Introduction
33.1. The 16-point standard was under review in Scotland from 1994 but it was not until 4 September 2006 that the requirement for a set minimum number of common characteristics was abandoned in favour of what is commonly known as 'the non-numeric standard'. That changeover had been implemented in England and Wales in 2001.1
Reviews in England and Wales
33.2. The 16-point standard was the subject of review by the Home Office in 1978 with representatives of the Scottish Criminal Record Office and Crown Office involved as observers.2
33.3. The Home Office commissioned a further review for England and Wales in 1988 and that culminated in the Evett and Williams report.3 Evett and Williams noted that fingerprint examiners could be certain of their conclusion on fewer than 16 points but practice at that time required them to regard findings on eight to fifteen points as "non-provable". The report recorded that the Audit Commission4 had found that in as many as one-third of provincial bureaux more than 20% of all identifications fell into that category, compared with less than 2% with the Metropolitan Police. On that basis, there was reason to believe that a significant number of identifications were being lost due to the application of the 16-point standard. The report concluded that a rigid numerical standard was unnecessary and irrelevant.
1994: review of the 16-point standard in Scotland
33.4. Crown Office had a Standing Committee on Expert Evidence from 1994 to 2001.5 This committee was responsible for the Expert Evidence Manual,6 first published in 1995,7 which contained guidance on fingerprint evidence. The committee was also responsible for a review of the 16-point standard; and the preparation of draft Lord Advocate's Guidance.8
33.5. The first review of fingerprint evidence carried out by the standing committee was in 1994.9 The background included the reporting to Crown Office of a case under summary procedure in Wick in which 12 points in sequence and agreement had been found but SCRO witnesses were not willing to speak to an identification. The point may, however, have been raised with Crown Office earlier in that same year in another context.10
33.6. The standing committee prepared a report to the Crown Agent in August 1994 and recommended:
33.7. The eight point lower threshold derived from the 1978 agreement among fingerprint experts that it was the number of characteristics sufficient to establish identity beyond reasonable doubt.11
33.8. The committee's understanding was that the number of cases where eight to fifteen points of similarity was found was very small ("no more than a handful of cases" each year)12 but, nonetheless, it was critical of the unwillingness of fingerprint examiners to give evidence of identity to a standard lower than 16 points, in part arguing that this attitude was based on a misunderstanding of "the purpose and value of their evidence in cases where there is evidence from another source implicating the accused."13 The committee also observed that this had implications for disclosure to the defence,14 presumably thinking of a case in which there were eight to fifteen points of similarity between the latent print and the fingerprint of, for example, a potential incriminee.15
33.9. The report was the subject of internal discussion in 1994-1995.16
Lord Advocate's draft guidelines
33.10. Mr Pattison stated that the Lord Advocate's draft guidelines were under consideration from 1995 but were never issued and subsequently were overtaken by events.17
33.11. Draft guidelines18 had been produced by March 1995 and appear consistent with the 1994 report. In particular, the guidelines would have required reporting of the finding of a smaller number of points of similarity than 16, noting that in some instances that evidence might be relevant to the defence and equally that in other cases the Crown might wish to use fingerprint evidence in order to show consistency or inconsistency of the source of the fingerprint impression.19
33.12. In 1995 the eight Scottish police forces and SCRO debated the draft guidelines and produced a response confirming that all Scottish fingerprint bureaux were prepared to express an opinion on marks yielding less than the existing standard and that more emphasis should be placed on the quality of the mark rather than a specific number of characteristics.20
33.13. A sub-group of the standing committee worked on the revision of the draft guidelines and circulated a revised draft in March 1998.21
33.14. The draft of the guidelines sought to make two changes:
33.15. The Lord Advocate (Lord Hardie) approved a draft of the guidelines on 2 September 1998.24
33.16. The draft guidelines were revised in 1999 but continued to pursue the same two changes.25 In the case of evidence of consistency, a letter dated 21 September 199926 indicates that Crown Office was interested in evidence that any mark was consistent with, or inconsistent with, the fingerprints of the accused. However, the Crown was not expecting fingerprint examiners to go further than an expression of "consistency" by, for example, giving an opinion as to the probability of a match.27
33.17. In relation to the non-numeric approach, the 1999 draft stated that "fingerprint officers of suitable experience and expertise should be able to express conclusions as to the identity of marks where they are satisfied of the common origin of fingerprint impressions and known fingerprints." It went on to prescribe that "An appropriate training programme, required standards of competence, auditing and quality assurance must, however, accompany any departure from the 16-point standard to ensure that the confidence that fingerprint evidence has traditionally enjoyed is not compromised."28
33.18. There were conflicting expectations as to the impact that the guidelines would have on the practice of fingerprint examiners. The minutes of a comprehensive review meeting on 18 August 199929 included the following statement: "A move away from the 16-point standard would¿require scientists to have a broader based expertise and be more open-minded in their approach." That contrasts with the statement in a covering letter dated 21 September 1999: "what the guidelines endeavour to do is not to change experts' practices in relation to examination of impressions but rather to change their reporting practices."30
33.19. On 17 April 2000 Mr Bell of SCRO wrote to Crown Office on the subject of change to the non-numeric system and reported that SCRO had taken cognisance of the willingness of Crown Office to accept evidence which did not meet the 16-point standard and that some cases had been reported on that basis.31
33.20. A comprehensive review paper was prepared for submission to the Lord Advocate in June 2000.32 That said in terms that the McKie case had "stalled progress in this area". The paper recommended that the 16-point standard be retained in less serious cases with consideration being given to non-numeric evidence in more serious cases where the accused had appeared on petition. That inconsistency stemmed from apprehension about "the McKie climate of popular uncertainty about fingerprint evidence" and the desire not to undermine non-numeric evidence by an adverse decision in a low priority case that may not have been properly prepared.
33.21. An internal Crown Office memo dated 17 August 2001 noted that the Lord Advocate accepted the need to move to the non-numeric system but, though the latest draft of guidelines had been approved by the Lord Advocate, they were not issued "because of the SCRO investigation and it was felt that the time was not right to be issuing new guidance about the presentation of fingerprint evidence."33
33.22. Lord Boyd of Duncansby explained that if the McKie case had not occurred then the change to a non-numeric approach would have been introduced earlier.34
HMICS report
33.23. The HMICS report published in September 200035 included some recommendations and observations on fingerprint practice and procedures. The matters covered included the need for standards and working practices associated with non-numeric identifications.
33.24. As to standards HMICS proceeded on this proposition: "The application of a standard is very important to maintaining a safe and reliable method of fingerprint comparison. Experience and expertise enables a fingerprint expert to 'know' that a mark has been made by a certain finger but it is necessary that a standard is applied to translate that view into a reasoned argument on which the conclusion can be based. The application of a recognised and accepted standard protects the fingerprint expert from inappropriate pressures and influences and allows the generation of safe and positive conclusions."36 To that end HMICS recommended the production of a national guidance manual on fingerprint standards and procedures (Recommendation 12).
33.25. Recommendation 15 was that management of the change to the non-numeric standard should be addressed at a very early point by the ACPOS Presidential Review Team. Ancillary observations were made on the changes that might be required in the event of a move to non-numeric identification evidence. HMICS suggested that court reports might require to contain greater detail regarding the fingerprint officer's opinion,37 with a high standard of documentation being kept in relation to operating standards and procedures.38 In particular there was seen to be a need to keep working notes39 recording the expert's findings and reasoning, all in the interests of transparency and accountability.40
ACPOS Presidential Review Group
33.26. The Change Management Review Team set up by the ACPOS Presidential Review Group reported in October 200041 and broadly echoed the conclusions of the HMICS report.
2002 draft Scottish Fingerprint Standard
33.27. In April 2001 and April 2002 a draft Scottish Fingerprint Standard was forwarded to Crown Office by Fife Constabulary for consideration. This adhered to the 16-point standard, supplemented with exceptions for 10 plus 10 and dire and crucial cases.42
33.28. Though the Deputy Crown Agent, Mr Gilchrist, was generally supportive, he argued that fingerprint officers should still report instances where the mark was consistent with the accused's fingerprint even if there were insufficient characteristics to enable an identification to be made.43
Introduction of the non-numeric system
33.29. On 4 December 2003 the Justice 2 Committee of the Scottish Parliament wrote to the Lord Advocate regarding the implications of a move to the non-numeric system and in February 2004 the Lord Advocate approved a draft response including the following statement: "Although the decision to adopt such a standard would be a matter for SCRO, clearly, any such move would require to be made in close consultation with the Lord Advocate, who would require to be satisfied that he would be entitled to rely on fingerprint evidence prepared using that standard."44
33.30. In the same month the Deputy Crown Agent Mr Gilchrist reported that the Scottish Fingerprint Service was ready to go live with the non-numeric standard, adding: "The Crown Office position has always been one of supporting the introduction of the non-numeric standard. If it had not been for the controversy over the Shirley McKie case, the standard would almost certainly have been introduced by now."45
33.31. In June 2005 SCRO submitted to Crown Office a draft implementation plan/communication strategy document46 for the move to the non-numeric fingerprint standard in Scotland anticipating that the Lord Advocate's approval would be required to implement the change. The implementation plan canvassed the rationale for the change and identified the key messages to be conveyed when the change was made:
"Non-numeric is a robust process for fingerprint identification based on quality, processes and procedures, people and training.
The fixed 16 point standard has never been a reality since 1983 when it was permitted to present fingerprint evidence on single identification showing fewer than 16 characteristics if that evidence was considered 'crucial' and 'of dire importance' to the case.
Evidence is available if required on every occasion where identity has been established.
More detail and information is included with reports / statements offered by SFS experts. The new format will include information about all marks on the case.
Experts are able to offer a fuller and more detailed explanation and information on how they come to their conclusions in the identification process when required to do so resulting in a more professional approach.
More easily understood for the court and in particular the jury.
Non-numeric brings to the fore the scientific basis for the uniqueness of fingerprints and the methodology employed by experts when analysing and comparing fingerprints.
Non-numeric is the accepted format for presenting fingerprint evidence in England and Wales and many countries around the world.
SFS is now fully prepared and ready to adopt the non-numeric standard."
33.32. The O'Dowd report47 was completed on 24 March 2006 and that report agreed that Recommendation 12 of the HMICS report - the need for a national procedures manual - had been discharged by the combination of the provision of a National Procedures Manual and a Scottish Fingerprint Quality Assurance Manual and the securing of ISO accreditation. As for Recommendation 15 - the management of the change to the non-numeric standard - the O'Dowd report concluded that this had yet to be discharged. Arrangements were in hand but the decision rested with the Lord Advocate as to when this system would be introduced and no decision had (as at that date) yet been made.
33.33. The Scottish Fingerprint Service published its Action Plan for Excellence in April 2006. That plan anticipated the change to the non-numeric system by the end of August 2006.48
33.34. A meeting took place at Crown Office on 4 July 2006. The minutes of that meeting49 were available to the Inquiry. The meeting discussed, among other issues, the format of reports to court. It did not discuss the methodology to be applied in fingerprint comparisons nor the standard that was to be applied.
33.35. The non-numeric system was applied in Scotland from 4 September 2006, since when Crown Office has set no minimum number of points.50
33.36. Crown Office circular 8/200951 states that the changeover to the non-numeric standard was made with the agreement of COPFS, ACPOS and the Scottish Government. There was no contemporaneous documentation provided to the Inquiry showing the agreement of the Lord Advocate (or COPFS) to the changeover. Mr Pattison advised the Inquiry that the Lord Advocate had indicated in 2005 that he was content, in principle, to accept reports based on the non-numeric system.52 Mr Pattison also explained that the responsibility for moving to a new standard lay with the SPSA and it was their decision to implement the new standard in Scotland. COPFS agreed to accept reports based on the non-numeric standard.53 COPFS would not normally have any input into the underlying standards applied by experts.54 COPFS in general terms placed reliance on SPSA experts on the move to the non-numeric standard.55
33.37. The current view of COPFS on the demarcation of responsibility for changes in standards, as expressed by Mr Pattison, was as follows: COPFS would expect to be told if a significant change was proposed in fingerprint evidence or any of the forensic sciences. COPFS would want to be reassured about it and ask questions. However COPFS cannot set the standards, it does not have the expertise to do so.56
Crown Office circular and other guidance
33.38. A DVD and explanatory leaflet about the non-numeric approach were prepared by the Scottish Fingerprint Service and copies provided to Crown Office and all procurator fiscal offices in September 2006.57 Mr Pattison explained that these were intended to alert staff to the change to the non-numeric approach and the implications for the presentation of evidence.58 The DVD was shown during a hearing of the Inquiry.59
33.39. An initial draft of the Crown Office circular was also prepared.60 The draft circular was discussed with SPSA in early 2009 in order to ensure that it reflected their practices and procedures correctly and the final approved version was issued in March 200961 along with consequential changes to COPFS's internal Book of Regulations, Practice Manuals and Precognoscer's Handbook.62 The circular should have been released to staff earlier but was not due to administrative error.63
33.40. Paragraph 6 of the circular states that the change did not affect the manner in which a fingerprint officer makes an identification, the difference being that now a fingerprint officer who has made an identification can give evidence in court irrespective of the number of points of comparison.
33.41. Paragraph 7 records three key features of the non-numeric system:
"Experts no longer need to establish a fixed number of points of comparison.
Experts can focus on the quality of any points of comparison, rather than the quantity.
Experts should be able to offer a much fuller explanation of the way in which they arrived at their conclusions."
33.42. Despite the third of those points, the report that the experts now prepare (Annex A to the circular)64 contains no detail beyond the expression of a conclusion as to identity. No photographic enlargements are provided and, instead, it is explained in the circular that the detail is to be secured through precognition of the expert. This is discussed in chapter 37.
Misnomer describing non-numeric as a 'standard'
33.43. The new system is commonly referred to as 'the non-numeric standard' but that is a misnomer. There is no prescribed standard for an identification.
33.44. Witnesses and various texts refer to the necessity for a 'sufficiency' of matching detail before there can be a conclusion of identity but Mr Grigg,65 Mr Wertheim66 and the Metropolitan Police67 all agreed that there is no objective test of 'sufficiency' for uniqueness. There is no benchmark standard.68 The definition of sufficiency relies on the subjective conclusion in the examiner's mind.69 It is expressed in this way by Professor Champod and Mr Chamberlain:
"In the absence of dissimilarities, the examiner will weigh the corresponding features in reference to the standards for identification... In a nutshell, the individualisation will be reached when the examiner observes a level of agreement (across the three levels of legible features) that exceeds the highest level of correspondence he observed through his/her training and experience in comparisons involving non-matching entities. An identification is then concluded when the mark shows sufficient ridge quality (clarity) of friction ridges in agreement with the print so that the probability for such a match to happen if a print from another person is submitted is deemed to be impossible." 70
33.45. That passage was discussed with Mr Chamberlain. While he confirmed that each examiner formulates a personal threshold based on previous observations, this should not be equated to each examiner having a personal numeric threshold. Mr Chamberlain does not have a numerical threshold because he takes into account the configuration of the characteristics as well as the number.71 That was consistent with the evidence of Mr Grigg who said that it is not possible to say that a particular number of points will be sufficient in every case. It may also depend upon the distribution of different characteristics as some are much rarer than others and would have a greater impact on the thought process of the examiner. Mr Grigg's advice was to look for differences as opposed to similarities. If an examiner cannot find any differences and finds sufficient similarities, he has individualised that mark.72
33.46. The Metropolitan Police stated that threshold values are developed through training and experience and monitored and challenged by quality assurance and peer review.73 Miss Hall, Fingerprint Operations Manager, said that their "tipping point" research showed that in some cases there are variations between examiners as to the amount of information required to effect an identification.74
33.47. The absence of any personal numerical threshold was unequivocally demonstrated by the fact that no fingerprint examiner, asked what the minimum number was, gave a definitive reply. The response given by Mr Geddes is representative: "I would have to say show me the mark."75 That is the stock answer that trainees are currently taught to give in mock trials.76
33.48. This is discussed by Ashbaugh in his book Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis. He writes that "When a print is analyzed by a different identification specialist the threshold of what is sufficient will fluctuate within parameters"77 and that "The opinion of the individualization or identification is subjective",78 founded on personal knowledge, ability and experience.
"How much is enough? Finding adequate friction ridge formations in sequence that one knows are specific details of the friction skin, and in the opinion of the friction ridge identification specialist that there is sufficient uniqueness within those details to eliminate all other possible donors in the world, is considered enough."79
33.49. 'Sufficiency' is a subjective judgment of the individual examiner. It is an empirical judgment based on training and experience shaped by the thresholds to which the examiner operates and not on any validated scientific data on the incidence or rarity of combinations of ridge characteristics. More succinctly, as Mr Zeelenberg put it, sufficiency is left to the discretion of the examiner.80 Professor Champod adopted the description by Stoney that the conclusion is 'a leap of faith'.81 At some point, the examiner has identified so many corresponding features that he becomes subjectively convinced that the chance of duplication is zero. He went on:
"This little jump from a probabilistic position to certainty escapes the science. It has been accepted by courts for years but it escapes a logical argumentation¿at some point the chances are considered to be so reduced that, for ease of discussion, it will be declared that an identification has been achieved and the chance of finding someone else on earth with the same features will be declared to be zero hence the 100 per cent certainty."82
Impact on fingerprint examiners' method of work
33.50. As noted in paragraph 18, papers made available to the Inquiry show conflicting expectations whether the move to 'the non-numeric standard' would alter the manner in which fingerprint practitioners carried out comparisons or merely changed their reporting practices.
33.51. Mr Padden,83 Mr Foley84 and Mr Geddes85 all spoke with one voice: the change did not affect the manner in which they did their job. Mr Padden explained that conclusions are not articulated in the same way, third level detail now entering in to the equation, and the paperwork is different, but his working processes are the same.
33.52. At the most practical level it is significant to note that Mr Geddes was unable to sign up to the identification of Y7 in 1997 because he could not then satisfy the 16-point standard but he was unequivocal that if he had had the freedom of the non-numeric 'standard' he could have been a signatory to the joint report because he was 100% certain that Y7 was indeed the mark of Ms McKie.86 In the absence of an objective standard the conclusion comes down to the "individual responsibility" of the examiner.87 Mr Geddes expressed the test in terms of a "sufficient volume" for an identification and quite clearly acknowledged that this was subjective and open to variations among examiners:
"THE CHAIRMAN: But does this not mean that the volume might be sufficient to satisfy one expert but not sufficient to satisfy another?
A. Unfortunately, yes. That is the very nature of - that is the issue where the scientists have issues with us because it is subjective and it is down to the individual. I spoke last week of [the] individual but the bureau has a responsibility to ensure that that individual is trained, has relevant knowledge and that expertise is maintained because it does come down to the subjective opinion of the individual expert."88
33.53. This answer places the emphasis on the competence of the individual examiner but Mr Geddes had also emphasised the wider protections afforded by the institutional controls such as effective training, quality assurance and compliance with appropriate procedures including effective verification.89 That is examined in Part 7.
OIG report on Brandon Mayfield case
33.54. Recognition of the fact that the abandonment of the 16-point standard did not alter the methodology that was being applied by fingerprint examiners leads to the conclusion that the core variables inherent in the methodology are constant factors of relevance to the reliability of fingerprint evidence irrespective of the legal 'standard' being applied.
33.55. In January 2006 the US Justice Department, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), published a report entitled 'Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield case'90 that cast light on the methodology and the core variables. There are parallels between the findings in that report and the conclusions in this report.
33.56. Brandon Mayfield was an American attorney arrested on suspicion of involvement in the Madrid bombing in May 2004 because of the erroneous identification of him by the FBI as the source of a fingerprint (LFP17) found on a bag of detonators. The identification was made by one FBI examiner and verified by a further two FBI examiners and was endorsed in due course by an independent court appointed examiner. The FBI initially adhered to its conclusion despite knowing that the Spanish National Police reported a negative result only subsequently to accept that there had been a misidentification when the Spanish authorities identified the mark as having been made by another man, an Algerian national by the name of Daoud.
33.57. The FBI examiners worked to a non-numeric standard but, after conducting an investigation, the OIG concluded that the methodological errors committed by the examiners could have led to a misidentification even if a numerical standard had been applied.
33.58. A number of methodological failings were found:
(i) There was a failure to carry out a complete analysis of the mark resulting in important differences being ignored.
(ii) There was an unusual number of apparent similarities between Mr Mayfield's print and LFP17. Mr Mayfield's print and LFP17 were close non-matches, with ten points bearing some degree of similarity. This confused the examiners.
(iii) The FBI interpretation was influenced by reverse reasoning that led the examiners to conclude that 'murky and ambiguous' details in LFP17 could be identified as points of similarity.
(iv) The examiners failed to address the poor quality of the similarities. Such was the lack of clarity in the mark that the examiners could not accurately determine the precise nature of some characteristics (as a bifurcation or a ridge ending). They were consequently relying on what were truly ambiguous features as points of similarity. The ambiguous quality of the characteristics was such that they did not support the conclusion of identity and on closer scrutiny some of the characteristics were found not to match (a bifurcation in one corresponding to a ridge ending in the other).
(v) The examiners gave inadequate explanations for differences, including discounting an entire section of mark and print because of an assumption of a double touch, an assumption that was based on an extraordinary series of coincidences.
(vi) They placed faulty reliance on third level detail.
(vii) The verification procedure failed in part because the verifiers were aware that an identification had been made by preceding examiners.
(viii) The FBI failed to re-examine the finding when advised of the negative Spanish result because of overconfidence in the skill and superiority of its examiners.
33.59. The OIG report made a number of recommendations to address those failings. Though the report was current at the final stages of preparation for the move to the non-numeric 'standard' in Scotland, it was not considered by either Crown Office91 or the Scottish Fingerprint Service.92
1. Mr Leadbetter 23 October pages 18-19
2. CO_1599 pdf page 23 - minutes of meeting 18 April 1978
3. CO_1375
4. The Audit Commission for Local Authorities in England and Wales
5. FI_0114 paras 47, 49 and 57 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Pattison
6. CO_4342
7. FI_0114 para 48 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Pattison
8. FI_0114 para 59 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Pattison
9. FI_0114 paras 51-53 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Pattison
10. See memo by W. F Torrance to the then Home Depute (now Lord Bonomy),10 February 1994, CO_1599 pdf page 10
11. CO_4427 para 2.6
12. CO_4427 para 2.3
13. CO_4427 para 2.8
14. CO_4427 para 2.5
15. Incrimination is a defence that the crime was not committed by the accused, but by another person, the incriminee.
16. CO_4387 - Manuscript note of the Lord Advocate (Rodger) to a memo by the Home [Advocate] Depute dated 27 September 1994 and CO_4362 - Minutes of the meeting of the Standing Committee on Expert Evidence dated 5 May 1995
17. FI_0114 para 64 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Pattison
18. FI_0114 paras 60-63 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Pattison
19. CO_4335 and CO_4309
20. See CO_4375
21. CO_4308
22. CO_4310 para 3
23. CO_4310 para 6
24. CO_4424
25. CO_4405 and CO_4406
26. CO_4405
27. CO_4407 pdf pages 4-5
28. CO_4406
29. CO_4407
30. CO_4405
31. CO_4399
32. CO_4395
33. CO_4380
34. Lord Boyd of Duncansby 10 November pages 63-64
35. SG_0375 - The Primary Inspection Report of the SCRO Fingerprint Bureau 2000 published 14 September 2000
36. SG_0375 para 8.1.1
37. SG_0375 para 6.10.2
38. SG_0375 para 8.1.8
39. SG_0375 para 8.16.3
40. SG_0375 paras 8.1.9-8.1.10
41. SG_0522
42. See CO_4389 and CO_4390
43. See CO_4388
44. See CO_4329 and CO_4330
45. CO_4391
46. See CO_4313 and CO_4314
47. PS_0036
48. SG_0786 paras 4.9-4.11
49. CO_4326
50. FI_0114 para 4 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Pattison
51. CO_4109
52. See CO_4428
53. FI_0195 para 15 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr Pattison
54. FI_0195 para 16 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr Pattison
55. FI_0195 para 21 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr Pattison
56. Mr Pattison 13 November page 156
57. FI_0114 para 26 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Pattison
58. FI_0114 para 27 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Pattison
59. 11 November page 164
60. FI_0114 para 27 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Pattison
61. CO_4109
62. FI_0114 paras 27-32 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Pattison ; CO_4110-CO_4114 - Excerpts from the Book of Regulations, Practice Manuals and Precognoscer's Handbook
63. Mr Pattison 13 November pages 167-168
64. CO_4109
65. Mr Grigg 29 September pages 14-15
66. Mr Wertheim 22 September page 34
67. MP_0008
68. Mrs Tierney 12 November pages 67-68
69. Mr Wertheim 22 September page 34
70. Champod C. and Chamberlain P. Fingerprints, in: Fraser J. and Williams R. (eds) Handbook of Forensic Science, Willan Publishing, 2009, page 69
71. Mr Chamberlain 18 November page 39 and Mr Pugh 24 November pages 33-34
72. Mr Grigg 29 September pages 13-15
73. MP_0008 pdf page 28
74. Miss Hall 24 November pages 65-66
75. Mr Geddes 26 June page 27 and also page 125
76. Mr McGinnies 4 November pages 78-79
77. Ashbaugh, D.R. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology, Boca Raton: CRC Press, 1999, page 101
78. Ashbaugh, D.R. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis, 1999, page 103
79. Ashbaugh, D.R. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis, 1999, page 103
80. Mr Zeelenberg 8 October page 18
81. Champod, C., Lennard, C., Margot, P and Stoilovic, M. Fingerprint and Other Ridge Skin Impressions. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2004, page 33
82. Professor Champod 25 November page 83, Stoney, D.A. What made us ever think we could individualize using statistics? Journal of the Forensic Science Society, 1991, 31(2): 197-199
83. Mr Padden 23 June pages 128-131
84. Mr Foley 24 June pages 25-26
85. Mr Geddes 26 June pages 23-25
86. Mr Geddes 26 June pages 24-25
87. Mr Geddes 26 June page 26
88. Mr Geddes 1 July page 40
89. e.g. Mr Geddes 26 June pages 26-27
90. US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (2006) Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case (Unclassified and Redacted) (US Department of Justice) URL:
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0601/final.pdf,
91. CO_4428 pdf pages 2-3 (letter from Mr Pattison dated 2 September 2009) and FI_0195 para 21 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Mr Pattison
92. Mrs Tierney 12 November page 51ff