Introduction
23.1. This chapter considers the substantive work of examiners at SCRO in 1997 by reference to analysis of marks, comparison, notes, ACE-V, verification, and resolving disagreements. These topics are also referred to in other chapters. The first part of the chapter is intended to serve as a general introduction to the evidence on the way in which SCRO carried out their fingerprint comparison work. It is followed by a discussion of some criticisms made of practices current in 1997.
General methodology
Initial analysis of the mark
23.2. Having checked the paperwork, the fingerprint examiner would assess the mark. He would consider many factors: donating article and development process, possible movement within the mark, distortion, overall shape and pattern, and digit determination.1
23.3. The examiner would identify problems with the mark, for example whether the image was 'reversed' (i.e. where ridges were white and gaps between ridges were black),2 or whether there were distortions (for example a mark on a plastic bag could be distorted), or obvious superimposition. He would check that the mark looked right for the surface it was said to be on, to make sure it had not been interfered with or transferred. He looked to see whether he could see a pattern, the delta and the core. He assessed whether the mark was good enough to allow comparison, the pattern of the ridges and from which finger it came.3
23.4. Mr Padden said that when assessing quality one would start by looking at the mark with the naked eye, to see what ridge characteristics might be present in the mark, what problem areas there might be and evidence of any factors that might explain differences. One would look at which areas were clear and unclear within the mark. Having done so the examiner would use a magnifying glass to look at the finer detail.4 Mr Foley said it was common practice on receiving a mark to look at it for quality and content using the naked eye, and then use a magnifying glass to examine minutiae.5 Mr Dunbar confirmed that officers were taught to look at the whole picture to assess the mark and then use the glass for the detail. Some officers went straight to a glass check but that could lead to a wrong assessment.6
23.5. Mr Stewart said that an examiner became good at assessing which digit and pattern a mark was and that cut down the comparison time.7 Mr MacPherson explained that, under the manual system, an examiner would have to assess which digit made the mark and search that against the two hand collection which was a mini version of the 300,000 persons kept on file. The examiner had one shot at it so he had to be pretty good at assessing which digit made the mark, whereas, under the AFR system, the examiner could put a mark in and search all ten digits against the national database. Even under the AFR system it helped if the examiner was positive that the mark was, for example, a left thumb as he could restrict the search of the national database to that digit.8
23.6. Mr Stewart described this initial assessment as a subjective process dependent on the expert's training and operational experience. SCRO made every effort to compare each mark they received.9 That said, the end of case letter recorded that in the Marion Ross case SCRO received a total of 428 marks. 235 were considered fragmentary and containing insufficient detail for comparison.10
Selection of characteristics
23.7. Mr Stewart explained that the next step with a mark that was suitable for comparison was to pick some characteristics in it to look for in a comparison print. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 28 under the heading of 'target groups'. Taking Mr Stewart as an example, he said that experience taught that there were common characteristics that occurred regularly in the cores of marks, and again around the delta of marks, so he would avoid those and try to pick another area where he could see three or four characteristics that would give a good starting point. Mr MacPherson spoke of finding a grouping of characteristics that caught the eye.11
Comparison of mark with prints - the technique used
23.8. Having obtained as much information as possible from the mark12 the examiner would then look at the mark with the print of the digit he wanted to compare. He would look on the fingerprint form to see if he could see the group of characteristics. If he could he would check they were in the correct sequence in relationship to one another then go back to the mark, see where the next characteristics were in relation to this starting point, then return to the form and build up the process from there.13
23.9. When comparing a mark the 'normal procedure' in Glasgow was to use a 'fingerprint glass' (also known as a 'linen glass' or 'linen tester' or 'magnifying glass').14
23.10. "As a norm" the examiners at SCRO were trained to use two fingerprint glasses simultaneously, one placed over the mark and the other placed over the relevant digit or piece of palm on the ten-print form.15
23.11. Mr MacPherson and Mr Stewart both did this, describing the process as taking in information through both eyes at the same time, one over the mark, one over the print. Mr MacPherson said "I would then be doing the comparison between the two in my head." He considered this to be the definitive test, as it showed marks and prints one to one and allowed direct comparison between the crime scene mark and the form simultaneously.16 More detail on this technique of "binocular comparison" is given in Chapter 28.
23.12. The examiner did not physically mark the characteristics on the mark. He would use 'dissecting needles' or pointers to keep note of the characteristic he was looking at, to follow a sequence from one characteristic to another on both the mark and the candidate print, to allow him to count intervening ridges.17
23.13. By way of example of another approach, Mrs Joanne Tierney, Fingerprint Unit Manager SPSA Edinburgh, who was trained in Northern Ireland,18 told the Inquiry that she used one eyeglass. This was slightly bigger than what she described as "the small square eyeglasses" and she would put the photograph of the mark and a print from the print form alongside one another under the glass at the same time and compare them through the one eyeglass. She did so by closing one eye and looking from one image to the other, always carrying information from the mark to the print and at the same time looking to see if there was anything in the print that disagreed with what was in the mark. This is how she was trained and how she would conduct a comparison today. At the time she trained, although there were computer systems, trainees worked in a manual capacity during the first part of their training, and built up their skills in assessing a mark without reference to a print.19
23.14. Mr Alex McGinnies, SPSA Training Officer, indicated that different people compare in different ways using different types of glasses and different numbers of glasses.20 He demonstrated the use of a fingerprint glass, which was black in colour, adjustable for eye relief, and locked with a wheel,21 and showed how SPSA trainees are instructed to place one glass over the mark and another over the print and go between the two. He indicated that after time, and with experience, examiners would work out which method of comparison was best for them. He said that as an area of the unknown mark is viewed, the brain stores that detail in memory. When the print is examined, the stored information is compared with the information from the unknown mark. He could not understand how Mr MacPherson and others could have been able to view two things simultaneously.22
Commentary
23.15. The Inquiry notes the technique described by the SCRO examiners which appears to differ from that advocated now. As Mr Ashbaugh has said "The identification process is synonymous with sight. Even though friction ridge prints are physical evidence, the comparison of this evidence is a mental process."23
23.16. In his book published in 1999, he wrote "When an area of the latent print is viewed, the brain stores in memory the data representing that area. Then, when an area of the exemplar print is examined, this new data is forwarded to the brain and compared with the stored data of the latent print. Seldom is there a situation where the brain can see the areas in the latent and exemplar prints at the same time, even when under the same fingerprint glass. A mental picture is always part of the comparison¿. Even though the latent print was viewed a fraction of a second before the exemplar print, as soon as the eyes leave the latent print the brain is depending on memory for the comparison."24 He also discussed how the brain has inherent abilities to assist us with recognising things with limited data, and how an expectancy of seeing something due to past knowledge or suggestion can cause errors to be made with recognition or identification. It was for reasons such as these that "A specific comparison sequence has been established within the friction ridge identification community. The latent print is always analyzed first, before comparison to the exemplar. The rule ensures an uncontaminated analysis of the unknown friction ridge detail. Comparisons conducted in this fashion ensure objectivity and prevent contamination through previous knowledge."25
23.17. The way in which the eyes and brain take in and use information was not a matter that the Inquiry investigated. It is clearly important that the fingerprint community keeps abreast of developments in the understanding of how the eyes receive and how the brain processes information, and considers what impacts these might have on practical techniques as well as on procedures.
The comparator machine
23.18. A comparator machine was available to SCRO examiners. The Inquiry heard (and was shown) that the photograph of a mark was placed on one side of the comparator and a known print on the other so that they were displayed, magnified, side by side.26 The points in sequence and agreement could be marked up on the glass screens. These had to be kept clean as with any enlargement there would be an element of distortion.27
23.19. There was no laid out practice for operating the comparator,28 and Mr Sheppard, the then Head of NTC fingerprint training, was not aware of any protocol as to how it should be used in a bureau. He described it as an ideal training tool, but he did not know how it was applied in bureaux.29
23.20. Mr Foley said that some officers would use the comparator more than others. He used it regularly as it gave a bigger image of the mark and enabled him to look at it from a fresh angle.30
23.21. Mr Stewart was "never a great fan of the comparator" but it might help him establish areas of movement or distortion in a mark because he could write all over the comparator and clean that off, which could not be done on the mark. He could trace ridge flow and shape and try and reach a decision as to where, if there were problem areas in a mark, the problems actually were.31
23.22. Mr Foley32 and Ms McBride both said that examination was carried out first by using a linen glass with the comparator machine being a secondary option. Ms McBride's view was that the correct way to approach a mark was to use a linen glass as the primary mechanism for viewing it. The comparator machine could be used to look at discrete parts of the mark. If a mark was unclear she would sometimes ask for a photographic enlargement as this was preferable to the comparator as it would sometimes obscure characteristics due to the lighting process. She would not "sign for" an identification unless she had used a linen glass to carry out the comparison.33
23.23. The comparator was also used as a means to discuss problem areas of a mark with other experts as the examiner could easily show them the area of interest. "We were always taught that it was good to seek other experts' advice."34 Mr Dunbar said he would not regard such discussions as counting as an additional check of the mark.35
23.24. Mr Dunbar said that no one should use a comparator as a means of comparison36 but some officers did admit that examiners involved in the process of verification did on occasion do just that. This is discussed in Chapter 28.
Notes
23.25. Experts would not mark up points of importance on a mark before looking at comparison prints and in general they did not keep notes of their analysis or comparisons.37 Mr Stewart explained that staff were not encouraged to take notes. When he started as an expert, staff did keep notes, but time and resource constraints meant the practice stopped.38
Photographic enlargements
23.26. In cases where the mark was unclear, fingerprint examiners would sometimes ask for a photographic enlargement of the mark to be produced39 or for the mark to be re-photographed.40
23.27. Mr Stewart said that in a difficult case it was standard at the time to get a photographic enlargement and mark it, and that would then form the basis of a discussion about the mark.41
ACE-V
23.28. On being asked about the procedure known as ACE-V (analysis, comparison, evaluation and verification), Mr MacPherson said that "ACE-V" was not in vogue at the time, but he did not think they were doing anything different.42 ACE-V was a way of verbalising the procedure when you looked at a mark. In the analysis process one would glean as much information as one could from the mark. "Evaluation" as a term came in as the bureau was moving towards the non-numeric standard but to him it described the initial stage of his assessment, it would be the first step.43 He called getting someone else to look at a mark at the stage now referred to as verification "peer review".44
23.29. Mr Stewart said that ACE-V was a modern label for a process that they had done more or less for years,45 and Mr Mackenzie that it was in line with the way he had always done it anyway.46
Verification
23.30. Findings in respect of marks had to be confirmed by other officers. The second person to view the mark, being the first checker, would check the insufficients, the negatives, the identifications and the eliminations in the case. Thereafter the third and fourth experts would check the identified marks.47
23.31. In a case such as the Marion Ross case, due to the number of marks involved, any identified marks would be fast-tracked to the verification stage as the primary importance in such a case would be to verify an identification and inform the investigation team of the result.48
The verifier
23.32. Mr MacPherson explained that who checked a mark depended on who was available.49 Mr Stewart said that a team handling the comparisons for a case would tend to get the next geographical team to do their verifications.50
23.33. At one time the chief inspector was the final signatory on an identification prior to it being communicated to the investigating officer in the case, but during the 1980s Mr MacPherson became the first civilian fingerprint officer to take on this role. There was basically a hierarchical way of checking identifications at that time i.e. the fourth and final check was carried out by a senior examiner. However, on a change of chief inspector the view was taken that each examiner was an expert in his or her own right so there was no need for a hierarchy and after that it might be a senior person doing the first analysis.
23.34. Mr MacPherson recognised that one of the conclusions of the Taylor report into the workings of SCRO was that junior experts could possibly be influenced by senior experts, if they were following on from their comparisons. Mr MacPherson was sceptical, and commented: "An anonymity based procedure was brought in to address this fallacy, but I believe that it has now been scrapped."51
Verification process adopted
23.35. Mr Dunbar said that "for an identification I would expect the process of comparison of a mark to be exactly the same for the first check as for the fourth checker."52 From the second checker onwards he would expect the comparison to involve binocular comparison with magnifying glasses.
23.36. Mr Stewart said that if he was not the first person to examine the mark against the prints it was essentially the same process except one did not do it against all ten fingers.53 If he was asked to look at an identification as part of the verification process he would usually remove the mark from the comparator screen and carry out his examination using glasses.54
23.37. However, Mr Foley said that sometimes the second, third or fourth examiners who were checking the identification might examine the mark only on the comparator screen;55 and Mr MacPherson confirmed that that occurred.56 Mr Foley did, though, add that if he had done a third or fourth check "from the comparator" he would look at that mark again when the case paperwork came around after the photograph had been initialled. This was to confirm that it was the mark that he had seen on the comparator and to satisfy himself that he could eliminate or identify the mark from what he could see under the glass.57
Knowledge of preceding examiner's findings
23.38. If an officer was "second checking" another officer's work for a volume crime case he would be aware of that officer's findings from the case envelope or diary, whereas in a special case he would know that he was doing a second check but frequently he did not know who had previously examined the mark.58 Of course, in those cases where examiners marked their initials on screen as the verification process proceeded59 each examiner would have known who the preceding examiners had been.
23.39. Because SCRO was always in a state of flux Mr MacPherson was unsure exactly what more would have been known to examiners in 1997. He preferred to rely on his evidence at the trial. In this, as quoted to the Inquiry, he indicated that SCRO practice was to pass on the mark and fingerprint form with the checker being told which digit the first examiner believed it was.60
23.40. Though Mr MacPherson was uncertain about practice in 1997 there is a consistency in evidence that supports the conclusion that at that time in some instances a verifier would know more than just the relevant digit identified by the preceding examiner.
23.41. Mr MacPherson said that sometimes when he had made an identification he would put the mark and form on to the comparator machine and mark up his points of comparison and ask someone else to look at it.61 More generally, he said that he would always leave a starting point, maybe two or three characteristics, on the screen for the next examiner, his justification being that the office was busy and this promoted efficiency:62 "if someone had spent an hour and a half looking for a piece of palm you had to give some indication as to a starting point."63 He disagreed with any suggestion that by leaving something on the screen one examiner was influencing another.
23.42. Mr Geddes said at that time markings might have been on the screen but it was incumbent on the individual to ensure that they could satisfy themselves.64 He would wipe the markings off65 but practice varied. Mr Stewart's practice was to take a quick look at the marking on the screen to give an indication of where points had been found before removing the material from the comparator machine and carrying out his examination at his desk.66 Mr Bruce said that officers asked other officers to look at things on comparators for their own opinion, with the original officer's marks and initials still on the screen. "The rule was that marks were supposed to be wiped clean before doing that, but sometimes that did not happen" and "at that time points were left on the screens and it was something of a practice."67
23.43. That was confirmed by Mr Foley who said that when verifying an identification: "the first time you would see it could be on the comparator¿.Normally you could find your colleague's findings marked on the screen in red pen to see what they could see, but would then wipe clean to start afresh and satisfy yourself that you could find 16 characteristics. It was a form of discussion between the experts."68 By that he meant literally that there could be a discussion between two examiners at the verification stage with one demonstrating to the other the 16 characteristics on which he relied in reaching his conclusion.69
Resolving disagreements about an identification
23.44. Mr Stewart's recollection was that in 1997 there was no written procedure. He considered that two broad scenarios arose:
(i) When one examiner considered that another examiner was wrong the matter would be taken to the head of bureau.
(ii) It was different where the two examiners were agreed as to the conclusion of identity but one could find 16 points and the other could not. The two examiners could discuss the matter and they might engage the assistance of a more senior examiner to resolve the difference. If one adhered to the view that 16 points were not present it was accepted practice for the mark to be taken to another examiner and, if four experts could agree, the mark "just progressed".70
23.45. The evidence of Mr Mackenzie, Mr Dunbar, Mr McKenna71 and Ms McBride was broadly to the same effect. Mr Dunbar's description of dispute resolution prior to the McKie case was that it was a matter for "open discussion".72 Mr Mackenzie said that it could be a case of "fine tuning, going through the mark and discussing to see if any differences of opinion could be resolved";73 and Ms McBride cited Y7 as an example of a case where one examiner (Mr MacPherson) was able to move on to other examiners when Mr Geddes took the view that 16 common points had not been demonstrated by Mr MacPherson.74
23.46. One incidental observation in this context by Mr Stewart merits further consideration. His recollection was that debates about the presence of 16 points between two examiners who were otherwise agreed as to identity were quite common and it is the explanation that he gave that is of interest:
"It would be reasonably common because your first examiner or your second examiner could be somebody who is just newly qualified as an expert and did not have the experience of the other examiner. It all comes down to interpretation. Your interpretation grows as you gain experience so there are areas that you would expect to have differences. I would not expect somebody who has just qualified to be able to identify a mark that someone who has got say ten years' experience ... there is a quantum leap. You are still learning as you are progressing."75
Criticisms made of practice in 1997
23.47. The fact that it was not uncommon for there to be differences of opinion as to the existence of the 16 common points required by the legal standard in 199776 leads in to a number of criticisms of the working methods in SCRO made by Mr Luckraft, a fingerprint examiner who joined SCRO in January 2000 from Grampian Police Identification Bureau (where he worked as a fingerprint/scene of crime officer) and who had worked prior to that in fingerprint bureaux in England.77 These included "a culture of being able to 'push' a comparison to 'tease' 16 points in agreement"78 and associated forms of peer pressure.
"Teasing out" points
23.48. "Teasing out" points was a phenomenon encountered by Evett and Williams:
"Probably because of the 16-points standard, a practice has grown in the UK service which we did not find in the other countries we visited. A fingerprint expert will generally reach an inner conviction about the correctness of an identification long before he has found 16 points. His subsequent activity will centre on establishing that features which are clearly visible in the print can also be seen in the poorer quality mark. The print is used as a guide for scrutinising the mark. This is called, in some quarters, 'teasing the points out'. This contrasts sharply with the practice in Holland, for example, where the expert must decide on all of the usable features that are present in the mark before comparing it with the print. Whereas we do not believe that the UK procedure entails risk, we do not consider it particularly good from a scientific viewpoint."79
23.49. Mr Luckraft said that the volume crime cases section (where junior officers would work) did not, at the time he worked there, make identifications with less than 16 points, and there was what he called a 'push for 16 points' culture in SCRO. He experienced what he called a degree of "peer pressure" which was directly related to this. Mr Luckraft's impression, based on conversations he had with trainees and on working with them, was that trainee fingerprint officers were made to feel inadequate if they could not see 16 points in comparison. He thought this was the area where there was probably the most peer pressure on junior fingerprint officers.80
23.50. Mr Dunbar gave evidence to the Inquiry in relation to this particular piece of evidence of Mr Luckraft. He stated that he was "at a loss" to understand what 'tease' actually meant. He had heard it described as 'if you have got 14 you have got 16', and said "No you do not. If you have got 14 you have got 14 so why would you tease it?" He also explained to the Inquiry that information on identifications with less than 16 points did leave the bureau.81
23.51. There was, nonetheless, confirmatory evidence of a working environment within SCRO consistent with a "push" to find 16 points.
23.52. There is the record from 1995 taken by Mr Dunbar of a meeting of the Q (short for 'Quality') circle which contained the following text: "Concern was shown by the group over the question of persons' names being taken over not signing an identification i.e. not seeing 16 characteristics when supervisors do. A. Dunbar informed the group that this would only happen if the same individual continually refused to sign impressions when others would." 82
23.53. Mr Dunbar's explanation was that the Quality Circles were started as a kind of precursor to quality assurance being formally recognised in the bureau, and were attended by a cross-section of staff. He took the note. To regard it as evidence of the potential for pressure to be put on examiners would be to misinterpret it. There had been a misconception among some members of staff that people were going to be noted any time they did not sign an identification. That was not the case but individuals who consistently did not find 16 points when supervisors did would be regarded as requiring further training.83
23.54. Even with that explanation it is clear that individuals who consistently did not find 16 points when supervisors did were to be regarded as requiring further training. It does not seem to have been regarded as conceivable that the error might be on the part of the individual or individuals who claimed to be able to find 16 points.84 It is also plain that the matter was one of concern to staff at the time, as it had been raised by them at the Q Circle meeting.
23.55. Mr Padden also described pressure being brought to bear on examiners who could not identify 16 points in sequence and agreement at the time when that was a requirement for presentation of the evidence in court. He spoke of "an eye rolled" or an "exasperated noise" because an identification had been "stopped" from "leaving the office".85 He said that one "would try everything [one] could to get to 16 points" but emphasised also the consciousness of an examiner that he might require one day to justify his view in court. Even fourth examiners did say "no."86
23.56. Witnesses were asked whether what could be considered as an arbitrary standard of 16 points might encourage examiners who were otherwise satisfied of their conclusion to seek to find additional points that were not readily or even properly discernible in order to meet the required standard.
23.57. Mr Stewart said it came down to the individual's interpretation of what they saw. Some experts would see more in a mark, some less. There was never any pressure or encouragement to "tease out" points. "Experts were always encouraged to be honest about what they saw."87
23.58. Ms McBride said that it was not a case of "teasing out" but rather of double-checking her work before passing it on and saying that she could not reach 16.88
23.59. It is apparent that examiners did not always adopt the positions of more senior colleagues as regards identifications. As an example, Mr Geddes adhered to his own opinion that he could see only ten points in sequence and agreement in Y7 despite the demonstration by Mr MacPherson of the 16 points that he observed.
Peer pressure
23.60. Evidence of peer pressure came from Mr Sheppard, based on his experience with trainee examiners who spoke of passing difficult marks to a more experienced officer.89
23.61. Mr Luckraft also gave evidence that there was a culture within SCRO of holding peers in very high esteem and that the view was that more years' service connoted a higher level of skill. He said that Mr MacPherson was viewed by other fingerprint officers within SCRO as a "brilliant, fantastic fingerprint expert who was not capable of making a mistake" and that the same view was taken of Mr Mackenzie.90 It was "very difficult indeed to stand up to and challenge the SCRO fingerprint bureau." His view was that this culture and 'peer pressure' could create a bias toward identifications. In his evidence to the Inquiry Mr Luckraft drew distinctions between SCRO and other fingerprint bureaux that he had worked in (for example, Manchester and Devon & Cornwall). His view was that at these other bureaux those working there were very good at their jobs but "they would hold their hands up if they made a mistake" and this was the difference between them and SCRO; they were not "arrogant" as SCRO were.91 He expressed the view that "just because you are a big bureau, [it] does not mean you are the best."92
23.62. The view that more years' service connoted a higher level of skill lies at the heart of Mr Stewart's explanation of the manner in which differences of opinion as to the presence of 16 common points were approached at SCRO in 1997.93
23.63. Mr Padden spoke of feeling that it was difficult for a junior officer to disagree with a senior officer where the senior had passed an identification to the junior for confirmation. In his view it was not good practice for very experienced fingerprint officers to pass an identification to a very junior or recently authorised fingerprint officer for confirmation. He stated: "In such cases, as the very junior officer, you can think 'who am I to doubt an experienced officer's work?'. There was no specific pressure, but I did feel sometimes that it was not conducive to independent conclusions. I know other officers shared that view and there was a general feeling that one or two people were not too happy if their identifications were not confirmed by others."94
23.64. He clarified in his oral evidence to the Inquiry that there were incidences where he did go to more senior officers in relation to identifications and say that he "did not quite see" something or ask for it to be explained. He said that there would be a certain amount of "unconscious pressure" in looking at an identification where the three preceding people looking at it were more senior officers and had all found 16 points. But people did question the identifications in such situations and he did know that the fourth person in such a situation had said no in certain cases.95
23.65. Mr Graeme Smillie, a fingerprint officer with SCRO since he joined as a trainee in 1979, did not ever feel he was put under any pressure to confirm a positive or negative identification as a second-checker. "I would like to think I am strong-willed enough not to succumb to any such pressure in any event."96 The earliest thing he could remember being told when he joined was that making a misidentification was the cardinal sin of fingerprints, and he could not think of any instance where he had heard of a colleague being pressured to confirm an identification.
23.66. Mr Smillie said that there were instances where one expert would present an identification with 16 characteristics and others could not satisfy themselves that there were 16 and they would refuse to sign to an identification. "On occasions where a person refused to sign up to the 16-point standard there might be a throw away comment by the first checker along the lines of 'oh, there is no point giving anything to you'." Depending on the personalities of the experts in question he might take such comments as either a throw away comment made in jest or with others, who were a bit more "bitter and twisted", there could be a bit of venom attached to the comment.97
23.67. Mr Bruce could not remember there ever being pressure put on checkers of a mark to confirm the findings of the first fingerprint officer,98 nor could Mr Foley.99 Mr Stewart said that if an expert felt under any form of pressure he or she could speak to a line manager; he himself had never felt under pressure to get a specific result.100 Ms McBride said that people would disagree about some marks with some vigour101 but she could not remember any serious disputes about the analysis of marks.102 She explained the background to one disagreement (in 2000) in her supplementary statement. She knew that some people might have been unhappy with the fact that she was disagreeing with the mark.103
23.68. Mr Dunbar commented on the views expressed by Mr Luckraft, challenging his use of the word 'culture'. He said that it was not unusual and indeed universal in bureaux throughout the UK, including the two bureaux Mr Luckraft worked in prior to SCRO, to find people who were held in high regard. "These people will have earned that on a day to day basis over years of giving feedback to others." It was a fact that examiners held certain of their peers with longer service in high esteem. "It is not just everybody with longevity in the job that is held in high esteem, it is earned."104
23.69. Mr Dunbar said that he was not aware of any 'peer pressure' to confirm the identifications of more senior officers.105 He emphasised that the approach taken by officers and taught at SCRO was that the decision was for the fingerprint officer irrespective of who had taken a prior decision. He suggested that some fingerprint comparisons were almost adversarial whereby the examiner would be trying to find something wrong, "so if you can eliminate that fact from your mind that there is nothing wrong then the decision is correct." The officer had to make the decision for himself. He would have to speak to it, and not, say, Mr MacPherson.106
23.70. Mr Bell said that he did not see the sort of peer pressure described by Mr Luckraft and others happening when he was Director of the Scottish Criminal Record Office. His understanding was that fingerprint officers were trained on the basis that they had to speak to what they saw. He was "quite confident" that if a fingerprint officer had a view, whether a junior or a trainer or whatever, then they would express that view. "The whole ethos was to give your view on what you found."107
23.71. The HMICS September 2000 report considered working practices within SCRO. The report observed that officers ought to be able to work independently and free from 'pressures' including 'internal' pressures such as "hierarchical pressures where a junior member of staff is verifying the work of a senior colleague."108
23.72. The points discussed in this chapter about criticisms of SCRO practice are picked up in Chapter 28.
1. FI_0008 para 7 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Padden
2. See Chapter 19
3. Mr Stewart 5 November pages 35-36, FI_0036 para 63 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart, and FI_0055 para 44 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
4. FI_0008 para 7 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Padden
5. FI_0051 para 5 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Foley
6. FI_0053 para 57 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Dunbar
7. Mr Stewart 5 November pages 35-36
8. Mr MacPherson 27 October pages 47-49
9. FI_0036 paras 48, 63 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart
10. SG_0383
11. Mr MacPherson 27 October pages 46-49
12. Mr MacPherson 27 October page 46
13. Mr Stewart 5 November page 36ff
14. Mr Stewart said that glasses which covered a larger area replaced linen glasses - FI_0036 para 54 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart. The term linen tester or glass derived from what was used to check the cloth quality in the linen trade. Linen glasses did not provide a huge degree of magnification. FI_0053 paras 79-80 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Dunbar. Mr McGinnies described linen testers as small square ones that fold out. Mr McGinnies 4 November page 16.
15. FI_0036 paras 51-53 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart, FI_0046 para 50 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie and FI_0053 para 80 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Dunbar
16. FI_0055 paras 45-46 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
17. FI_0046 para 52 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie and Mr Stewart 5 November pages 38-41
18. FI_0152 para 1 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mrs Tierney
19. Mrs Tierney 12 November pages 60-65
20. Mr McGinnies 4 November page 14
21. He said others were fixed position, and of a brass type.
22. Mr McGinnies 4 November pages 10-19
23. Ashbaugh D. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press, 1999, page 103
24. Ashbaugh D. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis, 1999, page 107
25. Ashbaugh D. Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis, 1999, page 108
26. FI_0046 para 108 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie
27. FI_0046 para 108 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie
28. Mr Geddes 26 June page 72
29. Mr Sheppard 8 July page 178
30. FI_0051 paras 9-11 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Foley
31. Mr Stewart 5 November pages 46-47
32. Mr Foley 23 June page 165
33. FI_0039 paras 21-22 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms McBride
34. FI_0036 para 55 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart
35. FI_0053 paras 84-85 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Dunbar
36. FI_0053 para 82 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Dunbar
37. Mr MacPherson 27 October page 54, Mr Stewart 5 November page 76, Mr McKenna 6 November page 33, FI_0046 para 92 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie, FI_0053 para 90 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Dunbar, FI_0031 para 67 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Geddes and FI_0039 para 82 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms McBride
38. FI_0036 para 141 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart
39. FI_0039 para 22 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms McBride
40. FI_0053 para 82 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Dunbar. See also Chapter 19
41. Mr Stewart 5 November page 16
42. See Chapter 28
43. Mr MacPherson 27 October pages 45, 64-65
44. Mr MacPherson 27 October page 66 - a description used by Ashbaugh, see Chapter 36 para 54.
45. Mr Stewart 5 November page 34ff
46. Mr Mackenzie 11 November page 102
47. FI_0046 paras 93-94 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie
48. FI_0031 para 42 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Geddes
49. FI_0055 para 55 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
50. Mr Stewart 5 November page 56
51. FI_0055 paras 14-18 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson
52. FI_0053 para 90 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Dunbar and FI_0046 para 98 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie, who agreed.
53. Mr Stewart 5 November page 42
54. FI_0036 para 56 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart
55. Mr Foley 23 June pages 163-169
56. Mr MacPherson 27 October pages 68-69
57. FI_0051 para 18 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Foley and Mr Foley 23 June page 163
58. FI_0036 paras 69-70 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart
59. See Chapter 6 para 43
60. Mr MacPherson 3 November page 101ff
61. FI_0055 para 55 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr MacPherson and Mr MacPherson 3 November pages 62-63
62. Mr MacPherson 27 October page 30ff, particularly at pages 36-37
63. Mr MacPherson 27 October page 69
64. Mr Geddes 26 June page 60
65. Mr Geddes 26 June page 68ff
66. Mr Stewart 5 November pages 43-44,173-174
67. FI_0015 para 6 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Bruce
68. FI_0051 paras 11-12 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Foley
69. Mr Foley 23 June pages 163-169
70. Mr Stewart 5 November pages 10-19
71. Mr McKenna 6 November page 5
72. FI_0053 paras 73-76 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Dunbar
73. FI_0046 paras 100-101 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Mackenzie
74. Ms McBride 6 November pages 88-89 and FI_0039 paras 30, 67-70 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms McBride
75. Mr Stewart 5 November pages 10-11 and FI_0036 para 120 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart
76. See Chapter 32
77. FI_0113 para 1 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Luckraft
78. FI_0113 para 9 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Luckraft
79. CO_1375 pages 26-27
80. Mr Luckraft 20 October pages 11-12 and 43 and FI_0113 para 2 and others Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Luckraft
81. Mr Dunbar 6 October page 126
82. DB_0554 - 24 March 1995
83. Mr Dunbar 6 October pages 109-118
84. Mr Dunbar 6 October pages 109-118
85. Mr Padden 23 June pages 81-82
86. Mr Padden 23 June page 86
87. Mr Stewart 5 November page 25
88. Ms McBride 6 November page 139
89. Mr Sheppard 8 July pages 174-175 and FI_0082 paras 71-72 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Sheppard - see Chapter 21 para 47
90. FI_0113 para 6 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Luckraft
91. Mr Luckraft 20 October page 13
92. Mr Luckraft 20 October page 12
93. See para 46 above
94. FI_0008 para 12 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Padden
95. Mr Padden 23 June pages 84-86
96. FI_0007 para 16 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Smillie
97. FI_0007 para 17 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Smillie
98. Mr Bruce 10 July page 35 and FI_0015 para 9 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Bruce
99. FI_0051 para 14 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Foley
100. FI_0036 para 75 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Stewart
101. FI_0040 para 86 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Ms McBride
102. FI_0039 para 70 Inquiry Witness Statement of Ms McBride
103. FI_0040 para 75 Inquiry Witness Statement (Supp.) of Ms McBride
104. Mr Dunbar 6 October pages 120-121
105. FI_0053 para 149 Inquiry Witness Statement of Mr Dunbar
106. Mr Dunbar 6 October page 122
107. Mr Bell 7 July page 10
108. SG_0375 para 8.15