screen for viewing but it did not mean that he had used the screen for his comparison. He could not remember if he saw anyone's markings on the screen. He might have marked the comparator with his views but he did not think that he used it.144
Mr Geddes
5.73. Mr Geddes also said that "on screen" indicated that the mark and photograph had been placed on the comparator for various examiners to view.145 He explained that the two parts of the mark could not be done at the same time as one could not get two separate marks on the screen at once. Clearly the comparisons had been done on the same day but he could not tell whether one had been done immediately after the other.146
5.74. He recalled being asked to check QI2, and acknowledged that if the order of the initials on the photograph reflected the order in which examiners looked at the marks, it was different for the two individuals.147 He could not recall whether he viewed QI2 only on the comparator or under glasses or both, but the option was there to use the comparator. That could include starting with the points left on screen by the previous examiner, and, as a second, third or fourth checker, only using the comparator. There would have been markings on the screen before he started but his preference was to wipe them off as they could obscure the location of the particular ridge characteristics. He would have used his normal approach. The markings on screen were what the first examiner considered necessary to demonstrate an identification and it was down to the checker to test that. The checker carried out his own analysis and comparison. If he was comfortable on the comparator then he would carry on there, but otherwise he would remove it and do the work at his desk.
5.75. Mr Geddes said that he and Mr MacPherson had discussions over markings on the comparator, but unless he could replicate it to the same level of confidence, it was immaterial what Mr MacPherson had marked up or not. He would test what was on the comparator to ensure he could actually see what the previous examiner could, and could justify what was there.148 He found QI2 of poor quality, but better than Y7 and with less distortion or movement. His recollection was that it was not a clear-cut, run-of-the-mill mark. There had been interference with the mark which made ridge detail difficult to find but it was of a quality they were used to working with in Glasgow.149 He was able to identify the mark as Miss Ross's and to find 16 points on the comparator illustrating that.150 He verified the identifications made.151
Mr Bruce
5.76. Mr Bruce had no recollection of having been involved in QI2 even when Chief Inspector Griffiths152 spoke to him in 1999 to say his initials were on the photograph. He said that one looked at so many things on the comparator back then it would be impossible to remember every one.153
5.77. In 2006 he prepared a charted enlargement of QI2 Ross154 in connection with Ms McKie's civil case but could not recall who had asked him to do this. The charting showed 12 points; he was unable to complete a full 16-point comparison. What he had been asked to do was to mark what he possibly could have seen nine years before. Because he had no recollection it was a somewhat artificial thing to try to do.155
5.78. He could not recall if, in 1997, he had been asked to do an elimination or an identification. His initials appeared third for QI2 Ross and fourth for QI2 Asbury which could suggest that he had been third and fourth checker respectively, but he could not recall how many people were required then.156 He thought that he would have seen from the comparator that it was an elimination form, and not a charge form, so he would know it was an elimination and they were treated differently "as far as he could recall".157 If he had eliminated it and his name was put on the back of the photo then he would assume he must have got at least ten points.158 He would not have had enough to take QI2 Ross to court, but told the Inquiry he was prepared to assign ownership to Miss Ross as an elimination.159
5.79. Mr MacPherson was sure he would have said to Mr Bruce that this was an important mark and he needed four people to sign it to the 16-point standard before he could phone the result out. His understanding was that Mr Bruce saw the mark to 16.160
5.80. Mr Bruce observed that his initials were not on the case envelope and he thought that one explanation for this could be that he had been unable to get to a full 16 points.161 Mr MacPherson disagreed with this suggestion. He had "to make the identifications, get them signed off" and phone them out to keep the police abreast of developments.162
The timing
5.81. The result on QI2 was phoned out to the police on 31 January, the day of Mr Asbury's full committal hearing. The note on the photograph is that Mr MacPherson made the call at 12:25. Mr Heath passed the information to the fiscal, though Mr McMenemy did not recall receiving the information directly from him.163
5.82. Mr McMenemy told the Inquiry that at this time full committal hearings were heard in Kilmarnock in the afternoon after 2pm. He only learned about the mark being identified as Miss Ross's some time later, but even if this adminicle of evidence was available to the procurator fiscal depute who appeared in court that day it would not have been placed before the sheriff at the hearing. During such hearings no information regarding the case would be given to the sheriff other than the charge. The detail of the case would only be put before him if there was an opposed application for bail. Generally the fact that the Crown's position was to fully commit was taken on the basis that there was a prima facie case which did not require to be explored in any detail by the sheriff. Therefore there would be no substantive discussion in court.164
5.83. Mr McMenemy165 and Mr Crowe166 had somewhat different recollections as to the significance or otherwise of the information about QI2.
5.84. Mr Crowe was not involved at the time and had never seen the police report in the Asbury case.167 It was only later that he became involved, as Deputy Crown Agent in the Crown Office.168 He said "I think my understanding was that David Asbury was not fully committed a week after first appearance, which is the norm, it was eight days, which sometimes happens when it is a bigger case and there are difficulties or whatever." In such a situation "the police may be scurrying about at the last minute to gather all the evidence that they have and put it in a written form for the fiscal." "The police would not necessarily know all the mechanics of the Crown Office side but they would be aware that they had, basically, a week to bring a better case back to meet the standard of committing somebody for trial and if they did not do that within a week, they had one more day and then that was it. Somebody might well be released."169
5.85. He recalled170 a comment made by Mr McMenemy on 30 July 2000 when he took Mr Rasmussen and Mr Rokkjaer to Kilmarnock.171 "Mr McMenemy's recollection was that at the very last minute the police were able to produce the Marion Ross fingerprint on the biscuit tin found in David Asbury's home and he had been slightly suspicious about that at the time. He was aware that it was an evidentially thin case from the outset and police (sic) had been especially thorough in their search for evidence." Mr Crowe thought that Mr McMenemy had remarked on it being right up to the wire.172
5.86. Mr McMenemy said that he always thought there was a reasonably strong case on the facts and circumstances against Mr Asbury even in the absence of Miss Ross's print being found on the tin.173 He had no recollection of receiving a telephone call about QI2 but, in any event, it would not have mattered because the fiscals had their instruction from Crown Counsel on 30 January.174 However, it was helpful, "as another layer of evidence" and one which indicated a financial element to the case. "I do not recall being suspicious of it certainly, not in the least."175
The other records for QD2 and QI2
5.87. There was no record of the series of marks which included QD2 and QI2 being checked against anyone other than Mr Asbury and Miss Ross. Mr Heath indicated that the police interest in the tin and money would not have been confined to Mr Asbury and Miss Ross, because he was of the view that more than one person had been involved in the crime.176
5.88. Mr MacPherson explained that in this case SCRO would only compare certain marks against certain elimination forms, based on information coming from the officer-in-charge. For example there were marks from money177 and SCRO only had to compare a specific set of eliminations with them. QI2 might have been compared only against Mr Asbury and Miss Ross in the light of the information that SCRO had about the tin. Form 13B indicated that the mark was to be compared with the deceased, a completed field in the form indicated that Mr Asbury was a suspect, and SCRO knew that the tin had come from Mr Asbury's house. So the logical approach would have been first to compare the marks forming QI2 against David Asbury's prints and determine which marks were fragmentary and insufficient or made by David Asbury and second to compare any outstanding mark(s) against Marion Ross's prints.
5.89. Once a mark was resolved no further comparisons were carried out or required. The cross through the columns in the elimination worksheet for the series QB2-QL2178 signified that there was no need to compare these marks against the persons listed, and the marks worksheet179 showed that all of the marks in this bundle were determined to be fragmentary and insufficient or identified as that of Mr Asbury or Miss Ross. There was therefore no more work to be done on them.180
Commentary
The standard applied
5.90. With the exception of the marks made by Miss Ross any others that were found could have been made by a suspect. It was therefore not inaccurate for Mr MacPherson to describe it as a "whodunit". The evidence suggests that there was an ill-defined flexibility within operating procedures in a case such as this. It was left to Mr MacPherson to select the standard to which examiners were to work.
5.91. There was an absence of written operating procedures resulting in a lack of clarity both as to the standard being applied and the number of checkers. It may be that if an examiner knew that he or she was being asked to be third or fourth checker then it must be an 'identification' and accordingly the 16-point standard was in play. This does not appear to have been clear. It was not evident that Mr MacPherson told everyone, and there was not a universal understanding among the SCRO examiners that he had decided that the comparisons were to be to 16 points.
5.92. While this did not affect those who ultimately came to prepare the joint reports for use at the trials in HMA v Asbury and HMA v McKie, because they certainly applied the 16-point standard, others involved in the background may not have applied that standard. In relation to Y7 that was the case in relation to those who were involved in the exceptional re-checking exercises including the 'blind trial'181 and in the case of QI2 Ross there is uncertainty as to the standard applied by Mr Bruce which cannot be resolved because no contemporaneous notes were kept.
Information made available to SCRO
5.93. Mr Heath explained that it was unusual for him to have been working closely with SCRO but this investigation was particularly focussed on fingerprints. There were more than 400 fingerprints from the house and it was important to have all of these identified or eliminated. It was only in this particular investigation that there were strategy meetings with SCRO, who were mainly independent. The police had to keep in mind that SCRO were also taking in other prints from other enquiries including murder investigations.182
5.94. It was accordingly normal, and, it appears, essential, for SCRO to be given information in a case such as this where they were dealing with a large number of marks, in order that they could prioritise their work. Also, it was important to the police investigation both that people were eliminated from their enquiries and that there was speedy identification of suspects. So there were sound operational reasons for the police to give information to SCRO, both for resources and speed.
5.95. One can also appreciate the desire to foster team-working as Mr Heath and Mr McAllister indicated and Mr Heath, as SIO, wanting to signal his acknowledgement of SCRO's contribution to the overall investigation through for example the strategy meetings and his personal visit to the office.183 Nonetheless, there are associated risks, as the HMIC report in 2000 observed:
"One of the key issues concerning the working practices of fingerprint experts is the need for independence and for experts to be able to work in an environment free from outside influence and pressures. Examples of such pressures can include closeness to the police investigation where knowledge of certain details of the crime or the police enquiry could result in pressure to 'get a result'."184
5.96. Of particular concern is where the information that is communicated goes beyond what is necessary to prioritise work and contains contextual detail that may influence fingerprint examiners in carrying out their comparisons. An example is information relating to the 'shape in dust' that at one point was under consideration as providing a possible link between the tin and Miss Ross's house.
5.97. The risks generally associated with contextual information are discussed in chapter 28.
XF
5.98. The fact that SCRO knew about the gift being "current" does not appear to have had a specific impact on the speed with which XF was identified. XF had been the only 'outstanding' mark in its bundle from Wednesday 15 January and it was not until the following Tuesday 21 January that it was identified as Mr Asbury's. There does not seem to be any issue there.
'Ident required for deceased' and QI2
5.99. The phrase 'ident required for deceased' on the incoming form 13B had the potential, as Mr Heath and others identified at the Inquiry, to be interpreted as requiring or expecting SCRO to produce a particular result. It could be read as being an instruction to find a mark that belonged to Miss Ross on the tin and contents.
5.100. This was a tin, with a large sum of money inside, found in the now accused's home and at this stage of the murder investigation a clear line of enquiry was to find out, as speedily as possible, if it could be linked back to Miss Ross. It was therefore unavoidable that the police had to convey to SCRO, in this instance through the Identification Bureau, that they were to check any marks on these items against Miss Ross.
5.101. I am satisfied that there was an innocent explanation for the wording used. The fields on form 13B were intended to give SCRO information about relevant prints but they contained only two categories: for 'eliminations' or 'suspects'.185 Marks identified as having been made by the deceased would not fall into the category of 'suspects' and ordinarily marks being considered for 'elimination' (such as marks made by the deceased in her own home) would not be incriminating. The tin and money found in Mr Asbury's home did not fit readily with the usual distinction between 'eliminations' and 'suspects'. The presence of Miss Ross's print on that tin would have been incriminating evidence and therefore this comparison was a 'hybrid'.186 This is evident also from the case envelope on which Mr MacPherson had to create a category of "Elim ident" for QI2 Ross as the proforma did not have space for such.187 I do not consider there was any intention to convey an instruction to SCRO, nor that SCRO read it in such a way. There was no impropriety. However, the somewhat loose use of language was unfortunate.
The timing of the result for QI2
5.102. The timing of the result for QI2 Ross and QI2 Asbury188 was such as to give rise to a suspicion either that QI2 was a rushed job, or that SCRO were under pressure to find a mark for Miss Ross on the tin because that was critical to Mr Asbury being fully committed. Neither suspicion has foundation.
5.103. A note from Mr McAllister to Mr Heath ("Stephen") on the Saturday (25 January)189 does mention that the notes had all been dipped in fluid and that Mr Gibbens would start Quaser examination of them on the Monday at the latest. One of SCRO's notes mentioned that "marks (if any) from money" were not yet with them. It was not until the Wednesday (29 January) that the marks reached SCRO. SCRO did attend to the marks that day, and Mr MacPherson was able to intimate when he was at the liaison meeting which Mr Heath attended that afternoon that Asbury marks had been identified on the tin and money.191 Priority was clearly given to them, although it is also to be noted that by this time fewer marks needed identification. Whereas as at 13 January SCRO were working on the 175 marks found so far, by 23 January only around 18 marks were outstanding.192
5.104. Mr Heath's note of the meeting on 29 January does indicate that he wanted all outstanding marks eliminated if possible. But SCRO did not phone out the result of QI2 Ross until the Friday (31 January) lunchtime, a timescale which is not consistent with SCRO being under significant pressure to produce a "result" for QI2.
5.105. The timing of the result relative to the court appearance of Mr Asbury was coincidence and nothing more. The finding of Miss Ross's mark was a material development but it was not significant to the committal of Mr Asbury. The significant point is that Crown Counsel had taken the decision on 30 January, the day before, to instruct the procurator fiscal to apply for Mr Asbury's 'full committal'.
5.106. I accept the evidence of Mr McMenemy that the telephoned result of the identification of QI2 Ross was not material to either the decision by COPFS to make an application for his full committal nor to the order made by the sheriff. That is irrefutable given that the instruction from Crown Office to the fiscal was contained in a letter dated 30 January 1997.193
1. See Chapter 28 and 35
2. See Chapter 22 paras 6-8 and Chapter 32 para 33ff
3. The 16-point standard is considered in Chapter 32.
4. See Chapter 6
5. See Chapter 7
6. See Chapter 28
7. Mr Stewart 5 November page 28ff
8. Mr MacPherson 27 October page 24ff and 3 November page 62
9. Mr MacPherson 27 October page 27
10. Mr Stewart 5 November page 187, Mr Bruce 10 July page 59 and Mr MacPherson 27 October page 32
11. Ms McBride 6 November pages 81-82
12. Mr Stewart 5 November pages 30-31
13. FI_0054 para 38 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McKenna
14. Mr Padden 23 June page 138
15. Mr Geddes 26 June page 124
16. See Chapter 6
17. See also Chapter 22
18. See Chapter 3
19. Mr McAllister 12 June page 126
20. FI_0068 paras 95-96 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McAllister
21. Mr McAllister 12 June page 123
22. Mr McAllister 12 June pages 121-122
23. Mr McAllister pages 129-130
24. Mr Heath 9 June pages 47-48
25. FI_0015 para 33 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Bruce and FI_0054 para 90 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McKenna
26. Mr Geddes 26 June pages 76, 79-80
27. Mr Stewart 5 November page 52ff
28. Mr Stewart 5 November pages 55-56,164-165
29. Mr Stewart 5 November page 163
30. FI_0036 para 74 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart
31. FI_0036 para 225 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart
32. Mr MacPherson 3 November page 122
33. FI_0056 para 129 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr MacPherson
34. FI_0036 para 206 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart, FI_0040 para 52 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Ms McBride and FI_0047 para 3 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr Mackenzie
35. FI_0032 paras 3-5 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr Geddes
36. FI_0015 para 26 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Bruce
37. DB_0264 pdf page 1
38. DB_0264 pdf page 3
39. Mr Thurley 10 June pages 41-43
40. See Chapter 4
41. DB_0265
42. DB_0253
43. The Christmas gift was from Miss Ross's house, and XF was found on the gift tag attached to it - see chapter 4.
44. FI_0056 paras 62 and 154 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr MacPherson
45. See Chapter 4
46. Mr Heath 9 June pages 50-52 and FI_0013 para 224 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Heath
47. Mr Heath 9 June page 48
48. DB_0256
49. Mr Stewart 5 November pages 53-54,159-166
50. FI_0056 paras 60, 147 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr MacPherson
51. FI_0068 paras 81-82 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McAllister
52. Mr McAllister 12 June pages 128-129
53. FI_0013 para 198 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Heath
54. CO_1688
55. FI_0068 para 57 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McAllister
56. DB_0256
57. FI_0068 para 82 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McAllister
58. FI_0068 para 82 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McAllister. The dust mark is not however mentioned in that report, AC_0045, dated 27 January or in Mr Heath's handwritten note for the fiscal dated 30 January AC_0052.
59. FI_0013 paras 196-197 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Heath
60. See chapter 14
61. FI_0017 para 55 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Brown
62. Mr Stewart 5 November page 161
63. Mr Kerr 18 June pages 48-49, 75-76, 79-80
64. See chapter 3
65. He took a video and photographs of the crime scene on 8 January.
66. At 22:47
67. Mr Moffat 10 June pages 145-146 and Mr Moffat 11 June pages 76-77, 90-92
68. DB_0258
69. FI_0056 paras 149-150 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr MacPherson
70. Mr Stewart 5 November pages 164-165
71. Mr Heath 9 June page 43
72. One of the series in DB_0251 (pdf page 33)
73. Collated as DB_0251
74. Mr Stewart 5 November page 50 and Mr MacPherson 27 October page 72ff
75. Mr MacPherson 27 October pages 74-76
76. FI_0056 para 50 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr MacPherson
77. Mr Stewart 5 November pages 51-52
78. FI_0040 paras 13-15 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Ms McBride
79. Mr Geddes 26 June pages 80-81
80. FI_0054 paras 54-55 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McKenna
81. Mr Heath 9 June page 51
82. See Chapter 4 para 47
83. He could not now recollect how he came to know - FI_0018 paras 54-55 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacNeil.
84. Mr MacNeil 12 June page 1ff
85. DB_0529
86. CO_1987h
87. Mr Padden 23 June pages 62-63 and Mr MacPherson 27 October pages 25-26
88. FI_0055 para 93 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson, FI_0056 para 64 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr MacPherson and Mr Padden 23 June page 24
89. This word might be "current."
90. Mr MacPherson 27 October pages 30-31
91. FI_0055 para 89 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
92. FI_0055 para 94 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
93. FI_0031 para 76 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Geddes and FI_0056 para 109 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr MacPherson
94. Mr Geddes 26 June pages 63-64
95. Mr McKenna 6 November pages 15-17, 24. It was not clear whether there was significance to the colour. Mr Padden for example did not attach any significance to the use of colour - Mr Padden 23 June page 63
96. Mr McKenna 6 November page 17
97. Mr McKenna 6 November page 19
98. Mr McKenna 6 November page 20
99. Mr Padden 23 June pages 26-27
100. FI_0055 paras 90-92 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
101. FI_0054 para 66 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McKenna
102. Mr Padden 23 June page 30, and see chapter 19
103. FI_0055 para 95 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson. The reversed image is at CO_1989h.
104. DB_0003
105. Mr MacPherson 27 October page 26
106. Mr Padden 23 June pages 27 and 71
107. Mr Padden 23 June pages 20-21 and 133 and FI_0008 para 3 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Padden
108. Mr Padden 23 June pages 77-78
109. Mr Padden 23 June pages 77-78
110. See also, for example, Mr MacPherson 27 October page 67
111. Mr Padden 23 June pages 79-80
112. Mr Padden 23 June pages 21-24, 75ff
113. Mr Padden 23 June page 76
114. Mr Padden 19 June pages 137-138
115. SG_0690
116. SG_0691
117. FI_0056 para 102 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr MacPherson
118. FI_0054 para 67 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McKenna, FI_0031 para 81 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Geddes and FI_0039 para 113 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms McBride
119. FI_0055 para 103 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
120. SG_0692 and SG_0359h
121. See Chapter 4
122. DB_0003
123. FI_0055 para 101 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
124. CO_1987h
125. DB_0003
126. DB_0003. DB_0266 is a note telling Mr MacPherson that Mr McAllister had called with this information. (SCRO received the marks from the tin and contents on 29 January. Mr Asbury had made his first court appearance on 23 January, the previous Thursday.)
127. DB_0001h
128. FI_0031 para 51 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Geddes
129. Mr MacPherson 27 October pages 31-32
130. Mr MacPherson 27 October pages 36, 39
131. FI_0055 paras 115, 128 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
132. Mr MacPherson 27 October page 39, Mr Stewart 5 November pages 28-29 and FI_0031 para 54 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Geddes
133. DB_0003
134. FI_0056 paras 52-53 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr MacPherson
135. Mr MacPherson 27 October page 43
136. FI_0055 para 118 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
137. DB_0142h and FI_0055 paras 114-116 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
138. FI_0055 para 127 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
139. FI_0055 para 125 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
140. Mr MacPherson 27 October page 35ff
141. FI_0055 para 128 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
142. FI_0036 para 169 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart
143. Mr Stewart 5 November page 45
144. FI_0036 paras 172-174 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart
145. Mr Geddes 26 June page 67 and FI_0031 para 53 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Geddes
146. FI_0031 para 54 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Geddes
147. Mr Geddes 26 June page 67
148. Mr Geddes 26 June pages 67-73 and FI_0031 para 55 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Geddes
149. FI_0031 para 58 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Geddes
150. FI_0031 para. 55 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Geddes
151. FI_0031 para 65 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Geddes
152. Mr Griffiths succeeded Chief Inspector O'Neill as Head of the Fingerprint Bureau on 30 March 1998 - CO_2081 Mackay enquiry statement of Mr Griffiths
153. Mr Bruce 9 July pages 154-156
154. SG_0751
155. Mr Bruce 9 July page 159ff and Mr Bruce 10 July pages 2ff
156. Mr Bruce 10 July pages 56ff
157. Mr Bruce 10 July page 17
158. Mr Bruce 10 July page 23
159. Mr Bruce 9 July page 163 and Mr Bruce 10 July pages 10-11, 15, 56ff
160. Mr MacPherson 27 October pages 30-34
161. Mr Bruce 9 July page 164
162. Mr MacPherson 27 October pages 31,38
163. FI_0013 para 230 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Heath and Mr McMenemy 11 June pages 117-118
164. FI_0073 paras 22, 24 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McMenemy
165. Mr McMenemy 11 June pages 120-122
166. Sheriff Crowe 2 July pages 130-136
167. Sheriff Crowe 2 July page 131
168. FI_0048 paras 3-6 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe
169. Sheriff Crowe 2 July pages 132-136
170. Sheriff Crowe 2 July pages 130-136 and FI_0048 para 16 Inquiry Witness Statement of Sheriff Crowe
171. See Chapter 13
172. Sheriff Crowe 2 July pages 130-136
173. FI_0073 para 17 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr McMenemy
174. Mr McMenemy 11 June pages 117-119
175. Mr McMenemy 11 June pages 120-122
176. FI_0013 para 227 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Heath
177. There were other marks from money in addition to those in the QB2-QL2 series.
178. CO_0197 pdf page 3
179. DB_0003 pdf page 25
180. Mr MacPherson 27 October page 74 and FI_0056 paras 54, 59-61 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr MacPherson
181. See Chapter 7
182. Mr Heath 9 June pages 41-44
183. Mr Heath 9 June pages 45-46
184. SG_0375 para 8.15.1
185. See Chapter 22
186. Counsel to the Inquiry to Mr Padden 23 June page 56
187. See Chapter 22
188. See para 62 above
189. AC_0044
190. See para 40 above
191. See para 62 above
192. CO_1706 - Mr McAllister's note
193. CO_4033